Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

106. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, April 7, 1955—11 p.m.

4399. For Secretary from Collins.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Even before receiving your kind letter (Deptel 4330²) I had been considering writing you personally as to my estimate of President Diem’s chances of successfully remaining as President of Viet Nam. I have just filed a despatch (Embtel 4382³) giving General Ely’s final views on this point. You and the President are entitled to my judgment in light of this and other recent events.

As you know, I have been doing everything within my power to assist Diem in accordance with my original directive from the President and subsequent instructions from you and the Department. In various messages, and in my January report, I have indicated my growing doubts as to Diem’s capacity for leadership under the difficult and complex conditions existing in Viet Nam.

I must say now that my judgment is that Diem does not have the capacity to achieve the necessary unity of purpose and action from his people which is essential to prevent this country from falling under Communist control. I say this with great regret, but with firm conviction.

During the five months that I have been here I have come to admire Diem greatly in many ways. He has valuable spiritual qualities, is incorruptible, is a devoted Nationalist, has great tenacity. However, these very qualities, linked with his lack of practical political sense, his inability to compromise, his inherent incapacity to get along with other able men, and his tendency to be suspicious of the motives of anyone who disagrees with him, make him practically incapable of holding this government together. As I have often pointed out, he pays more attention to the advice of his brothers Luyen and Nhu than he does to General Ely or me. He has consistently failed to decentralize responsibility to his ministers, or to consult with them in advance of reaching important decisions. This has resulted in the resignation of the few able men in his Cabinet who were not “yes men”.

I agree with the appraisal of General Ely and of men like Dr. Quat, Do and Minh, that Diem will not succeed in getting any new men of ability to join even a reorganized government. Damaging as the above facts are, perhaps even more serious is the President’s apparent incapacity for creative thinking and planning. At no time since I have been here has he offered to me a single constructive thought of his own volition. All of the progressive programs which we have attributed to him have in fact been developed through the cooperative efforts of General Ely and me, and our staffs. I am still not sure whether Diem really grasps the full significance of these programs, or the great difficulties of implementing them. Instead of sticking to the clear but difficult road leading to the conversion of these paper plans into accomplished facts, Diem has been ever ready like Don Quixote to dash off on side excursions to tilt with windmills. And while bent on these excursions, whether they be to displace officers of the army whom he regarded as loyal to General Hinh, to take action against Soai or Ba Cut, or to relieve a police chief, he loses all sense of direction toward the essential goals, and it is almost impossible to bring him back to the high road. We have had many such tiltings.

In summary, despite his several fine qualities, it is my considered judgment that the man lacks the personal qualities of leadership and the executive ability successfully to head a government that must compete with the unity of purpose and efficiency of the Viet Minh under Ho Chi Minh.

In saying this I hasten to add that I do not believe that Diem is indispensable for the accomplishment of our purposes in Viet Nam, that is, to save the country from Communism. Programs which General Ely and I have developed are, I believe, sound and susceptible of accomplishment. But our successors here must have a President and a Cabinet to work with, which to some degree will talk our language and will stick steadfastly to the implementation of these programs.

I believe that Tran Van Do or Dr. Quat could form and successfully head such a government.

If our government should accept such a change, I would urge that we stipulate as a prior condition the removal, by President Diem with the complete support of Bao Dai, of the control of the National Police and Sûreté from the Binh Xuyen. You may feel that if this is done, Diem should be given further time to see whether he can broaden his government and speed up progress. I believe it would be better not to wait. By having saved a certain amount of face for Diem by the transfer of police powers from the Binh Xuyen we should then accede to the appointment of Do or Quat as President of the country.

I feel it better not further to lengthen this letter by outlining the successive steps which I would recommend be followed in order to constitute a new government and settle the short and long term problems of the sects. I shall be prepared to submit such recommendations promptly, if you so desire.⁴

I fully appreciate gravity of the recommendations I have made above. I need not tell you with what a heavy heart I file this message. However, it is by no means with a feeling of defeat for our objective here. I still feel that under proper native leadership, which can be had, the programs which we have initiated can still be made effective and can save Viet Nam from Communism.

Faithfully, Joe Collins

[

Collins

]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–755. Top Secret; Niact.
2. Document 96.
3. Supra.
4. See Document 108.