105. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Secretary of State1
4382. 1. Department deliver to Secretary 8 a.m. local time 7th.
2. Ely received me at 1100 7th with no French staff present. He wished to inform me without reservation of results of his reflections on present crisis. He said he had not yet informed his government of views he was about to express. Ely said our mission here is identical, to save Vietnam for free world and to bar Communist advance in Southeast Asia. He said he viewed this mission as one of exceptional importance and believed no future assignment he or I might have would carry graver responsibility, since we are the “key figures” in present situation.
3. Ely said he and I have been asked to save Vietnam, with Diem. He said he believes we have done everything possible, even if he for his part may have been maladroit at times. Thus far we had avoided civil war, which would mean loss of Vietnam. He continued saying Diem can no longer be saved except at cost of overcoming enormous difficulties, and if he is saved, we shall have spared for Vietnam the worst Prime Minister it ever had.
4. Ely believed Diem is entirely isolated save for his family and perhaps a dozen friends. Army has virtually abandoned him; intellectuals are against him; and the masses are not for him, but rather for whoever is willing exert effort to win and hold them. Diem’s prestige has dropped dangerously in provinces, and in army only two or three leaders are loyal to him.
5. The joint approach to Bao Dai which we had agreed to recommend to our governments might save Diem temporarily, but latter’s problems would [be] identical. Ely said that for a Nationalist, Diem is in extraordinary position of being supported only by Ely and myself and in consequence is more of a puppet than any of his predecessors. He said he felt deeply it was in interest of Vietnam and free world that Diem not be saved. He said on contrary Diem must be rapidly replaced since continued delay can only compromise future of Vietnam. Accordingly, he said, he and I must demonstrate to our governments it is impossible to continue longer on present course and our governments must now ask Bao Dai to remove Diem and name a successor.
[Page 216]6. Ely went on to say that in his opinion Vietnam can still be saved, and cited these favorable factors:
- a.
- Viet Minh are not as active in Vietnam as one might have feared.
- b.
- Economic situation is relatively good, as compared with north.
- c.
- Population is still relatively neutral and can yet be taken in hand.
- d.
- Army contains good raw material that can be whipped into respectable shape in next few months by TRIM.
- e.
- The government has in its files excellent plans and reforms, worked out by us, which can be implemented by a new and more efficient government.
7. Ely said these favorable elements were reinforced by absolute obligation which French and US have towards refugees, whom they have rescued from north.
8. Ely said he would not pretend Diem’s record was all bad, and would hope Diem might be included in a future Cabinet. To Diem’s credit, Ely cited relative calm which was maintained after Geneva, services rendered to refugees, and social plans which have been adopted under Prime Minister’s direction. However, he continued, another man is urgently required to carry out major programs and prepare for elections. We should not, he said, say Diem experiment had been a mistake, but rather that his time is now past and choice of a new man is imperative.
9. Ely said importance he attached to his and my collaboration was such that he had informed me of his conclusions before speaking of them even to his closest associates. He added that day before yesterday he had believed we must continue to support Diem but that today, April 7, after a full day of “soul searching” from all angles, he was forced to conclude that in order to save Vietnam for free world, Diem must be replaced. He said he realized I would need time to consider his remarks and did not ask for an answer at once.
10. I told Ely I appreciated his sincerity, frankness with which he had spoken, and gravity of his views. I asked if I was to take these views as final. He said that I was so to take them and that they had been arrived at in full consciousness of his civil and military responsibilities. He said he had gathered as much information as he could and had considered problem entirely independently. I said if action was taken along lines he proposed, the first question to consider would be possible successors. Ely replied he was prepared to accept anyone but Diem, provided new appointee did not mark return to colonialism. He said he had made no specific inquiry of his staff but that he could cite following as possible successors: Quat, Foreign Minister Do, Minister for Plan Thoai, and former Defense Minister Minh. I did not discuss this list with Ely, who offered it only by way [Page 217] of example, but did say that my information indicated there might be widespread opposition to Quat as northerner, Dai Viet and persona non grata to sects. Ely replied he did not take these objections to Quat very seriously and said everything possible should be done to prevent change of administration from appearing as victory for sects. I said to Ely I believed it would be very difficult to prevent any other interpretation by press and public.
11. I told Ely I would have to have time to consider his statement but that I believed I could say Washington might not be willing to give any consideration to replacement of Diem until after French-US had brought maximum pressure on Bao Dai to back Diem fully in relieving Binh Xuyen completely of police and sûreté controls. I said in any case this must be done. Ely said he agreed Binh Xuyen could not be allowed continue control police, but he felt this change must be made within framework of a new and general solution. As for our bringing pressure on Bao Dai and Bao Dai’s bringing pressure on Binh Xuyen, it was quite possible that sects might be unresponsive to Bao Dai and might go underground, possibly even with tacit concurrence of Bao Dai. Ely commented once more on the anomaly of Bao Dai’s being 12,000 kilometers from scene of action and endowed with authority which he can assert without risk to himself. He added hastily however he did not favor Bao Dai’s return to Vietnam. Ely went on to say he agreed with me that if government were changed, police control should be changed within overall new framework.
12. I told Ely I would have to report his views to Department but would restrict dissemination of them here. He said he would, of course, report to his own government at once, similarly restricting distribution.
13. I said to Ely I could not at once tell him whether I agreed with his position or not. I was inclined to feel we had not gone far enough in our support of Diem to render such a change acceptable now. Ely said he was certain that we stand on the verge of a grave crisis. He feels uneasy movements of all sorts throughout Vietnam, Communist or “Progressive” inspired.
14. I remarked that if change in government were made that would not get at root of sect problem, and any new Chief would have same difficulties. I analyzed present crisis as arising from fact French had stopped aiding sect suppliers, by agreement with US, and from Diem’s and our steps to create a single army, and various reforms which threaten sect position and privileges. I added that unless we could agree on solution to sect problem, we would do no more than preserve intact for any new Prime Minister same problems which have beset Diem. Ely agreed sect problem must be solved but said it was more vast than my analysis indicated. At present it has [Page 218] reached state in which personal animosity between Diem and sect leaders is such that no compromise between them is possible.
15. I said I believed we had discussed this matter enough for time being. I agreed Diem is exceedingly difficult for everyone to do business with. I said I was not sure a change would solve our problem. In any case, if there is change of government, there must be firm agreement between France and US, with agreement of Bao Dai, enforced if necessary, that our various programs will be completely supported. I suggested Ely quickly complete his study of our current proposal for treating sect problem (Embassy telegram 43732) and that we discuss it later in day. He agreed meet with me at 1730.
16. I asked Ely if he thought Quat or Do or another would accept office of Prime Minister. He said he had no doubt of it. While nearly everyone is reluctant to serve under Diem, there is no problem about finding people willing to take over top job. I said I was sure Diem would not remain in any future Cabinet but would probably withdraw to write a White Paper attacking France and US. Ely said he thought best solution for Diem would be some kind of “mystic mission” to deal with Vietnamese refugee problem, which is a world problem, at a world level.
17. My personal comments and recommendations will follow, after some further reflection, in special message to Secretary.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–755. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated for information niact to Paris for Dillon and Achilles. In a memorandum from Dulles to Eisenhower, attached to the source text, the Secretary suggested that the President read this cable as well as telegram 4399 from Saigon, infra.↩
- As reported in telegram 4373, April 6, the Franco-American working group proposed that Diem make a declaration outlining the following plan: integration into the National Army of 10,600 and demobilization of 6,000 Cao Dai, integration of 7,300 and demobilization of 7,200 Hoa Hao, and integration of 1,500 and demobilization of 4,000 Binh Xuyen; employment of integrated sect troops for security purposes in their territories of influence; and assistance for demobilized sect troops on the same terms as men released from the National Army. (Ibid., 751G.00/4–655)↩
- Infra.↩