Office of the Historian

795.00/11–2354: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea1

secret
Washington, November 25, 1954—3:52 p.m.

351. Seoul’s 608 sent Tokyo 421.2 Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Secretary away from city until November 30.3 Assure President Rhee your report your conversation with him will be brought his attention immediately upon his return. Also tell him as much of following as you think useful.

Since conversations Washington we have worked hard find solution NNSC problem which we like Koreans regard as serious. It not easy [Page 1927] solve without putting us at great propaganda disadvantage. Meantime as General Hull has explained he has taken measures we assured Rhee last summer would be taken limit activities Polish and Cezch members Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in ROK. Their potential as espionage agents we believe has thus been eliminated.

At present as Korean Embassy Washington informed we making confidential approach to Swiss and Swedes. The sixteen nations who fought in Korea have all agreed French, UK and US should approach Swiss and Swedes to determine their reaction to suggestion (1) they inform MAC that due Polish and Czech attitude they cannot carry out their specific terms reference and therefore request MAC work out more satisfactory arrangements and (2) they withdrawing their personnel from inspection teams to Demilitarized Zone until two commands can work out more satisfactory arrangements. Once Swiss and Swedish members inspection teams leave ROK there will be no legal basis on which Poles and Czechs could claim right remain within ROK and we would then have no objection if UNC took action to remove them forcibly if necessary.

General Won’s ultimatum of November 22 to Polish and Czech members inspection teams gives us concern.4 Appreciate way Korean people feel about Communists in their territory. Nevertheless hope there will be no further statements this sort at this time5 nor any publicity of any kind given our approach to Swiss and Swedes. Either action might seriously prejudice possibilities persuading Swiss and Swedes to withdraw since they would be most reluctant do so if there is any public appearance pressure.

Saltzman6
  1. This telegram, drafted by Jones and cleared by McClurkin, was repeated to Tokyo as 1076.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. Dulles was vacationing on Duck Island, Nov. 24–28.↩
  4. Transmitted in telegram 602, Nov. 22, not printed. (795.00/11–2254)↩

  5. In telegram 620 from Seoul, Nov. 26, the Embassy reported as follows:

    “Despite comments by General Hull and me to President Rhee re undesirability public announcement on NNSC (Embassy telegram 608), OPI Director Karl yesterday issued statement on subject. Full text transmitted TWX dated 260250Z. OPI statement declared that Hull and I gave Rhee assurances ‘NNSC issue will be settled very shortly to Korea’s complete satisfaction’. This is, of course, distortion our comments to President but is obviously used as face-saving device for removing one week time limit for departure NNSC set by Provost Marshal General in his letter to Czech and Polish delegation heads (Embassy telegram 602 repeated Tokyo 415).” (795.00/11–2654)

    ↩
  6. Charles E. Saltzman, Under Secretary of State for Administration.↩