320/12–154
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key) to the Secretary of State1
Subject:
- Korean Question in the UN General Assembly.
Discussion
There are attached alternative draft resolutions on Korea. The first (Tab A),2 which the British believe India will agree to sponsor, makes only preambular references to the report on the Geneva Conference and to the UN objectives in Korea, and the sole substantive operative paragraph expresses the hope “that progress in respect of the settlement of the Korean question will be made,” with no reference to UN objectives. This text, which was undesirably weak when the British first showed it to us, has been weakened even more in the British effort to obtain Indian sponsorship. The second (Tab B)3 which our delegation worked out with the British, includes as operative paragraphs: (1) approval of the allies report on Geneva (which means endorsement of the position on which we broke off negotiations at Geneva); (2) reaffirmation of the UN objectives in Korea; and (3) an expression of hope that it will soon prove possible to make progress toward these objectives.
We strongly prefer and believe we must continue to support the second draft, as our Delegation is currently instructed to do. It endorses the allied position at Geneva and reaffirms the UN objectives. For the Assembly to do otherwise would be interpreted as a weakening of our position on Korea and as somewhat of a repudiation of the allied stand at Geneva. Moreover, we would be very reluctant to support any resolution sponsored by Menon and see no reason why it is necessary for India to sponsor any Korean resolution. The Republic of Korea shares our views.
On the other hand, the British are committed to support the first draft, provided India sponsors it, and Ambassador Wadsworth reports that some of the other allied participants at Geneva, who no longer fully subscribe to the allied position, prefer it. The only concession that would be made to the United States would be advance agreement on submission of an amendment whereby the first preambular paragraph [Page 1929] would read “Noting with approval” the report on Geneva. India would abstain on this amendment.
The British believe that there are substantial advantages in an Indian initiative on Korea. In view of their commitment, they argue, as Ambassador Makins told you yesterday, that it is better for the United States to go along, making clear in its statement its views on the continuing basis for a Korean settlement, than to expose serious differences among the allies by insisting upon amendments or submitting a separate proposal which they and others would be obliged to oppose publicly. In these circumstances, if we continue to insist upon the alternative draft, or upon submitting amendments, Ambassador Wadsworth believes we risk a public split with the British and others among our Korean allies. However, if we remain firm, this may not materialize.
Recommendation
That if you are approached by the Delegation on this point you reaffirm its present instructions not to accept the weaker draft resolution.4
- This memorandum was drafted by Elizabeth Brown and cleared with Robertson, Murphy, and Merchant (in substance).↩
- The alternative draft resolution, attached as Tab A is not here printed. With the exception of the additional paragraph, “Decides that it would be inopportune to make further recommendations regarding the Korean question at this stage,” it was virtually the same as the draft Indian resolution of Dec. 2, UN document A/C.1/L.118.↩
- Tab B, which is not here printed, was adopted by the UN General Assembly on Dec. 11 as Resolution 811 (IX).↩
- A marginal note initialed by O’Connor read as follows: “Sec[retary] directed me to tell Wadsworth to stand firm.”↩