795.00/11–2354: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
608. Repeated information Tokyo 421. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. CG AFFE/Army Eight and CAG. Joint message to State and Defense from Briggs and Hull.
General Hull and I spent over 1 hour with President Rhee this afternoon over problem created by Provost Marshal General.
Announcement yesterday that he has requested Czech and Polish members NNSC “to leave Korea peacefully” (Embtel 6021 repeated Tokyo 415). After covering much familiar ground, including points made by Rhee that continued presence “Communist spies” in ROK is intolerable and that action now imperative, and by Hull reiterating his responsibilities pursuant to armistice and his intention fulfill them, Rhee finally asked if I would send personal message from him to Secretary Dulles in following sense:
Recalling his conversation with Secretary in Washington last July and fact that Poles and Czechs still here, Secretary be informed that Rhee cannot wait longer than “another week or ten days” for allied action to solve problem at end of which Rhee himself proposes take action.
I told Rhee that message of that character, which is in essence an ultimatum, would not be favorably received in Washington where Secretary has in fact been bending every effort toward solution desired by Rhee, namely removal Poles and Czechs from ROK territory. To take action threatened by Rhee would alienate friends of Korea among other nations and would certainly not be understood in Washington with ink still damp on agreed minute which sets forth basis for largest aid program authorized by Government. Accordingly I proposed to Rhee to send message saying instead that Rhee would welcome further assurance from Secretary Dulles, with reference to their conversation last July, informing Rhee of progress made to date plus any additional information available concerning developments in our negotiations with other 14 countries plus Swiss and Swedes.
Rhee gave grumbling and unhappy assent, and then asked whether he could make public statement that Secetary Dulles preparing force Czechs and Poles out of ROK within few days. Hull and I immediately pointed out unproductive effect of such announcement and urged that [Page 1926] nothing further be said or done by ROK until time comes for us to act together and in agreement. During course of discussion General Hull once more described in sympathtic but firm terms background of present situation including his responsibilities pursuant to armistice. He denied Communist members NNITs can, under existing situation, engage in espionage or carry on any activities beyond those strictly permitted by armistice. In performance those duties, however, Hull made clear he intends continue afford necessary protection. Rhee’s argument, many times repeated, was that US now infected by appeasement and belief co-existence possible, therefore US unconcerned by presence of Communists in ROK whereas this is “matter of life and death for Korea”.
Admiral Sohn, who was present during meeting, informed us privately he had had no advance notice of yesterday’s action by Provost Marshal Won Yung-Duk. He also indicated, as demonstrated by our conversation with Rhee, that Provost Marshal action under Rhee’s personal orders. Sohn also intimated to us that President may again be raising subject because he recognizes loss prestige over lengthy argument concerning agreed minute and feels necessary reassert himself and show independence.
By way of comment on conversation with Rhee, Hull and I are of opinion that unilateral action against Communist members NNSC somewhat unlikely during next few days. However it is also our belief that unless Rhee convinced progress being made along lines Washington negotiations it will be more and more difficult to keep him in line. Once again we are facing highly emotional issue with Rhee and one in which he is convinced right on his side.
- Not printed. (795.00/11–2254)↩