Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/11–854: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

top secret

Washington, November 8, 1954—6:38 p.m.

316. State–Defense message. Reference C 69958.²

1. State has recently approached UK and France with suggestion Sixteen make concerted approach Swiss and Swedes suggesting they announce to MAC that because of inability carry out their responsibilities in north they withdrawing their personnel from NNSC inspection teams in both north and south Korea to DZ until convinced of Communist willingness cooperate. Hope was this approach more persuasive in view its concerted nature plus fact withdrawal Swiss and Swedes would be only to DZ rather than complete.

2. Meantime Canadians proposed UNC attempt negotiate with Communist command a strengthened NNSC. Canadians believe negotiations should have limit of 6 months.

3. State made clear to French and British Canadian proposal completely unacceptable in view urgency elimination Czechs and Poles from ROK. French then proposed compromise position which UK strongly supports. Compromise was that Sixteen make concerted approach Swiss and Swedes suggesting Swiss and Swedes announce presumably to MAC that: (a) the terms of NNSC and manner in which they are being implemented inadequate permit effective supervision and thus change in these terms should be negotiated by military commands; and (b) in view this situation they withdrawing their personnel from teams in north and south to DZ until satisfactory arrangements for more effective supervision have been negotiated by two military commands. Propositions (a) and (b) constitute package proposal to be carried out simultaneously and thus would solve immediate problem Czechs and Poles in ROK who would be ejected if necessary on grounds no team can exist without equal number neutrals both sides. We would impose time limit not more than 3 months on negotiations.

4. Recognize negotiation probably fruitless but French proposal easier for Swiss and Swedes and our Allies accept and has better chance gain our immediate objective. Realize difficulties involved in conduct negotiations even for limited period. Presumably in negotiations our proposals could include propositions which Communists would find unacceptable but which would not appear unreasonable to our Allies. Might consider for example negotiating change in composition since composition our fundamental criticism present Commission. In proposing changes composition would reject Indians as fifth member on grounds their involvement Indochina commissions and on same grounds suggest Communist nominate replacement for Poles. Argument would be situation two areas somewhat different and unfortunate to have members with responsibilities both Commissions and thus with tendencies use precedent one situation as basis decision other situation.

5. Request comments specific proposal of French and views as to feasibility limited negotiations and detailed changes UNC might propose in such negotiations. Note in this connection comments on Jodahl³ suggestion reftel.

Dulles

1. This telegram, drafted by Jones and cleared by McClurkin and Sullivan of the Department of Defense (in draft), was repeated to Tokyo as telegram 965 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.
2. Dated Oct. 18, not printed.
3. The retiring head of the Swedish NNSC contingent.