Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

FE files, lot. 55 D 480, “Korean Black Book, November 1954”: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Hull) to the Chief of Staff United States Army (Ridgway)¹

top secret
priority

Tokyo, November 8, 1954—8:37 p.m.

C 70208. Exclusive for Ridgway. While Pres Rhee’s final posit on draft min of understanding and other iss before US and ROK Govt is still in doubt, there is sufficient likelihood that agreement will not be reached, that urgent consideration ought to be given by highest levels US Govt to what course we should then fol. It is the conviction of rep of all US agencies having resp in Korea that if Rhee does not cooperate in resolving sat the iss presently in dispute, such as the draft min and the dol hwan controversy, and persists in unfriendly acts toward the US, we must be prep to consider other courses of action. It is therefore evident that the resp US auth need an integrated plan embracing political, econ and mil meas to cope with Pres Rhee’s cont resistance to cooperate with US plcy in Korea. This msg undertakes to outline such a plan for urgent consideration and concurrence at Wash level.

The overall obj of this plan is to induce Rhee to cooperate with US plcy. Failing this, the US must consider what dev may result from this situation, incl Rhee’s possible reply by elm more fav to the US and decide its course of action in such eventualities.

The plan consists of 4 series of actions increasing severity designed to dev mounting pressures upon the Rhee Govt.

• Series 1. The following steps will be taken if Rhee does not cooperate with the US, for example if he does not agree to draft min fol Wash reply to his req of Oct 29.² Rhee should thereupon be informed of the substance of (a) below. He should also be told that these steps are the consequences of his refusal to cooperate with the US in its plcy of political, econ and mil supp for Korea, and that they do not in any way indc lessening of interest on the part of the US in Korea and its people and the attainment of their legitimate obj.

  (a) Wash would announce:

  (1) Except for certain spec commodities which it is deter essential to cont sup in order to safeguard ROK econ and US aid program against irreparable losses, reduce all outstanding proc auth to amt rep by contr already made and iss no new proc auth. The effect of this action would be to initiate substantial reduction in rate of pdn and consumption, while preventing sudden and catastrophic setback of the econ. For example, POL should be prov after settlement of hwan dwg iss to the min extent nec to mt essential trans and lub, but not for civ heating.

  (2) Slow down of mil program, incl cessation of any expansion beyond presently auth levels.

  (3) Cont and expansion of present efforts to acquire hwan for US forces needs until ROK lives up to existing agreements or concludes acpt new one.

  (4) Wash is rev all plans relating to Korea.

• Series 2.

  The actions under Series 2 should be considered if Rhee takes action of the fol sort:

  (1) Cont build up of anti American sentiment and vilification of US plcy.

  (2) Cont to reject the min of understanding.

  (3) Cont to withhold hwan.

  (4) Enforces an unrealistic exch rate to the detriment of the aid program.

  (5) Uses violence against Neutral Nations Insp Teams.

  (6) Withdraws ROK forces from UNC opr con.

  This list is merely illustrative of some of the actions the US might be reqr to counter either singly or in comb. It is not intended that any one of these actions would auto release the steps contempleted below, but the situation should be reexam for this purpose in light of such actions as Rhee may take.

  (a) Wash would announce:

  (1) In view of Rhee’s attitude, the US will reduce its relations with Rhee Govt to min rqr for maint of formal diplomatic relations;

  (2) Susp of all econ aid which is in the phase prior to conclusion of contr;

  (3) The US is considering the redeployment of remaining US forces in Korea and will discuss withdrawal of other UN units with the respective Govt;

  (4) The US will cont mil aid only on min basis consistent with US interests. This does not signify lessening of US interest in the scty of Korea and its people, as the Joint Declaration of Sixteen and the US ROK Mutual Def Treaty (if ratifications exch) remain in eff.

  (b) Contacts with Rhee political opponents (incl where desirable, selected mbr of present Govt and Liberal Party) will be established by US ofl in Korea. These political leaders, as well as selected ROKA commanders, will be kept fully informed regarding the situation, and particularly regarding US plcy and actions and reasons therefor.

• Series 3. If the Rhee Govt does not give its full cooperation as result of foregoing meas, the fol add steps should be considered:

  (a) Wash would announce:

  (1) To fullest extent possible, all aid fin contr will be term and aid shipmt on the high seas will be diverted. Econ Coord and his staff will be withdrawn. All KCAC actys, except the dir rel of phys emerg, will be susp. All prev offers and proposals of aid will be voided.

  (2) The US and UN intends to withdraw all forces from Korea except KMAG.

  (3) The reiteration of cont US interest in Korea’s scty as exp in Series 2 Para (a)(4) above.

  (b) Withdrawal of residual forces will take place immed fol KCOMZ roll up, prov political situation has not changed in the meantime.

  (c) Contacts with Korean political and mil leaders will be increased and to the extent deemed appropriate they may be informed that Rhee’s continued refusal to cooperate with US may rqr reexam of US attitude toward Rhee Govt, incl consideration of possible altn situations which might be brought about by Koreans themselves; that the US could only consider supp leaders who rep broad segment of political opinion in Korea, have the supp and cooperation of ROKA, and can dmst their ability to cooperate together and with US; and that US would consider prov political asylum in US mil instl on an indiv basis to extent US auth are sat that it is essential and wrnt by circumstances.

• Series 4. Assuming that Rhee cont intransigent and that successful move on part of Koreans to repl his Govt has not taken place, the last action remaining to US would be withdrawal of KMAG. In view of valuable mil eqp in hands of ROK, it will never be desirable step to withdraw our advisors as long as their posit is marginally tenable. This action should therefore be considered as last resort.

  General comments. It is conceivable that at any time Rhee may take some action so offensive to US interest that telescoping of these series might be rqr. On the other hand, Rhee may take occasional meas to placate US momentarily, such as renewal of sale of hwan. While US actions should be adjusted to recog adequately such fav meas, we should not be beguiled into relaxing pressure on Rhee Govt until it has clearly shown its intention to cooperate as loyal ally.

  Recm. It is recm that:

  (a) The concept of scaled application of pressures to induce Rhee to cooperate be appr.

  (b) Action in Series 1 be appr for immed planning by appropriate US auth and for impl if Rhee refuses to acpt the draft min of understanding when Wash reply to his req of Oct 29 has been comm to him.

  (c) The appropriate US auth be dir to dev supp plans to permit impl of Series 2, 3 and 4, with understanding that these series of meas would only be undertaken fol subs recm.

1. This telegram, which was passed by the Department of the Army to the Department of State and FOA, was also from Briggs and Wood and copies were provided them and Taylor for their exclusive information.
2. Reference was to telegram 509, p. 1907.