Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795B.00/10–2954: Telegram

¹

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

secret

Seoul, October 29, 1954—9 p.m.

509. Repeated information Tokyo 343. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. Reference Embtel 503 repeated Tokyo 338 October 28.²

Letter quoted reference telegram delivered President Rhee this morning. Prime Minister Pyun, Admiral Sohn and Counselor Strom likewise present. President received letter and supplementary oral observations³ concerning two memoranda with equanimity, but gave little indication either then or in course of meeting lasting nearly three hours of action which he may eventually take re minute of understanding.

1. With regard to letter and minute Rhee made lengthy discursive statement along familiar lines, with emphasis on unification issue and inability Korea remain indefinitely “half slave and half free.” He made, however, two requests both with regard unification. He asked whether US Government would agree either delete all references to unification from minute (which would presumably result in suppression Korean commitment point one and US commitment point five) or else have US point five read “support unification of Korea” with deletion following phrase “by all peaceful means.” When he insisted that this be conveyed to Washington as ROK request I agreed but pointed out that as set forth in letter, American position on substantive points in minute is firm, and since my government unquestionably regards unification as substantive, answer bound to be negative. Discussion of letter and minute concluded by statement by Rhee at end of meeting that US Government views would be studied immediately by him and his advisors.

Only reference to hwan drawing and exchange rate controversy also came at end of talk when President expressed optimism concerning prospects of solution to which I replied that solution was inherent in minute as submitted by US, if accepted by ROK.

Balance of conversation had to do principally with economic coordinator Wood and ROK relations with Japan.

2. Regarding Wood I declared after presenting letter (and repeated in substance several times thereafter) that he enjoys full confidence US Government, is true friend of Korea, US considers his knowledge and ability have been of mutual benefit to both ROK and US, and that his removal would be viewed by US as matter of utmost gravity affecting fundamentally trust and confidence without which aid program cannot succeed. Rhee replied with long harangue alleging inter alia Wood “unfriendly” and had dragged feet on economic program especially last year by failure comply President Eisenhower’s alleged directive to allocate first 200 million dollars by December 31, 1953. I told President that sum mentioned had been for fiscal year ending June 30 rather than for allocation during first half year, that Wood’s authority from Washington did not include allocation in absence basic agreement concerning use of funds except that Wood had been able obtain 50 million dollars for immediate allocation last year, and that he had used that amount pending agreement last December on terms of reference.

I also informed President that in precisely same way in which ROK Government is preventing use of this year’s funds by failure accept minute, ROK was responsible for delay last year in developing program. I said there is no more reason blame Wood for last year’s delays, which were attributable to ROK Government, than there would be to blame Wood concerning present situation which results from failure thus far ROK Government accept minute of understanding.

President received these observations tranquilly, if unenthusiastically, and he did not press points further or specifically declare Wood persona non grata. Whether Rhee pays attention is another matter. (In this connection I hear Rhee last night gave interview to Scripps-Howard correspondent Lucam, who reportedly described President as “near considering Wood PNG”.)

3. Relations with Japan. On this subject Rhee consumed much time but covered little new territory. Since my primary object today was promote consideration minute I intended limited observations to informing President that as stated many times before US desirous of facilitating solution, and that our willingness extend offices still stands. Rhee however embarked on interminable attack, substance of which was that unless American Government is pro-Japanese US should obtain Japanese agreement to points in controversy, especially renunciation claims, as conditions precedent resumption negotiations. I produced memorandum submitted by Rhee October 22 (Embtel 476⁴ that date) whereupon Rhee sought disclaim knowledge thereof asking how he could be expected “remember all these details”. When I asked whether 280 million dollars demanded from Japan according to memorandum as part of price for renewing negotiations was a detail, Rhee sought give impression never saw memorandum before and instructed Sohn “find out what this is all about”.

(We thus face Alice in Wonderland situation in which Prime Minister Pyun last Monday said memorandum prepared in President’s office without Pyun’s knowledge, and President today says he himself unaware contents. As if all this were insufficient I this afternoon received letter from Pyun dated today in which he gives me following, described as supplementary clarification re item 7 of ROK memorandum: “During Japanese war against US, Japan took gold reserve away from Korea. If Japan cannot return this gold reserve 280 million dollars allocated as US economic aid may be used toward replacement of gold reserve.” If I correctly understand this project, US is being called on to give Japan 280 million dollars now earmarked for Korean economic aid, which Japan transfers to Korea in settlement gold reserve account, which Korea will thereupon use with no strings attached).

4. NNSC. This subject again raised by Rhee in complaint almost identical with that expressed October 22 meeting, see Hull’s CINCFE C 70040 October 24.⁵ I repeated what Hull said last week.

5. During meeting Rhee made several statements along line “if US won’t cooperate I shall be forced to work out unification with Communists” (Please see Embtel 362 repeated Tokyo 237 September 27⁶).

Recommendations follow.

Briggs

1. The following file number was also printed on the source text: 611.95B/10–2954.
2. Supra.

3. Enclosed in a letter from Briggs to McClurkin, Nov. 3, was a memorandum, entitled “Supplementing Embtel 509 from Seoul, dated October 29, 1954,” which read as follows:

   “On delivering to President Rhee the letter referred to in Embtel 509, I likewise made the oral observation concerning the second ROK memorandum, pursuant to the instructions contained in Deptel 295 of October 26.

   “With reference to this second memorandum I informed President Rhee that the majority of the allegations contained therein relative to the economic aid program had already been considered by my Government, that it did not seem necessary therefore for that document to be considered further between him and me, but that should the ROK Government so desire, Mr. Wood would be pleased to consider them through CEB channels. The President made no comment.” (611.95B/11–354)

4. Ante, p. 1902.
5. In this telegram, Hull reported that Rhee had stated on Oct. 22 that the presence of the NNSC in South Korea was intolerable and that he proposed to have the ROK police arrest them and escort them back to the DMZ where they would be freed. Hull cautioned patience and reminded Rhee that the UNC was obligated by the armistice to protect the NNSC and this Hull intended to do. Hull strongly recommended that action be taken in Washington to expedite the withdrawal of the NNSC from South Korea before Rhee initiated an incident which would prove extremely embarrassing to CINCUNC and the U.S. Government. (FE files, lot 55 D 480, “Korean Black Book, October 1954”)
6. Ante, p. 1888.