795.00/7–554: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Hull) to the Chief of Staff United States Army (Ridgway)
priority
C 68619. (Army Message) Sent Department Army G–3 passed for information to State Department. For Ridgway, signed Hull. Noforn. References: A. Van Fleet MG 7558.2 B. Your 964055. C. My C 68573. D. My letter AGJ 091.711 subject: ROK Armed Forces dated 29 June 1954.3
- 1.
- As requested in your DA 964055 I set forth below my comments on Van Fleet’s MG 7558 (reference A). My comments are numbered to correspond to the paragraphs of Van Fleet’s cable to which they relate.
- 2.
- In my opinion withdrawal of United States forces from the Far East (in which I include Hawaii) would be a sign of weakness. Withdrawal from Korea but retention in the Far East would merely free these divisions for employment anywhere in the Far East and would not be a sign of weakness. With respect to activating additional ROK units of “comparable strength” to replace US units, I feel that, under present conditions, there is no justification for increasing the personnel ceiling of the ROK Armed Forces nor their equipment above that already recommended. In addition, I feel that the present personnel ceiling can be maintained only if additional military support funds are made available this year to a minimum of $100 million. Within the ceiling of presently authorized personnel strength and available equipment, I believe that additional Korean divisions can be formed. If these divisions have approximately one-third of their strength furnished by reserves we could unquestionably form one additional Korean division to compensate for each US division withdrawn, but each of these Korean divisions would be lacking strength comparable to that of a US division.
- 3.
- With respect to the withdrawal of US divisions from Japan before or concurrently with the withdrawal of US divisions from Korea, I feel that Korea does not need the military strength now available there since the Communist withdrawal has left the UN with greater strength in Korea than that the Communists deploy there. US divisions in Japan are better able to intervene anywhere in the Far East than are US divisions in Korea. My principal mission is the defense of Japan. Moreover, the forces now available in Japan are marginal to accomplish this mission. Accordingly, I do not feel it advisable to redeploy units from Japan in advance or concurrently with the redeployment from Korea.
- 4.
- I favor a change in US policy with respect to Japan from the current policy of withdrawing US forces only after Japanese forces have been organized in adequate strength to take over the defense mission. I will shortly propose to you a scheduled withdrawal of US forces from Japan at a rate which will permit the Japanese to take over their own defense providing they make a reasonable effort to do so. In accordance with this policy, I have already directed withdrawal of the First Cav division from Hokkaido beginning in August of this year; concurrently the Japanese will take over primary responsibility for the ground defense of that most sensitive area. The First Cav division will occupy the area in northern Honshu originally planned for the 24th division. The transfer of facs [facilities] on Hokkaido to the NSF will reduce the maximum US deployment that can be quartered in Japan, exclusive of Okinawa, to 3 and ⅓ divisions. I expect shortly to receive requests from the NSF for the release of additional accommodations for the 6th NSF division. I propose to comply with this request. This will reduce to 2 and ⅓ divisions my ability to accommodate US forces in Japan, exclusive of Okinawa. When and if the 24th Division is withdrawn from Korea, I recommend that I be authorized to place it on Okinawa under field conditions if no funds for permanent housing are available.
- 5.
- Announcement of withdrawals from Korea may be accompanied by announcement that additional ROK Divisions are being activated providing it is accepted that in augmenting the number of Korean Divisions, personnel strengths will not be increased, additional equipment will not be required, and the additional aid funds already requested will be furnished. In forming additional divisions I have reference here to the plan for the reorganization of the ROK Army which I have forwarded to you (reference D).
- 6.
- President Rhee and other government leaders are reported to be fearful the US is preparing to abandon Korea and further withdrawal will undoubtedly deepen their discouragement. However, ample assurances have been given to the ROK Government and to the world that the US will defend the ROK against aggression. Rhee’s discouragement is therefore probably related not to any inadequacy of ROK defense to meet the current threat but to a realization that the US will not cooperate in an offensive to re-unite Korea. I doubt if anything at this time other than offensive action by the United States can balance the discouraging effect of the deterioration of the situation in Indochina. It is essential that we face up to the long term issue that Korea presents to the United States. Korea is a small country surrounded by three powerful neighbors. Korea cannot maintain itself against any of these neighbors without strong support from the United States. Since Japan is the one of these three friendly to the West, Korea must align itself with Japan or forever be a millstone around the neck of the United States. Korea’s value to the US is only in the degree it protects Japan militarily [Page 1824] and supports Japan economically. We must find a way to make Korea look to Japan for protection. Unless Japan is far stronger militarily than Korea and unless Korea feels the need for cooperating with Japan and of Japanese protection we are unlikely to be able to bring these two powers together. Accordingly, any further strengthening of the Korean military forces will only prolong the period in which the United States must be prepared to commit powerful military forces to the Far East.
- 7.
a. There has been a major withdrawal of Chinese Comunist strength from North Korea. Since spring of last year Communists have redeployed from Korea 8 out of 19 CCF Armies. To some degree this withdrawal is compensated for by the increase in North Korean Corps from 6 to 7 and by the increased effectiveness of all North Korean Forces, although their combat value is still lower than that of the CCF.
b. The UN Forces are now stronger than the Communist Forces and there is therefore little prospect of Communist attack unless strong reinforcements are brought in from Communist China. The movement of these reinforcements would give us some warning of an impending attack. The ROK can never be expected to be strong enough to defeat Communist China, but only to delay a Communist attack until the United States or Japan can intervene. In this connection it is well to realize that the UN Forces are stronger now than they were at the time of the armistice. We have increased the Korean strength by 5 divisions. We have reduced the UN strength by only two. In addition the South Koreans have tremendously improved in training, in equipment, in command capability and in supporting troops.
- 8.
- I question that the remedy for any alleged diplomatic defeat at Geneva is to strengthen further an ally who is already strong enough for the requirements of the current situation and whose increased strength would not be readily applicable in newly threatened areas.
- 9.
- The essentiality of a US policy for the entire Far East cannot be over emphasized.
- 10.
- With respect to Van
Fleet’s conclusions, I believe:
- a.
- That necessary strength in Korea can be provided by native efforts within the present ceiling of manpower and equipment if additional financial aid is made available at once. Our over-all strength can be increased by a proper redeployment of US Forces, but the redeployment I recommend is different, as indicated elsewhere in this cable, from the redeployment Van Fleet recommends.
- b.
- I am not convinced of the desirability of a statement of the “United States position of strength in the Far East.” We are inclined now to deviate from Theodore Roosevelt’s wise admonition, “speak softly but carry a big stick.” The Communists will evaluate our strength by what we do, not by what we say, particularly this soon after our reversal in Indochina.
- 11.
- I recommend:
- a.
- Redeployment:
- (1)
- Retention of the present 2 and ⅓ US divisions in Japan, exclusive of Okinawa, for the time being with acceptance that this force will not be increased.
- (2)
- Withdrawal of one US Army Division from Korea to Hawaii.
- (3)
- Withdrawal of one US Army Division from Korea to Okinawa.
- (4)
- Reduction of service support in Korea by transferring to the Korean’s line of communication functions from Pusan forward, together with reserve stocks for Korean Forces up to 45 days reserve, retaining for US Forces a port at Inchon and reserves for all the remaining UNC forces less the ROKs.
- b.
- Before any further redeployment is decided, or any announcement is made other than for the redeployment recommended in a above, US policy must be determined for the entire Far East. Such policy might require deployment elsewhere in the Far East of US Divisions which might be withdrawn from Korea. For example, if the US is going to send forces to Thailand in the event of attack on that country, it might be well to move a division there now and thus perhaps forestall an attack rather than to wait until Thailand is already under attack.
- c.
- I recommend strongly against any announcement or any policy such as one which would mention 10 additional combat divisions for Japan, Korea and Formosa but not mention their reduced or reserve status. Such statements would have no effect on the Communists who would recognize them as propaganda but would have a dangerous effect at home in lulling the people of the US into an unjustified feeling of security. When and if we are prepared to so do, we should of course announce the formation of a SEATO and a North East Asian alliance including Japan, Korea, Formosa and possibly the Philippines. Depending on the strength of these organizations, this might provide a considerable encouragement to the ROK as well as to other Asian countries.
- d.
- I do recommend the early movement from Korea of the 25th US Division to Hawaii and the movement of the 24th US Division from Korea to Okinawa. I do not recommend the withdrawal at this time of major units from Japan. I do not recommend further withdrawal of major units from Korea until a United States Far East policy is decided upon.