Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/7–454: Telegram

The Chief of the Mission to the Far East (Van Fleet) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

top secret

Taipei, July 3, 1954—2 p.m.

MG 7558. (Army Message) Information to State Department and CINCFE (for Hull). From Van Fleet Mission for Secretary of Defense Wilson.

1. My attention has been called to Secretary of State cable No. 1043 to Seoul 26 June¹ and repeated to Tokyo, Taipei, Saigon and CINCUNC requesting views as to whether further withdrawal of American forces from Korea would be interpreted in Far East as sign of weakness and if so whether public statements or explanations could obviate such an impression. Because of close relationship to purposes of my mission, I wish to give you an expression of my views for such use as you may deem appropriate.

2. Withdrawal in present atmosphere would be interpreted throughout the Far East as another retreat and marked sign of weakness, further endangering our prestige and position and would be most disheartening in Korea itself. I agree that large numbers of United States Forces must be withdrawn from Korea but believe this should be done only as we are prepared to announce the simultaneous activation of additional ROK divisions of comparable strength.² I have discussed this problem with President Rhee and he would have no objection to withdrawal of any United Nations Forces if met by activation of additional ROK units.

3. In my view we should reverse current planned priority of withdrawal of divisions from Japan and Korea, or at least effect divided withdrawal of United States divisions. Moreover, withdrawals from Korea now and in the future should be direct without staging through Japan or other intermediate areas, both for reasons of morale and economy and for best political effects.

4. Announcement of withdrawals from Japan should be couched in terms of the increased strength and effectiveness of the Japanese national defense forces. Such action would provide a strong incentive to Japan to move faster under own defense program. Needed facilities would become available to the Japanese and departure of United States Forces would enable the Japanese to recognize their reliance on their own defenses. Japan has the capability with some help from the United States of building powerful defenses of her own but so long as we provide defenses for her, she will not achieve the transformation in her thinking that is requisite to her rearmament. Withdrawal of one division now and another soon will enhance Japanese pride and sense of responsibility.

5. Announcement of withdrawals from Korea should be accompanied with announcement that additional ROK divisions are being activated even if they are to be under strength or reserve divisions.

6. President Rhee and other Korean civil and military leaders already are fearful that the United States is preparing gradually to abandon Korea and any further withdrawal without replacement by ROKs would lend credence to their fears and produce deep discouragement. In my opinion, no other explanation of further withdrawal could have any effect in allaying that fear or in obviating the impression of weakness either in Korea or elsewhere in the Far East.

7. Recent evidence of withdrawal of some Chinese Communist armies from North Korea may be cited as basis for withdrawal of further United States Forces from South Korea, but in current situation in Far East I do not find that argument convincing. Those Chinese Communist Forces can be redeployed back across the Yalu on short notice. They are a force in being which actually threatens all the fronts. Moreover, any lessening of tension from this source has been more than offset among ROK civil and military leaders by their increasing fear of being abandoned by the United States.

8. Geneva Conference and impending concessions to the Communists by the French are already widely interpreted in Far East as major diplomatic defeat for the United States and a major victory for Communist China and as revealing our inability to secure support from our European allies and unwillingness by the United States to act without their support. It is being said that we ourselves by our actions and inactions have built up Red China from a regime beset by grave and fundamental weaknesses to a position as one of the major world powers. This is the context in which we must weigh effects of withdrawal or other actions or statements and explanations.

9. I have found in the Far East also a strong current of distrust of British policy and a growing fear that United States policy in the Far East is being determined in London rather than in Washington. Leaders in both Korea and Formosa express puzzlement over this in view of the relative power positions of the two countries, the dependence of Great Britain on United States power in Europe, and the different stakes of the two countries in the Pacific. In particular, they express the fear that London is step-by-step forcing the United States to recognize Communist China and admit her to the United Nations which they would take as an ominous hand writing on the wall. The feeling has also been expressed that the British and the French take unilateral action when their interests are at stake, whereas the United States will act only when backed by a united front which, in practice, we are unable to form in the Far East. Therefore, the impression is created that the British and the French exercise veto power on United States Far Eastern policy. We must ask ourselves what future formidable problems we are building up for ourselves in the Far East and specifically what further losses of countries or partitions we must be prepared to face over the next few years under the trends now apparent.

10. In conclusion, I find:

a. That strength can be maintained and vastly improved by native efforts and at great savings in United States personnel and dollars, and by a proper redeployment of US Forces.

b. That a statement of United States position of strength in the Far East is mandatory.

11. To recapitulate I recommend:

a. Redeployment of United States Forces both in Japan and Korea be continued and expedited, with combat elements being withdrawn from Japan first and Korea last.

b. That simultaneous announcements be made in Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul by governments concerned, and perhaps by other governments in Far East.

c. That the announcement emphasize the strategic redeployment in Far East of United States Forces, and the continued buildup of country forces, perhaps mentioning a figure of 10 additonal combat divisions each for Japan, Korea, and Formosa, but not mention their reduced or reserve status.

d. Specifically withdraw First Cavalry Division and First Marine Division to the United States. Move Third Marine Division to Okinawa and the Philippines and 1 other division in Korea to Hawaii; and the immediate activation of 2 full strength (less artillery) ROKA Divisions.

1. Ante, p. 1815.
2. On a copy of this telegram in the Eisenhower Library, this sentence was underlined and a marginal note was written and initialed by Eisenhower which read: “This cable shows difficulty of allowing more than 1, in a region, to advise in policy.” (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)