Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795B.11/7–654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Seoul, July 6, 1954—7 p.m.

12. Repeated information Tokyo 6. Tokyo for CINCUNC. It is apparent from President Rhee’s July 1 [2] letter to Secretary Dulles¹ (Embtel 6 repeated Tokyo 1) that Rhee is viewing possible Washington visit primarily in terms of benefits he can extract from it. He will accept only if he is reasonably confident he can obtain tangible dividends to exhibit on return in compensation for failure achieve Korean unification in near future. Unless he can expect something substantial seems doubtful he will undertake trip at this time as he is well aware relative advantage in past of negotiating from Seoul (Embtel 1383, June 23 repeated Tokyo 825).²

Line followed by his letter suggests once again (1) that Rhee has little expectation direct US support for military drive north, (2) that he is still anticipating, and probably counting on, substantial increase ROK forces as result General Van Fleet’s recommendations, (3) that by continuing truculent behavior he can obtain at least some part of his objectives through US action to pacify him, and (4) that US imperfectly informed re attitude ROK people (penultimate paragraph giving impression eagerness military leaders march north, etc. is altogether contrary facts, as interpreted by Eighth Army and Embassy). Rhee’s relating question of size ROK forces to broader questions US policy re Korea emphasizes a new necessity our being prepared consider major pending political, economic and military questions together. To handle them on piecemeal basis would invite trouble and magnify difficulty in obtaining satisfactory solutions. My impression from studying General Hull’s recent messages is that from miltiary viewpoint we should implement promptly and adequately standing commitment in Rhee–Dulles agreement of August 8, 1953 to expand ROK air and naval (including marine) forces³ but not increase ROK ground forces much beyond existing level. This agrees with my assessment of situation.

If I am correct in interpreting Rhee’s first alternative as envisaging atomic bombing, I assume this is as unacceptable to us as resumption Korean hostilities by any other means. As to second alternative I assume that until Van Fleet recommendations are in and have been considered in concert with General Hull (as per President’s April 16 letter⁴) it may be difficult give Rhee specific answers. For various reasons (including fact that until we decide size and cost underwriting ROK military establishment, FOA economic program will continue to be seriously handicapped) decision re ROK military establishment is most urgent question now facing Washington concerning Korea. Notwithstanding this I would favor reply to Rhee, preferably Presidential reply, at earliest possible date and along following lines:

1. In American international affairs and among US international responsibilities, unification of Korea remains an important objective of US Government. We shall continue to strive honestly and actively that this ancient land may be reunited, free and able pursue its independent destiny without Communist or other outside interference.

2. Having accepted armistice, we are unwilling resume fighting following failure political conference bring about Korean unification. We recognize this may mean deferment unification of Korea perhaps for considerable period, perhaps even until some general readjustment possible of relations between Communist and non-Communist world. But whatever develops we are pledged seek peaceful reunification and will strive sincerely in association with ROK to do so.

3. Although we are unwilling resume hostilities or support ROK initiative involving resumption hostilities, should ROK again be victim Communist or other aggression we are prepared in accordance mutual defense treaty immediately to come to assistance of ROK.

4. As tangible evidence our policy above declared, US Government is prepared, pending unification and in order render ROK strong, thus minimizing Communist threat to Korea to underwrite: (a) ROK military establishment capable of resisting Communist aggression until we can come to their aid. We are thus prepared develop, support and maintain land, sea and air forces at levels to be described. (Having in mind General Hull’s recommendations last week re air and navy strength, I again stress importance reaching comparable decision concerning size ROK Army along with decision meet major share cost thereof.) (b) General program of economic rehabilitation and reconstruction, to be integrated with (a) above. In this connection we could remind Rhee of our willingness go forward with this program as per Rhee–Dulles August 1953 agreement to a total of approximately one billion dollars during next several years, in addition to amount required to develop and maintain military establishment, both these major contributions necessarily subject congressional appropriations.

5. All foregoing must be considered in context general Asian developments and US responsibilities in other (notably SEA) areas. For example US Government may decide encourage and support formation of regional organization of Asian states and directly interested non-Asian powers to strengthen collective defense of area and promote economic, cultural and political cooperation. Prerequisite to this is regularization ROK-Japanese relations so both nations can participate equally and simultaneously in developing organization. Anything less might fail obtain US support and might require limiting American efforts organize collective defense in Asia, with primary emphasis at least for present on SEA area.

6. This program cannot, however, be effective without unreserved acceptance thereof and thereafter genuine collaboration by ROK. During past year our efforts have repeatedly been handicapped by Rhee’s tendency to proceed unilaterally via criticism, threats or denunciation. This repeated rocking of our boat and upsetting of our applecart whenever spirit of Rhee’s irritation moves him must be dealt with in connection present situation. It is recommended therefore that our program be contingent on certain pledges by Rhee including:

(a) Honest acceptance of entire program by ROK Government and pledge of ROK collaboration during period program is in operation. In military field this should also require pledge no ROK unilateral military action except in agreement with US Government.

(b) Acceptance workable terms of reference concerning economic program, including necessary supervision required by US Congress over disbursement US funds and agreement on part ROK Government to cease public carping and sniping. US Government prepared to entertain at any time private suggestions from ROK Government designed improve performance but public campaign of sort indulged in during past several months apparently deliberately seeking discredit program should not further be stalemate. Terms of reference should also include agreement to move as rapidly as possible toward rationalization of ROK economy, including establishment realistic exchange rate.

(c) Assurance from Rhee that negotiations with Japan will be resumed in good faith without further opposition and delay on his part and that genuinely sincere effort will be made by ROK to normalize relations between two countries. Substitution of so-called Rhee line by conservation arrangement and abandonment by Rhee of attempt boycott Japan procurement should be included in pledge concerning normalization ROK-Japan relations.

I recognize foregoing is large order and that its acceptance by Rhee major undertaking, but to fail to face these issues at this juncture would in my opinion be borrowing future trouble. Although Rhee talks confidently of public support for unilateral action, extremely little such support now in fact exists and in my judgment notwithstanding threats and blackmail aspects Rhee’s latest letter, way to handle situation created thereby is through firm presentation of US positions, with Rhee left in no element doubt concerning our attitude.

Briggs

1. Ante, p. 1818.
2. Ante, p. 1813.
3. At this point a marginal note by McClurkin read as follows: “No such commitment.”
4. See footnote 3 p. 1809.