Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795B.11/6–2154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

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Seoul, June 21, 1954—7 p.m.

1376. Repeated information Tokyo 820, niact Geneva 189. Geneva for USDel. Tokyo for CINCUNC. For the Secretary.

Spent day at Chinhae with President Rhee who expressed his deep appreciation suggested Washington invitation but said he could not see way clear to leave Korea at this time. Personally Rhee said nothing would give him more satisfaction than to accept since he regards invitation great honor not to speak of value of renewing personal touch with President and you. Later in conversation with Mrs. Rhee, President remarked would be impossible make round trip in less than 2 weeks and even so at his age bound to be exhausting and in addition air travel adversely affects Mrs. Rhee. I think President was genuinely pleased and considerably tempted but nevertheless definitely declined for any predictable future.

Rhee then turned to other pending business. He said he is working on post-Geneva declaration to be issued after further consultation with and if possible endorsement by US which would include following points:

1. Statement that consultation with Communists over Korea is finished; that Communists by Geneva conduct once again demonstrated futility of negotiating with them because no solution possible, Communists merely consumed time meanwhile strengthening and arming selves, as he declared enemies are now doing in north in violation armistice terms. Therefore Rhee said he will attend no more meetings of “5 or 7 or 9” and would refuse participate in any follow-up project including any post-Geneva mission or committee.

Although Rhee failed specify I doubt whether this rules out ROK attendance at informal Washington meetings such as preceded Geneva but Rhee did object to special UNGA and in fact said he could see no profit in any further UN efforts toward Korean unification. “Every time big powers meet with Russia to talk about small countries latter are sold down the river” Rhee observed bitterly.

2. Because Communists have refused negotiate in good faith Rhee regards armistice as terminated insofar ROK concerned. He said that does not mean he is planning unilateral action toward north “right now” but he does not propose to be bound any further within ROK by armistice terms. He also said “I do not propose allow Poles and Czechs travel around any longer in my country.”

Rhee went on to say he is in process of getting his ideas on paper but wanted my government to know direction of his thinking. He indicated he might defer making his views public until after return of Foreign Minister Pyun, who is due reach Tokyo June 26. (Rhee mentioned Pyun invited by Tasca see latter in Rome; also that Ben Limb accompanying Pyun back to Korea after which Limb will return US.)

In reply to Rhee’s statements I said it is my understanding that US Government likewise would be reluctant have follow-up meetings or see established anything in nature standby committee on Korea, or have special UNGA session called discuss Korea. In other words I said we are probably in approximate agreement concerning Rhee’s first point.

Re armistice, however, I said my government regards it as still in effect pursuant Article 62 and that I recalled General Smith had so expressed himself at final Korean plenary Geneva. (Rhee interrupted with some heat to denounce armistice again, reiterating his intention not to be bound by it any longer.)

Regarding NNSC I then outlined plan explained last week to Cho, who was present with me at Chinhae today, whereas we hoped to persuade Swiss and Swedes to withdraw. I said this impressed American Government as more effective way to end NNSC than by unilateral ROK action. Rhee agreed proposal might have merit “if you can really persuade Swiss and Swedes to act”. In this connection it appears, however, that Cho issued statement last week prior to conversation reported Embtel 1370¹ declaring ROK will soon demand commission cease functioning within ROK.

To say that Rhee appeared convinced by any observation made to him today would probably considerably strain the facts. I received distinct impression views President expressed are evidences of feelings and intentions that have been developing and hardening ever since Geneva meeting scheduled, possibly ever since armistice.

After about 1 hour of discussion Rhee remarked very amiably “now let’s go fishing” which we did. He did not revert to business until after luncheon when he said again how personally distressed he is not to be able to accept Washington invitation and also that he assumed there would be no publicity about Secretary Dulles’ approach regarding possible Washington visit. I told Rhee I knew of no plan for publicity in that connection.

I likewise informed President Rhee of General Van Fleet’s proposed visit to Chinhae from tomorrow evening through June 23. Rhee expressed satisfaction at prospect. I am seeing Van Fleet here this evening.

Briggs

1. In this telegram, June 19, Briggs reported a conversation with Acting Foreign Minister Cho as follows:

   “Cho was informed lines our thinking re NNSC and emphasis was placed on importance avoiding premature publicity re possible withdrawal Swiss and Swedish members, and eventual dissolution of commission. Cho expressed gratification at news and stressed importance ending NNSC activities in ROK as soon as possible. Agreed keep ROK Government informed re developments this subject.” (795.00/6–1954)