Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/6–1854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Seoul, June 18, 1954—6 p.m.

1358. Repeated information Tokyo 809, Geneva 182. For the Secretary from Briggs. Tokyo pass CINCUNC exclusive for General Hull. Re Embtel 1259,¹ repeated Tokyo 746, Geneva 132.

Conclusion Korean phase Geneva Conference calls for reexamination our Korean policy both with respect broad principles and specific questions precipitated by Geneva failure unify Korea. This telegram seeks define these problems within political sphere and recommend courses of action.

1. Rhee–Dulles agreement of August 8, 1953,² provides for consultation following political conference re demand unifying Korea if conference abortive. Although agreement envisaged 90-day conference period, I believe we should accept view we have commitment consult with ROK on this subject and should at early date take initiative do so. If Rhee still unwilling visit Washington in response earlier invitations, I recommend consultations be undertaken through Embassy Seoul although it might be desirable renew President Eisenhower’s invitation if feasible. Believe we should be prepared discuss entire spectrum our relations with ROK and our policy in Asia.

Rhee’s commitment not undertake unilateral military action to unify Korea is ended and in fact some months back he gave us notice of his freedom to act. I do not believe these facts unnecessarily increase likelihood of early ROK unilateral move however, as other factors, particularly developments in Southeast Asia, and attempts unify free nations of Asia, have intervened and may influence Rhee for time being. President Eisenhower’s April 16 letter³ is clear re US refusal support military action unify Korea but obligation remains make final determination re expansion ROK Armed Forces and I presume this may be done on basis General Van Fleet’s present survey.

2. Related to above is status of armistice agreement which by terms paragraph 62 remains in effect. Nevertheless, I believe we should examine provisions of armistice agreement carefully to evaluate their longterm advantages and disadvantages and to determine courses of action we should pursue. Specifically re NNSC I recommend we urge Swiss and Swedish Governments take early action withdraw their representatives so that NNSC can be terminated soonest.

3. As recommended Embtel 1350⁴ we should promptly agree with UNCURK measures to effect transfer area north of 38th parallel to ROK control, administratively and ultimately juridically.

4. Related to above problem is general question UNCURK’s future. While there are some functions UNCURK can usefully perform between now and Ninth UNGA Session, particularly action re item three above, we should in conjunction other interested governments consider whether UNCURK or other UN body should be continued indefinitely. Various ideas have been advanced here, both within and without UNCURK, including (a) continuation of commission as is (b) retention of commission on more streamlined basis perhaps with new membership (c) reduction to representative of UN Secretary General with small staff (d) amalgamation of latter with UNKRA or creation of new political economic aid agency of UN. Embassy has no detailed recommendations at this time but strongly favors continuation some distinct form of UN political representation, preferably in form of commission of not less than 5 members.

5. Korea’s relationship to Indochina war and defense SEA should be given fresh examination. Failure achieve Korean settlement as isolated problem suggests necessity considering it increasingly in future in context Communist threat throughout Asia. Our moves to organize collective defense in SEA and somewhat corollary efforts by Rhee through mechanism Chinhae conference⁵ should to extent possible be brought together or at least coordinated. Heretofore, we have for good reason pursued a passive policy re Rhee’s not very skillful efforts in this field but I believe we should now seek to exercise greater leadership in order channel his and other Asian efforts in directions most nearly consistent with our own interests.

For example I favor re-examining advisability convening early meeting among foreign ministers of free Asian nations and interested western powers in order weld together separate efforts in common aims and policy. Meeting of this sort should have helpful effect in demonstrating our interest in Asian problems and as setting precedent for subsequent meetings and possibly creation of a limited regional organization. While question arises whether a sufficient ground work can be laid for profitable meeting of this sort, I am convinced seriousness and urgency of Asian situation warrant careful exploration of this approach. We might include (in addition to US, UK and France) Australia, New Zealand, ROK, Japan, Philippines and Thailand. Formosa, of course, presents special problem. We could also consider desirability including all or some of Colombo powers.

6. In context foregoing we should re-examine state of ROK-Japan relations and decide whether further attempt should be made, either openly or behind scenes, to bring parties together in negotiations. Conceivably multi-lateral meeting such as envisaged paragraph 5 above, might have helpful effect in affording framework within which high Korean and Japanese officials could meet and discuss bilateral problems. Frank exposé to Rhee of general lines our Asian policy and essentiality active Japanese role therein might help influence him in direction regularization ROK-Japanese relations. (While Rhee’s attitude toward Japan so ingrained it is impossible be optimistic relative real improvement relations, I nevertheless share view expressed Ambassador Dean in Embtel 1155 May ll,⁶ that we should “tell Rhee frankly about our Japanese program and that he has nothing to fear.”)

7. Entry into force of mutual defense treaty, on assumption ROK willing proceed with treaty as it now stands, may precipitate long-pending question administrative agreement covering US and UN Forces and may also raise problem command relationship ROK forces to UNC. Latter question must be dealt with eventually in any event.

Foregoing does not attempt cover all subjects at issue between US and ROK, particularly those in economic field which demand urgent consideration. I understand Wood will be submitting certain recommendations to FOA with particular view to obtaining congressional assistance regarding most important problems in his field.

Briggs

1. Dated May 28, p. 1800.
2. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 17, 1953, pp. 203–204.
3. In this letter Eisenhower told Rhee that the United States was considering assisting the Republic of Korea in maintaining a field army capable of sustained combat operations, p. 103.
4. Not printed. (795.00/6–1654)
5. The Chinhae Conference held in mid-June 1954 under the sponsorship of the Republic of Korea succeeded in establishing the Asian People’s Anti-Communist League. Thirty-one delegates from Nationalist China, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Hong Kong, Macao, and Thailand assembled at Chinhae, Korea. Ostensibly the delegates were “people’s” representatives, although in the cases of South Korea, Nationalist China, and Vietnam, the participants had strong governmental connections. The conference set up a constitution for the unofficial anti-Communist organization it had created and passed a number of anti-Communist resolutions. Additional information on the Chinhae Conference is located in file 790.00.
6. For text of this telegram, see vol. xvi, p. 244.