Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795B.11/6–2354: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

secret

Seoul, June 23, 1954—7 p.m.

1383. Repeated information Tokyo 825. Department pass General Taylor. Tokyo pass CINCUNC exclusive for General Hull.

In connection mytel 1376,¹ I believe additional reason behind Rhee’s decision decline Washington invitation is his feeling that he is in stronger negotiating position here than in Washington where he might be more subject pressures US official and public opinion. This impression has been fortified during past year by numerous official visits to Korea by high-ranking US Government officials to discuss fundamental matters relating US-ROK relations. As result Rhee probably feels he can continue to deal with these matters through emissaries sent him from Washington. While I do not wish to underestimate importance Korean matters to US Government, I believe Rhee should not be encouraged in his conviction he can continue play “hard to get” practically at will in his dealings with us. It is important for Rhee to understand that our problems and relations with ROK must be placed within context our world wide problems and responsibilities. Consequently, if Rhee replies to Secretary Dulles’ letter along lines indicated my conversation with him June 21, I recommend we undertake consultation through normal diplomatic channels.

Re paragraph 1 Embtel 1358,² I have been giving much thought, in connection General Van Fleet’s present mission, to problem expansion ROK armed forces and its relation to other matters pending between our two governments. I believe Rhee counting heavily on Van Fleet recommendation for substantial increase ROK military establishment and this expectation colors Rhee’s current thinking. I am somewhat reluctant to tread on this subject which obviously involves military considerations. I am not able fully to judge but there are also pressing political and economic implications of further build-up ROK forces which cannot be ignored. I recognize that determination of size ROK armed forces requires most careful consideration but nevertheless believe it is important to reach decision soonest in order this problem be dealt with along with other matters between our two governments.

I therefore urge that conclusions of Van Fleet’s mission be formulated soonest, at least in preliminary form, in concert with General Hull as per President’s April 16 letter and Defense Secretary directive April 26, to General Van Fleet.³ (Van Fleet now in Chinhae with Rhee; Assistant Defense Secretary McNeil reaches Seoul from Tokyo tomorrow.)

Once decision reached on this fundamental matter of size future ROK military establishment, related decisions re US–UN forces to be left in Korea, rate redeployment, command relationship between UNC and ROK, etc., can then be taken. All of these decisions together with others in political and economic fields (Embtel 1358, repeated Tokyo 809) ought to be brought together as basis for early discussions with Rhee. As indicated in number of recent Embassy messages, I anticipate Rhee may become more difficult to deal with in near future. For example, his impending denunciation of armistice and his proposed action barring further NNSC activities in ROK are only two of several actions he may take on unilateral basis—to our subsequent embarrassment or danger. I doubt Rhee contemplates any drastic step such as attempting resume war for present at least. Likewise I recognize it can perhaps be argued that so long as he does not know precisely what he can expect from us in way of military aid he may be more inclined to refrain from provocative actions, but we would be deluding ourselves if we consider that a valid reason against informing him of our intentions in political, military and economic fields.

Even though suggested negotiations with Rhee may be difficult and perhaps at times unpleasant, I think clearer understanding on his part of what he can and cannot expect from us is now essential to fundamentally better relations. It is equally my opinion that any apparent lack of decisiveness and clear talking on our part is more likely encourage intransigence and faits accomplis than reverse.

Briggs

1. Supra.
2. Dated June 18, p. 1808.

3. This directive from Wilson to Van Fleet established general guidelines for the Van Fleet Mission. The specific reference to Korea read:

   “The President has asked specifically that you go to Korea to consult with President Rhee and his military advisers to study the situation thoroughly, and to develop recommendations in concert with General Hull both as to the future size and composition of the active armed forces of the Republic of Korea and the practicability of a joint United States–Republic of Korea program for Korean reserve forces.” (Eisenhower Library, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Records, 1952–61, Report of the Van Fleet Mission)