795.00/11–753: Telegram
The Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Department of State
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39. Repeated information Seoul unnumbered, Tokyo unnumbered, CINCUNC unnumbered.
1. [One?] Of most affirmative ways to prevent ROKs war of nerves by threatening to move north unilaterally would be to work out satisfactory agreement time, place, composition political conference. At least that is something positive and concrete to which we can point and then ask American, ROK and world opinion to wait conference itself.
In order to reach satisfactory results here believe we must be prepared work out some compromise theory which will be reasonably satisfactory American and world opinion and consistent spirit armistice agreement if possible and do level best with top level pressure if necessary to convince Rhee. For if no agreement these preliminary talks which he is already sabotaging by frequent unattributable comments on radio he will threaten, since perfectly obvious political conference cannot begin, no use waiting further before acting unilaterally. Even if Department believes nothing satisfactory will come out of political [Page 1600] conference itself, should we not again (a) weigh concrete advantage reaching agreement these preliminary talks and (b) advantage of possibly forestalling threatened unilateral ROK moves against making compromise at all and allowing conference to fail? In view Swedes and Swiss and majority press correspondents real admiration Indian handling here and renewed Commonwealth pushing for India, if question composition of conference is ever thrown back in UNGA, believe our position will be infinitely more difficult than last August. Know you are examining all proposals, but hope reflective examination will be made of all possible solutions with relative advantages and disadvantages whole situation including military as of today and decision as of last August will not hold us captured.
Real question of course is whether Rhee without real persuasion will ever agree to any of our suggestions on composition. We must then consider what we should do in Panmunjom talks if Rhee remains intransigeant. We can go ahead here despite Rhee, or break off talks if Communists remain inflexible, or try to get Communist agreement any of our proposals through diplomatic channels during talks here including possibly approaching Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia about declination. Should also consider whether we would be better off to break here and then compromise in talks with sixteen or in UNGA itself.
- There was no time of transmission indicated on this telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 3:20 a.m., Nov. 7.↩