Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 170 Series

Draft Report by the National Security Planning Board of the National Security Council¹

top secret
NSC 170

Washington, November 9, 1953.

[Here follows a table of contents.]

U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea

objectives

1. The long-range U.S. objective with respect to the Korean problem is to bring about the unification of a free Korea with its political and territorial integrity guaranteed by international agreement and with armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power.

2. The current U.S. objective, pending achievement of the above long-range objective, is to maintain a position of strength in Korea (a) in support of the United Nations commitment to oppose aggression, (b) to prevent the area from coming under Communist domination either by subversion or by being overrun, and (c) to ensure the continuance of a free government on the peninsula.

3. The United States seeks to achieve these objectives through peaceful means, if possible, avoiding or preventing the resumption of fighting in Korea.

4. To achieve these objectives, the United States must be prepared to take the following courses of action:

Preventing or Countering the Resumption of Fighting by the ROK

5. In order to prevent or to counter any resumption of fighting in Korea by the Republic of Korea the United States should:

a. Continue to observe the armistice.

b. Seek to ensure that the Republic of Korea observes the armistice by:

(1) Notifying President Rhee formally and letting other ROK leaders know (on behalf of the United States and as executive agent for the UN), that if South Korea unilaterally initiates military operations against Chinese or North Korean forces in or north of the demilitarized zone, then:

(a) UNC air, ground and sea forces will not support such operations directly or indirectly;

(b) The United States will not furnish any military or logistic support for such operations;

(c) All U.S. economic aid to Korea will cease immediately;

(d) The UN Commander will take any action necessary to prevent his forces becoming involved in the renewal of hostilities and to provide for their security.

If Rhee should ask whether or not UNC forces might be withdrawn from Korea, he should be told that, if he ceases to cooperate with UNC, the UNC will decide its course of action purely in terms of its own interest and without consulting him.

(2) Attempting to obtain from Rhee a formal assurance in writing that he will not initiate unilateral military action at any time against the Communists in or north of the demilitarized zone. If he refuses to give such assurance, the United States should inform him immediately that the UNC reserves all rights to take whatever actions it deems necessary to preserve the security of the UNC forces.

(3) Making UNC plans and dispositions such as to permit maximum flexibility in meeting any likely eventuality and, insofar as possible, to reinforce the statements made to Rhee and to manifest U.S. determination to carry them out.

6. In anticipation of the possibility that President Rhee may order the renewal of hostilities by an attack on Communist forces in or north of the demilitarized zone, despite all the actions taken by the United States under paragraph 5-a and b above, the United States should take the measures stated in Annex A, which is being given separate distribution.²

7. If ROK forces should renew hostilities unilaterally, the United States should, in addition to appropriate actions under Annex A:

a. Stop all economic and military assistance to Korea.

b. Discontinue all logistic or other support to the ROK forces.

c. Take such other military measures as seem feasible and consistent with the security of UNC forces to block ROK offensive action.

d. Evacuate UN civilians.

e. Notify the Communists that the UNC will continue to abide by the armistice terms, but will defend UNC forces against any Communist attack, and will be prepared, if a Communist counterattack against the ROK threatens the security of UNC forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of UNC forces.

f. Renew general hostilities with the Communists only if attacked in force by the Communists or if Communist attacks against the ROK seriously threaten the security of UNC forces.

g. Promptly seek to obtain the support of the other members of the UNC, and as appropriate inform the United Nations of the actions taken by the UNC under UN authority to ensure compliance with the armistice.

Countering the Resumption of Fighting by the Communists

8. If Communist forces violate the armistice and renew hostilities in Korea, the United States should:

a. Invoke the Joint Policy Declaration by calling upon the signatories to carry out the commitment that “if there is a renewal of armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.”

b. Make clear to the world the necessity of expanding the war to China by air and naval action as the only feasible way of honoring our collective security commitments to the United Nations and our security commitments to the Republic of Korea.

c. Implement the military and diplomatic measures referred to in NSC Action No. 794 of May 20, 1953,³ as approved following the urgent review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State.

d. Call on other UN members for effective manpower and other military assistance appropriate to the expanded war against China.

Seeking to Obtain Satisfactory Agreements from the Communists

9. The United States should:

a. Continue to seek, by political negotiations between the Communists and the UN (with the Republic of Korea associated with the latter), a unified and neutral Korea under a substantially unchanged ROK [under a ROK based on free elections].^* To this end be prepared to accept:

(1) A unified Korea friendly to the United States, without U.S. or other foreign forces or bases in Korea;

(2) Mutual guarantees with the Communists for the territorial and political integrity of Korea under the ROK but foregoing all rights granted to the United States under a U.S.-Korean mutual assistance pact; and

(3) A level of Korean armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power.

b. Continue to exert political and economic pressures against Communist China, including unconventional and covert pressures, at least until settlements satisfactory to the United States can be achieved in the areas around Communist China.

Achieving a Position of Strength in Korea

10. Pending a political settlement and in the absence of a violation of the armistice, the United States should, conditioned upon the satisfactory cooperation of the Republic of Korea, continue to observe the armistice and try to avoid renewed fighting; accept indefinitely the division of Korea on the present demarcation line while seeking a satisfactory solution of the Korean problem by the use of other than military pressures; tie the Republic of Korea into the U.S. security system and develop it as a military ally. To this end the United States should:

a. Ratify the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea.

b. Build up and maintain the defensive capacity of ROK armed forces in accordance with existing commitments, consistent with the armistice terms, and in a manner and to an extent that will permit the phased and orderly redeployment of the bulk of U.S. armed forces at the earliest feasible date.

c. Carry on a vigorous campaign to secure additional armed forces from other UN members for service in Korea in accordance with the existing formula (see Annex B), covering reimbursement of U.S. expenditures for such forces.

d. Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea.

e. Pending a satisfactory understanding with the ROK Government with respect to internal measures required to achieve economic stability, make such use of UNC facilities in Korea as is practicable, consistent with the primary mission and security of the UNC, to provide limited assistance to the Korean people in order to give tangible evidence to them of the value of U.S. friendship and assistance.

f. Conditioned upon a satisfactory understanding with the ROK Government with respect to internal measures required to achieve economic stability, implement the present expanded program of economic assistance in that portion of Korea controlled by the ROK and the UNC, subject to the following conditions:

(1) The Republic of Korea satisfactorily cooperates in carrying the armistice into effect.

(2) A standard of living approximating the 1949–1950 levels should be the goal toward which the program should contribute.

(3) The investment component of the program should be increased as rapidly as is consistent with economic stability.

(4) Investment in areas which would be most affected by renewal of hostilities should proceed at a limited rate until an assessment can be made of the likelihood of such renewal.

(5) Investment in those projects which would be subject to reconsideration in the event of unification should proceed at a limited rate until an assessment can be made of the likelihood of such unification,^†

(6) The program should be directed toward an economy which the Republic of Korea could support with a minimum of future external aid.

g. Continue in effect all pertinent instructions to the UNC involving the maintenance of the security of U.S. forces in the Korea area.

h. Conduct a high-level diplomatic campaign to persuade our allies to accept U.S. courses of action and contribute to their support.

i. Continue a program of covert operations designed to assist in the achievement of U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Korea.

Annex B

[July 23, 1953]

Formula Regarding Reimbursement for U.S. Logistic Support of Other Un Forces in Korea

(NSC Action NO. 858-b, July 23, 1953⁴)

1. The United States desires to obtain and retain the maximum contributions of effective manpower from the nations allied with it in the effort of the United Nations to repel aggression in Korea.

2. In principle, each such nation should, to the extent that it is able, either equip and supply its own forces or pay for such military equipment, supplies and services as may be furnished to it by the United States.

3. The overriding consideration, however, should be the maximum contribution of effective manpower. When any such nation is willing to contribute effective manpower but not able to provide for logistic support, the Department of Defense should furnish to such nation military equipment, supplies, and services; without requirement of payment to the extent that the Department of State, in consultation with the Departments of Treasury and Defense, may determine such nation cannot reasonably be expected to pay.

4. A nation capable of contributing money beyond the support of any forces furnished by it, should be encouraged also to contribute toward the logistic support of the forces of other nations.

5. Except when the manpower furnished by any such nation is additional to forces already furnished by it, the contribution should be in effective military units as determined by the Department of Defense.

Annex C

Excerpts From Documents Relating to The Political Conference and the Armistice Agreement

Excerpt from the Understanding Between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea Regarding the Political Conference

The understanding between the United States and the Republic of Korea regarding the political conference is contained in the following portions of the Statement issued by Secretary of State Dulles and President Rhee on August 8, 1953:

“If, after the political conference has been in session for 90 days, it becomes clear to each of our governments that all attempts to achieve these objectives have been fruitless and that the conference is being exploited by the Communist delegates mainly to infiltrate, propagandize or otherwise embarrass the Republic of Korea, we shall then be prepared to make a concurrent withdrawal from the conference. We will then consult further regarding the attainment of a unified, free and independent Korea which is the postwar goal the United States set itself during World War II, which has been accepted by the United Nations as its goal and which will continue to be an object of concern of United States foreign policy.”

Excerpt from the Special Prisoner of War Agreement Supplementary to the Korean Armistice Agreement

11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days^‡ after the transfer of custody of the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, access of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in Paragraph 8 above, shall terminate, and the question of disposition of the prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated shall be submitted to the Political Conference recommended to be convened in Paragraph 60, Draft Armistice Agreement, which shall endeavor to settle this question within thirty (30) days,^§ during which period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall continue to retain custody of those prisoners of war. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoner of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the Political Conference within one hundred and twenty (120) days^|| after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their custody. Thereafter, according to the application of each individual, those who choose to go to neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross Society of India. This operation shall be completed within thirty (30) days, and upon its completion, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall immediately cease its functions and declare its dissolution. After the dissolution of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, whenever and wherever any of those above-mentioned civilians who have been relieved from the prisoner of war status desire to return to their fatherlands, the authorities of the localities where they are shall be responsible for assisting them in returning to their fatherlands.

1. According to a covering note by Lay, Nov. 9, 1953, this draft statement of overall policy on Korea, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 949-f was transmitted to the Council for its consideration at the NSC meeting of Nov. 19, 1953. For text of NSC Action No. 949-j see the memorandum of discussion at the 168th meeting of the NSC, Oct. 29, p. 1570; for a report of the discussion at the NSC meeting of Nov. 19, see the memorandum of discussion at the 171st meeting, p. 1616.

   The enclosed statement was intended, if adopted, to supersede the current NSC policies contained in NSC 118/2, Dec. 20, 1951, printed in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vii, Part 1, p. 1382; NSC 154/1, July 7, 1953, p. 1341; NSC 156/1, July 17, 1953, p. 1384; NSC 157/1, July 7, 1953, p. 1344; and NSC 167/2, Nov. 6, 1953, p. 1598.

2. Access to Annex A was strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis and therefore it was distributed separately from NSC 170. Annex A is not printed.
3. For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 145th meeting of the NSC, May 20, p. 1064.
4. Proposed by the Defense member. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

5. The State member proposes substitution of the following for subparagraphs (4) and (5):

   The investment program should be restricted to those projects contributing to the goals stated in subparagraphs (2), (3) and (6) of this paragraph, and should place greatest emphasis initially on projects contributing most immediately to increased productivity. [Footnote in the source text.]

4. For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 156th NSC meeting, July 23, p. 1420.
5. This 90 days expires December 23, 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. This 30 days expires January 22, 1954. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. This 120 days expires February 21, 1954. [Footnote in the source text.]