Office of the Historian

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 167/2 Series

Report by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council1

top secret
NSC 167/2
Washington, November 6, 1953.

U.S. Courses of Action in Korea in the Absence of an Acceptable Political Settlement

1.

The U.S., acting in its own behalf and in its capacity as executive agent for the UN, should promptly notify Rhee formally and let other ROK leaders know that if South Korea unilaterally initiates military operations against Chinese or North Korean forces in or north of the demilitarized zone, then:

a.
UNC air, ground and sea forces will not support such operations directly or indirectly;
b.
The U.S. will not furnish any military or logistic support for such operations;
c.
All U.S. economic aid to Korea will cease immediately;
d.
The UNC Commander will take any action necessary to prevent his forces becoming involved in the renewal of hostilities and to provide for their security.*

If Rhee should ask whether or not UNC forces might be withdrawn from Korea, he should be told that, if he ceases to cooperate with UNC, the UNC will decide its course of action purely in terms of its own interest and without consulting him.

2.
At the same time the U.S. should seek to obtain from Rhee a formal assurance in writing that he will not initiate unilateral military action at any time against the Communists in or north of the demilitarized zone. If he refuses to give such assurance, the U.S. should inform him immediately that the UNC reserves all rights to take whatever actions it deems necessary to preserve the security of the UNC forces.
3.

The UNC plans and dispositions should be such as to permit maximum flexibility in meeting any likely eventuality and, insofar as possible, to reinforce the statements made to Rhee and to manifest U.S. determination to carry them out.

. . . . . . .

5.
If the ROK should renew hostilities unilaterally, the U.S. should,…
a.
Stop all economic and military assistance to Korea;
b.
Discontinue all logistic or other support to the ROK forces;
c.
Take such other military measures as seem feasible and consistent with the security of UNC forces to block ROK offensive action;
d.
Evacuate U.N. civilians;
e.
Notify the Communists that the UNC will continue to abide by the armistice terms, but will defend UNC forces against any Communist attack, and will be prepared, if a Communist counterattack against the ROK threatens the security of UNC forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of UNC forces;
f.
Renew general hostilities with the Communists only if attacked in force by the Communists or if Communist attacks against the ROK seriously threaten the security of UNC forces.
  1. According to a covering memorandum by Lay, the President approved this paper on Nov. 6 including the agreement by State and Defense to retain paragraph 5-c and delete 5-f. The OCB became the coordinating agency for implementation of the courses of action in this paper. Lay again requested that special security precautions be observed and access to NSC 167/2 be “very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis.”↩
  2. Hereafter in this paper, the term “UNC forces” refers to those forces which remain loyal to the UNC and excludes ROK forces engaged in any unilateral renewal of hostilities. [Footnote in the source text.]↩