Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 169th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, November 5, 1953¹

top secret
eyes only

November 5, 1953

The following were present at the 169th meeting of the National Security Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the Under Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration, and the Acting Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President was not present at the meeting because of his absence from the country. Also attending the meeting were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Commerce (for Items 2 and 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; General Ridgway for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Chief of Naval Operations; the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Acting Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Assistant Secretary of Commerce (for Item 3); Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Assistant to The Assistant to President (for Items 1, 2, 3 and 4); the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

[Here follows discussion on items 1. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”, 2. “U.S. Economic Policy Toward Hong Kong and Macao”, 3. “United States Policy Toward Communist China”, and 4. “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist Government”.]

5. U.S. Courses of Action in Korea in the Absence of an Acceptable Political Settlement (NSC 167/1;² NSC Action No. 949³)

With respect to NSC 167/1, Mr. Cutler noted that the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff⁴ had been received only the evening before, and that there had been no time to circulate these comments, many of which seemed to him meritorious, to the Council. He then read the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Certain proposals by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which were designed to distinguish between actions by the United States in its own behalf and actions by the United States in behalf of the UN, were accepted after a brief discussion. The major proposals for changes in subparagraphs 5-c and 5-f were, however, the subject of lively discussion.

Secretary Smith stated that he was reluctant to accept either of these two proposals. The language suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to paragraph 5–c seemed to him designed to play into the hands of President Rhee. In effect, they gave him a blank check in taking the initiative to renew hostilities, and Secretary Smith was certain that Rhee would take any blank checks offered him and gamble on them. Accordingly, Secretary Smith suggested that the Council be permitted a day or two in which to think about the proposed changes.

Secretary Wilson also expressed some concern about the proposal for a change in paragraph 5–c, and supported Secretary Smith’s request for additional time to study the matter.

Secretary Smith repeated the view that the Joint Chiefs’ phraseology suggested to him a return to the general idea of concerting with President Rhee if he succeeded in initiating hostilities against the Communists in violation of the armistice.

The President pointed out that of course the proposal of the Joint Chiefs should be read in conjunction with the earlier statements in the paper which called for the utmost expenditure of effort to persuade Rhee to abide by the terms of the armistice.

Secretary Smith replied that he was aware of this, and indeed he was so concerned to dissuade Rhee that he felt that if we were pushed to the last extremity by Rhee we might well decide to tell him that we would withdraw from Korea. In any case, we could not agree with the phraseology of the Joint Chiefs, which was tantamount to suggesting to the ROK’s that they could fight all they wanted north of the demarcation line, but not south of it.

When exception was taken by the President and others to any suggestion of a threat to withdraw, Secretary Smith said that of course he did not mean that we intended actually to withdraw, but merely that we would use the threat to deter Rhee.

The President warned that it was impossible to contemplate walking out of Korea. To do so would be to cross off three years of terrible sacrifice. He then asked Admiral Duncan to explain the purpose behind the revision proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the first instance, said Admiral Duncan, he wanted to point out that this proposal dealt with what we would do if Syngman Rhee had actually succeeded in renewing hostilities, and had nothing to do with attempts to dissuade him from renewing hostilities. As regarded the views of the Joint Chiefs respecting paragraph 5-f, they felt that it was desirable either to delete this subparagraph entirely or to change it in such a way that we did not find ourselves obliged to tell the Communists just exactly what our reactions would be in the event that the ROK’s renewed hostilities.

After further discussion, during which there seemed to be no meeting of minds, the President suggested that the Secretaries of State and Defense get together and agree as to a final wording for subparagraphs 5c and 5-f

Secretary Humphrey added that he wished to express strongly the view respecting paragraph 5-f that we should tell the Communists what we would do.

Secretary Wilson, however, said he greatly regretted any modification of this action until we had in readiness war plans to back up the action about which we would warn the Communists.

The National Security Council:⁵

a. Discussed the reference report on the subject (NSC 167/1) in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect thereto, as read at the meeting.

b. Adopted the courses of action in NSC 167/1, subject to:

(1) The following amendments:

(a) Page 1, paragraph 1, 1st line: Insert, after “The U.S.”, the words “, acting in its own behalf and in its capacity as executive agent for the UN,”.

(b) Page 1, subparagraph 1–a: Change “U.S.” to “UNC”.

(c) Page 2, paragraph 2, 5th line: Change “UNC” to “U.S.”, and “it” to “the UNC”.

(2) Agreement by the Secretaries of State and Defense as to the final wording of subparagraphs 5-c and 5-f

Note:NSC 167/1 as amended and approved by the President, including agreement by State and Defense to retain subparagraph 5-c and delete 5-f, subsequently circulated as NSC 167/2⁶ and referred to OCB as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

[Here follows discussion on item 6. “NSC Status of Projects.”]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Drafted by Gleason on Nov. 6.
2. Dated Nov. 2, p. 1583.
3. For text of NSC Action No. 949, see the memorandum of discussion at the 168th meeting of the NSC, Oct. 29, p. 1570.
4. See the memorandum from JCS to Wilson, Nov. 4, p. 1585.
5. The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 954, a record copy of which is located in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.
6. Infra.