795.00/11–253: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea1
324. Your 3842 indicates complete misunderstanding Department position and apparently you are confusing the sequence of certain events. Department does not agree that US-ROK relations in past 6 months have deteriorated nor that during this time a “soft” policy toward Rhee has enabled him to “wring” concessions from US through “intransigence”. To the contrary. As late as mid June Rhee was refusing to cooperate on any basis in connection with implementation of the Armistice despite fact that promises of economic aid, strengthening and maintenance of military forces and Mutual Defense Pact, the latter strongly recommended by both you and Clark, had all been offered him. It is therefore incorrect to state that “By agreeing ‘not to oppose’ (rather than to support Armistice) Rhee obtained significant advantages from US including signature security pact plus promise of costly economic and military assistance programs stretching several years in future.” Since President Eisenhower’s letter June 63 no US concessions have been made to Rhee with the exception (1) US agreement to walk [Page 1594] out of political conference if after 90 days US considered conference to be a sham, and (2) Secretary’s promise to come to Korea after signing of Armistice to consult regarding plans for political conference and negotiations Defense Pact along lines of Philippine Treaty previously offered him. In the meantime Rhee has receded from positions repeatedly proclaimed to Korean people and world as unalterable, the Armistice has been signed, prisoners of war desiring repatriation have been exchanged and Rhee to date has kept his agreements. Further, Rhee’s commitment was obtained despite his failure to obtain commitments demanded of US which he considered basic and at a time when he had greatest ability by unilateral action to disrupt Armistice negotiations and involve us in continued and possibly wider hostilities. Department considers this progress.
Of course there are many outstanding problems with ROK as there are with Japan, France and many other countries. In none of these instances, however, do we consider the situation to be such that all problems can be packeted for settlement by ultimatum on all-or-none basis.
The Department now as in the past fully backs Wood in his recommendations and at all times has urged that he be supported without equivocation and that he be given wide latitude of judgment. We did not and do not agree that Wood’s economic problems should be complicated with Korean-Japanese questions or even be mentioned in connection with such minor issues as the acquisition of a site for construction of new Embassy residence. Fisheries and other questions at issue between Japan and Korea should be settled by negotiation between the two countries with every proper assistance from US. It is our hope that Bond and Herrington will be helpful in bringing about resumption of negotiations and practical resolution of outstanding issues. We are prepared to help in every way open to us and at appropriate time after due notice to ROK to make public US position regarding Rhee line.
We agree that forthcoming visits by Vice President Nixon, Senator Smith and Congressman Judd should be fully utilized to best interests US and have been making plans to do so. It is particularly important that all take same US position. We are briefing Congressman Judd before he leaves and you will be sent telegram for delivery to Senator Smith requesting that he emphasize to President Rhee absolute necessity for appropriate safeguards US economic aid and likewise for continued cooperation between ROK and US if ratification Mutual Defense Treaty to be obtained.
Letter from President Eisenhower to Rhee and covering letter from the Secretary to Vice President Nixon4 are being dispatched by courier to Vice President in Taipei. The Vice President in company with you and General Hull will deliver President Eisenhower’s letter to Rhee. [Page 1595] Letter states in clear and unmistakable terms situation which would be created by unprovoked unilateral action by ROK to resume fighting. Copies are being sent to you, Allison and Hull by courier arriving Tokyo NW flight # 1 November 8. Tokyo please meet.