Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 167 Series

The Secretary of State to the Vice President¹

top secret

Washington, November 4, 1953.

Dear Dick: I enclose herewith a letter from President Eisenhower to President Rhee.² For reasons given in the letter, which you will fully understand, it is necessary to get some explicit written assurance from Rhee that he is not going to start the war up again on the gamble that he can get us involved in his effort to unite Korea by force. Rhee has been making a good many statements to the effect that he will order his forces to attack after the expiration of the period he agreed on with me. We do not refer to these statements in the President’s letter itself, as it seemed that to do so would merely make it more awkward for Rhee to back down. There is no reason, however, why you should not mention these statements orally to Rhee when you talk with him, if you think fit. Briggs and Hull can tell you about them.

The background of this letter is an NSC action which, in substance, has been reported to General Hull and which he will make available to you.

Also I am enclosing a memorandum embodying much the same information.³

There are two other major issues up with Rhee. One is the handling of economic aid, where there is an impasse with Tyler Wood. The other is relations with Japan, which are near the exploding point, particularly because of the ROK seizure of some 500 Japanese fishermen and their imprisonment. Rhee is fanatically anti-Japanese.

These matters you may want to mention orally, so that Rhee will not think we ignore them. But it did not seem wise to have the President get into these matters at this time, or to complicate the basic issue of war or peace in Korea with these other problems. While the economic and Japan matters are of great importance they are, in a sense, subsidiary to the central issue of sustaining the armistice.

As the enclosed letter suggests, we think it wise that it should be presented in the presence of Ambassador Briggs and General Hull. They will have to carry on after you leave, and it would embarrass them and undermine their future authority if they were not present when the President’s letter was delivered. On the other hand, our experience has been that oftentimes it is profitable to talk privately with Rhee, and I am sure they would have no objection to your following up this matter in private talks, when he will not have his advisers present, and when he can talk more freely.

Throughout your conversation with Mr. Rhee, however, you should, of course, make it clear that it is our keen desire to cooperate fully with Mr. Rhee to achieve a united Korea by peaceful means; to assist largely in binding up the wounds of his devastated country and restoring its economy, and in general to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with him in combating aggressive Communism.

Kenneth Young, now working with Arthur Dean, has the most complete background on negotiations with Rhee, and we shall try to get him free to see you. Incidentally, Arthur Dean has been doing a superb job—resourceful, flexible, firm and patient. His cables have been highly illuminating with reference to Communist tactics. I know you will want to have a good talk with him.

The President and I are very happy that you are to be available at this time in Korea for this very important mission.

With best wishes and congratulations on the outstanding success of your trip so far, I am

Faithfully yours,

Foster

[Enclosure]

President Eisenhower to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee)⁴

top secret

Washington, November 4, 1953.

Dear Mr. President: There is a matter which I must take up with you in the interest of our future close cooperation. I want you to know that such cooperation is my sincere purpose. However, to achieve it, I must know your purpose also.

I recall that your agreement of August eighth with Secretary Dulles provided that, until the Mutual Defense Treaty between our two nations could be expected to come into force—which we then thought might be about sixty days after the Senate reconvenes in January—you will keep your forces under the United Nations Command which would comply with the armistice terms.

Time is fast running out on this period. I need now to be thinking and planning ahead beyond this period in political, security, and economic terms.

From a political standpoint, the important thing is the ratification of our Mutual Defense Treaty. We shall face many questions from the Senators when they meet again and begin considering this Treaty. I hope for prompt and favorable action from the Senate. But to get that, I shall have to be able to assure the Senators that this Treaty will actually promote peace and mutual defense. If I should be forced to conclude that after the coming into force of the Treaty, you might unilaterally touch off a resumption of war in Korea, I could not recommend its ratification and I am certain that the Senate would not ratify it. When I formally submit the Treaty to the Senate next January, I must be in a position personally to give a clear assurance on this point.

From a military standpoint, I have heavy responsibilities for the safety of the United States forces in Korea as their Commander-in-Chief, and for the safety of the other United Nations forces as President of the United States which exercises the unified command for the United Nations action in Korea. We are, of course, now committed to react instantly if the Communist forces violate the armistice. Planning for this contingency involves the assumption that your forces and those of the United Nations will continue to act in coordination. But if you should decide to attack alone, I am convinced that you would expose the ROK forces to a disastrous defeat and they might well be permanently destroyed as an effective military force. Therefore, I must know whether or not we are to stand united so that our military leaders may make appropriate plans.

In signing the armistice, the United States has pledged itself not to renew hostilities in Korea. We mean to carry out that commitment fully. Moreover, we will not directly or indirectly violate or evade that commitment by assistance in any form to any renewal of such hostilities by ROK forces. If you were to plan to initiate military action while the Communist forces are complying with the Armistice, my obligation as to both United States forces and other United Nations forces would be to plan how best to prevent their becoming involved and to assure their security.

To turn now to economic matters, we are making plans for the future which will require me to ask for further appropriations from the Congress during the next session. When I request those appropriations, I shall surely be asked whether I have confidence that the expenditure will promote a long-term restoration of the Republic of Korea. If I believed that those funds would merely create new targets in a war renewed by you, I could not, consistently with my duty, request Congress to authorize this appropriation.

I am sending you this frank letter to take you into my confidence about pressing problems of great concern to both our countries. I count upon your loyal cooperation. However, I cannot, as you see, leave that to assumption and speculation. I must have explicit confirmation from you, in order to reach my own decisions and to be able to answer the questions which the Senate and the Congress will properly ask before they make their indispensable contribution to the cooperative plans which you and Secretary Dulles and I have been developing.

I have asked the Vice President to hand this note to you when he calls on you with Ambassador Briggs and General Hull.

He has my complete confidence and you can talk to him as you would to me. As you know, he is not only Vice President but the President of the Senate and a former member of the House and Senate. As such, he will be consulted by many Senators and Representatives when our Treaty comes before the Senate for ratification and when economic appropriations are sought. He is conversant with my views on the matters covered in this letter.

You can, if it is convenient to you, hand to him your reply to this letter. Otherwise, you can deliver it to our Embassy for transmission to me.

I extend to you and Mrs. Rhee my very best wishes and the assurance of my continuing regard.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

1. Additional copies of this letter are located in file 795.00/11–453 and the Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Korean file, box 54.
2. A note on the source text indicated that the enclosed letter was delivered to Rhee by Nixon on Nov. 12.
3. The text portion of the attached memorandum was identical to NSC 167/2, Nov. 6, p. 1598, with the exception of paragraph 5f which read as in NSC 167/1, Nov. 2, p. 1583. According to telegram 409 to Taipei for Nixon, Nov. 9, paragraph 5f was to be deleted and paragraph 5g to become 5f, with the rest of the memorandum standing unchanged. (033.1100 NI/11–953) This change was as per the agreement reached by the Secretaries of Defense and State after the 169th NSC meeting on Nov. 5 (see the memorandum of discussion, p. 1595).
4. A copy of this letter was not attached to the signed letter from Dulles to Nixon in S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351. This copy came from file 795.00/11–453. Texts of this letter as drawn up by Dulles in draft on Nov. 1 for Eisenhower’s approval are located in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Korean file, box 54.