Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/11–453: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Hull) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
routine

Tokyo, November 4, 1953—4:42 p.m.

C 65842. 1. Subject is recommended psn at the political conf regarding withdrawal of non-Korean Forces from Korea.

2. Analysis of psn to be recommended from a mil viewpoint involves consideration of:

a. Whether such a withdrawal of UN Forces would jeopardize the security of South Korea, and ultimately the security of Japan and the Ryukyus.

b. Whether, and to what extent, US/UN Forces should be retained in Korea to stabilize the ROK Government, or to prevent ROK aggression in violation of the armistice or eventual peace settlement.

c. The ultimate effects of retaining US/UN Forces in Korea with the attendant risk of becoming reinvolved in a protracted grd war on the Asiatic mainland.

3. After reviewing the factors involved, and considering the risk of Communist reinitiation of hostilities, I have concluded that a withdrawal of all, or all but a fixed number of non-Korean Forces of both sides, phased over a sufficient pd to provide for an orderly turnover of equip to ROK Forces, will involve no unacceptable risk to this comd, if proper safeguards are provided. While expanded US Mil Advisory Groups should remain in Korea for an indefinite pd to assist in the development of South Korean defenses and to cont log support to ROK Forces until ROK capabilities in this fld are properly developed, in my opinion retention of UN Combat Forces in Korea would not restrain the ROKs in any unilateral action once the UN Command in Korea is removed. On the contrary, the Rhee Government might take the presence of residual UN Forces as implied support for unilateral action. I also believe that an early withdrawal should be effected to avoid the risk of becoming reinvolved in a protracted ground war on the Asiatic mainland.

4. I therefore recommend:

a. UN objectives at the political conf should include withdrawal of US/UN Forces from Korea in consonance with the withdrawal of CCF Forces.

b. US Mil Advisory Groups should be expanded and remain in Korea for an indefinite period in order to cont the development of the defenses of South Korea, complete the turnover of US supplies and equip, and assist in maintaining the contd cooperation of the ROK Government.

c. The early withdrawal of US/UN Forces from Korea should be effected in order to minimize the possibility of the US becoming reinvolved in a ground war on the continent of Asia against nations having unlimited manpower resources.

d. Withdrawal of US/UN Forces from Korea should be begun as soon as the decisions of the political conf can be determined, and should be completed in a min of 11 months.