Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

top secret

Washington, November 4, 1953.

Subject:

• Courses of Action in Korea (A draft proposed by representatives of State, Defense, and CIA¹ in response to NSC Action No. 949 c²).

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding the attached draft of proposed courses of action in Korea, dated 2 November 1953, prepared for consideration by the National Security Council pursuant to NSC Action No. 949 c.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in general agreement with the proposed courses of action for dissuading or preventing the Republic of Korea (ROK) from initiating unilaterally a renewal of hostilities, and for dealing with the situation, if despite our efforts, the ROK does renew hostilities. They feel, however, that the following changes would be appropriate in the interests of clarity and to distinguish between actions to be taken by the United States in its own behalf and actions to be taken in its capacity as executive agent for the United Nations (changes indicated in the usual manner):³

a. Change paragraph 1 to read as follows:

“The U.S., acting in its own behalf and its capacity of executive agent for the UN, should promptly notify Rhee formally and let other ROK leaders know that if South Korea unilaterally initiates military operations against Chinese or North Korean forces in or north of the demilitarized zone, then:”

Reason: It would be more appropriate, as well as more authoritative, for the U.S. to speak both for itself and as executive agent for the UN.

b. Change subparagraph 1 a to read:

“U.S. UN air, ground and sea forces will not support such operations directly or indirectly;”

Reason: For accuracy and for consistency with the change recommended in a above.

c. Change the second sentence of paragraph 2 to read as follows:

“If he refuses to give such assurance, the US should inform him immediately that it the UNC reserves all rights to take whatever actions it deems necessary to preserve the security of the UNC forces.”

Reason: To indicate that this information is to be transmitted by the U.S. Representative acting both for the U.S. and the UNC.

d. Change subparagraph 5 c to read as follows:

“So long as there remains any prospect of limiting the hostilities and restoring the armistice, take such other military measures as seem feasible and consistent with the security of UNC forces to block ROK offensive action;”

Reason: If fighting between ROK and Communist forces reaches large-scale proportions despite appropriate UN efforts to prevent the renewal of hostilities, it would be in the best interest of the U.S. and the UN forces not to employ military measures to block or obstruct ROK military action beyond those measures necessary in the interest of the security of UN forces.

e. Delete subparagraph 5 f.

Reason: Any Communist reaction to a renewal of hostilities by the ROK would almost certainly involve UN forces in some degree. If the U.S. and the UNC were categorically committed in advance to expand the hostilities beyond Korea in such circumstances irrespective of the manner in which UN forces became involved, there would be no alternative other than attacking Communist China without adequate preparation, or failing to carry out the threat. If the Communists react in a manner intended to restore the armistice line, it would not be in the U.S. interest to extend hostilities. If the threat is not to be carried out, it should not be made.

3. With reference to subparagraph 2 e above, in the event that the National Security Council should not agree to the deletion of subparagraph 5 f the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that it be changed as follows:

“Preferably in concert with our principal Allies, notify the Communists that if UNC forces are attacked by the Communists, the counteraction will not be confined to Korea. they take military action beyond that necessary to restore the armistice line and attack UN forces, in all probability it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.”

Reasons:

(1) Inasmuch as this proposed counteraction might involve extension of hostilities outside of Korea, it would appear that the U.S. should consult with its principal Allies prior to announcing its intentions in this regard.

(2) Any Communist reaction to a renewal of hostilities by the ROK would almost certainly involve UN forces in some degree. If the U.S. and the UNC were categorically committed in advance to expand the hostilities beyond Korea in such circumstances irrespective of the manner in which UN forces became involved, there would be no alternative other than attacking Communist China without adequate preparation, or failing to carry out the threat. Therefore, any warning should apply specifically to Communist action beyond that necessary to restore the armistice line.

(3) The revised wording conforms to the text of the Joint Policy Declaration agreed to by the UN Allies in Korea.

4. Subject to the foregoing comments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you concur in the adoption of the proposed courses of action formulated pursuant to NCS Action No. 949 c.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Edwin H. J. Carns

Brigadier General, Usa Secretary

1. Supra.
2. For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 168th meeting of the NSC, Oct. 29, p. 1570.
3. i.e., additions in italics; deletions struck through.