Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 167/1

Draft Report by the Departments of State and Defense With the Assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency to the National Security Council¹

top secret
NSC 167/1

Washington, November 2, 1953.

U.S. Courses of Action in Korea in the Absence of an Acceptable Political Settlement (Summary prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 949–c²)

1. The U.S. should promptly notify Rhee formally and let other ROK leaders know that if South Korea unilaterally initiates military operations against Chinese or North Korean forces in or north of the demilitarized zone, then:

a. U.S. air, ground and sea forces will not support such operations directly or indirectly;

b. The U.S. will not furnish any military or logistic support for such operations;

c. All U.S. economic aid to Korea will cease immediately;

d. The UNC Commander will take any action necessary to prevent his forces becoming involved in the renewal of hostilities and to provide for their security.^* If Rhee should ask whether or not the UNC forces might be withdrawn from Korea, he should be told that, if he ceases to cooperate with UNC, the UNC will decide its course of action purely in terms of its own interest and without consulting him.

2. At the same time the U.S. should seek to obtain from Rhee a formal assurance in writing that he will not initiate unilateral military action at any time against the Communists in or north of the demilitarized zone. If he refuses to give such assurance, the UNC should inform him immediately that it reserves all rights to take whatever actions it deems necessary to preserve the security of the UNC forces.

3. The UNC plans and dispositions should be such as to permit maximum flexibility in meeting any likely eventuality and, insofar as possible, to reinforce the statements made to Rhee and to manifest U.S. determination to carry them out.

. . . . . . .

5. If the ROK should renew hostilities unilaterally, the U.S. should,…:

a. Stop all economic and military assistance to Korea;

b. Discontinue all logistic or other support to the ROK forces;

c. Take such other military measures as seem feasible and consistent with the security of UNC forces to block ROK offensive action;

d. Evacuate U.N. civilians;

e. Notify the Communists that the UNC will continue to abide by the armistice terms, but will defend UNC forces against any Communist attack, and will be prepared, if a Communist counterattack against the ROK threatens the security of UNC forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of UNC forces;

f. Notify the Communists that if UNC forces are attacked by the Communists, the counteraction will not be confined to Korea;

g. Renew general hostilities with the Communists only if attacked in force by the Communists or if Communist attacks against the ROK seriously threaten the security of UNC forces.

1. According to a covering memorandum by Lay, Nov. 2, this draft summary was to be transmitted to the NSC for consideration at its meeting of Nov. 5. Lay reiterated that the special security precautions which were required for NSC 167 would be in effect with this paper. Furthermore, records were kept of individuals who had access to the summary and all copies were to be returned to the NSC after Council action on it.
2. For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 168th meeting of the NSC, Oct. 29, p. 1570.
3. Hereafter in this paper, the term “UNC forces” refers to those forces which remain loyal to the UNC and excludes ROK forces engaged in any unilateral renewal of hostilities. [Footnote in the source text.]