Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/11–453: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean)¹

secret
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Washington, November 4, 1953—11 a.m.

24. For Dean from the Secretary. Further your 20.²

1. I have considered further question of composition. In view position we have taken publicly and Rhee’s attitude I do not see we can go very far towards meeting Communists point of view, if they continue insist on advance agreement that we will admit neutrals to the conference. Suggestion contained paragraph [7] b your 20 that each side designate mutually agreed neutral, or neutral on its side, appears basically contrary to position we have taken against neutral participation. Neither does it solve problem of India. We could not agree to or designate India in view Rhee’s attitude; and it would be highly undesirable have India come to conference as nominee of Communists.

2. It would be best if we could still persuade Commies leave this question to conference itself on basis either paragraph [7] c or d your 20.

3. So far as any advance understanding on substance composition question is concerned we could not go further than along lines suggestions your telegram 20:

(a) It would be acceptable to us to have India present in its capacity as Chairman NNRC, and if necessary we could accept other members NNRC in same capacity. For this however we should seek obtain Rhee’s acquiescence.

(b) We see no objection proposing seven-power conference if you believe this holds promise of breaking deadlock but only if we can get our allies to agree. We are taking this up with some of our friends and will inform you. (See Deptel Munsan-ni 23.³)

(c) No objection combining (a) and (b) under conditions stated above.

Dulles

1. This telegram, repeated to Seoul as telegram 310 and Tokyo as telegram 1065 (to be passed to CINCUNC), was drafted by Henkin and McClurkin and cleared by Wainhouse, Drumright (in draft), and Dulles.
2. Dated Nov. 1, p. 1578.
3. This telegram reported that Murphy had asked the Canadian Ambassador in Washington to take up the seven-power conference idea with Pearson who, if he concurred, might be willing to raise it among the 16 nations with troops participating in Korea (795.00/11–353). The result, according to telegram 38 to Munsan-ni, Nov. 7, was that the Canadians agreed to canvass the so-called “lesser 12” (nations whose forces in Korea were only token ones) to determine whether or not they would be willing on their own initiative not to participate in the conference. (795.00/11–753)