Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/11–253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

top secret

Seoul, November 2, 1953—7 p.m.

384. Repeated information Tokyo 197. Tokyo pass CINCUNC exclusive for General Hull. Repeated information Munsan-ni for Ambassador Dean by pouch.

Purpose of this message is to survey status US-ROK relations and make recommendations relative early US action. Message submitted in light impending separate visits to Seoul of Vice President Nixon (November 12–15), Senator Smith (about November 8) and Congressman Judd (November 17–19), on which I believe we should seek to capitalize. Also have in mind current negotiations of Ambassador Dean regarding political conference.

1. Our relations with Korea at this time depend chiefly on attitude and behavior of President Rhee. Although Rhee has had long association with democratic nations his own government is one-man show operated along personal dictatorial lines. His political position has strengthened during present year, partly through elimination effective opposition and partly as result his success in dealing with US. Successive visits high US officials beginning with President-elect last December have likewise enhanced Rhee’s prestige.

2. US-ROK relations have grown increasingly unsatisfactory, especially since last April when Armistice negotiations renewed. By agreeing “not to oppose” (rather than to support) Armistice Rhee obtained significant advantages from US including signature Security Pact plus promise of costly economic and military assistance programs stretching several years in future.

During same period Rhee has become increasingly stubborn and defiant by reason of observing that defiance and stubbornness have achieved his objectives vis-à-vis US by bringing about substantial modifications US position in direction Rhee’s own demands. To degree we have permitted Rhee wring major concessions from us we have increased his appetite as well as his conviction of infallibility.

3. Not only have US-ROK relations become increasingly unstable, but Rhee’s behavior especially since Armistice has adversely affected US relations with other countries, notably Japan and India but including also other members Commonwealth and other UN Nations fighting in Korea, whose continuing close collaboration highly important to US. Rhee’s hostility toward India and constant denunciation of that country are making it more difficult to go forward with political conference seeking unification Korea. Japan has been brought close to point of explosion against Korea by Rhee’s enforcement of “peace line” and arrest several hundred Japanese fishermen.

Although undertakings set forth in Rhee–Dulles Agreement of August 8 have been generally honored, attempts to enforce Rhee line by ROK Navy represent undermining of authority United Nations Command which at very least sets dangerous precedent. In addition various threats which we cannot ignore have been made in regard to unilateral action at end of six months after Armistice (January 27) regardless of whether political conference convened.

5. In economic field, economic coordinator Wood in ten weeks of patient and skillful negotiation has not yet been able obtain ROK Government’s written agreement on arrangements and measures necessary for reasonable prospect of effective use of US aid. I am extremely gratified that in past few days Wood has received authorization from Unified Command to take firm stand on crucial issues, and to hold up at his discretion submission of further firm requests to FOA Washington to initiate procurement, but decisive meetings with President and Prime Minister have still to take place.

6. Embassy has on various previous occasions (Embtels 350 and 237)¹ recommended abandonment “soft” attitude which has marked our dealings with Rhee and substitution therefor of insistence that reasonableness and mutual respect should henceforth characterize relations, and that friendship is two-way street involving recognition that on certain fundamental issues US national interest must prevail.

7. If I correctly understand Department’s reluctance to come to grips with Rhee it is that we should save our ammunition for big issue of possible unilateral ROK action to terminate Armistice by resuming fighting, and in meantime tolerate other actions by him even though inimical to US interests. If this understanding correct, I must record my belief that such policy is merely storing up trouble and cost for US Government. While obviously we should not waste ammunition over trifling issues, it is submitted that those facing us at present in connection with Korean-Japanese relations (including status Dulles–Rhee agreement August 8) as well as in economic field are fundamental and should not be postponed. Furthermore, they can only be solved by firmness and willingness back up our demands on Rhee; they will undoubtedly become more acute in measure in which we temporize, vacillate, or postpone in hope something may turn up.

8. I believe we should forthwith confront issues described and that we should capitalize on official visits taking place during next three weeks to drive home to Rhee fact his recent conduct if persisted in can only lead to destruction of his country and himself and major victory for communism in Asia.

Specifically I recommend:

a. With respect to ROK relations with Japan that, if present attempts to reopen bilateral negotiations not successful, we tell Rhee (and state publicly at proper time) that we do not recognize Rhee line nor will we support it by permitting US aid, military or economic, to be employed for purposes its enforcement. Unless Rhee will abandon policy which will otherwise lead directly to rupture peaceful relations with Japan, we should immediately inform Rhee of withdrawal logistic support from ROK Navy. While recommendations may shortly be formulated in greater detail, approach which I believe we should make is generally as set forth in Embtel 377 October 31.²

b. We should support Wood 100 percent in his insistence on satisfactory commitments from ROK government on arrangements and measures necessary to permit effective use of US aid. Now that our government has reached high level decision authorizing Wood make firm stand, it is imperative he be fully supported when final test comes. Worst possible outcome, from a standpoint our broad interest, would be to have Wood back down when Rhee challenges his position.

c. I hope that Senator Smith and Dr. Judd will be willing give strong support this position and to add that unless appropriate safeguards are accepted by ROK government, further appropriations on part US Congress are unlikely—notwithstanding profound sympathy of American people for Korea and our desire make substantial contribution to relief and reconstruction of this country.

d. Re mutual defense treaty, I hope our Congressional visitors, especially Senator Smith, will be equally explicit in letting Rhee know how damaging his behavior has already been to prospects of obtaining Senate ratification during next session. When one considers importance apparently attached by Rhee to obtaining such pact, it is difficult to believe he would be willing now to throw it all away if it were made clear to him that that would be consequence of continued intemperate and unreasonable conduct on his part.

e. There remains possibility of unilateral action on Rhee’s part to resume fighting. I believe Rhee should be left in no doubt whatsoever that if he attempts to breach armistice and resume war, he can expect no support from us. I believe further that strongest possible deterrent to reckless resumption fighting will be certainty in Rhee’s mind that we will not support him nor permit US–UN involvement and that he will be destroying himself and risking loss of everything obtained thus far by attempting to make war alone. Visit of Vice President offers unparalleled opportunity for this message to be put across on behalf President Eisenhower earnestly, sincerely, with genuine friendship for Korea, and in terms both unmistakable and convincing.

Briggs

1. Neither printed. (795.00/10–2153 and 611.95B/9–1953, respectively)
2. The approach set forth included three proposed public statements to be issued simultaneously: first, that Japan and Korea had requested the United States to use its good offices to help settle ROK–Japanese differences; second, that Japan would return such Korean national treasures as it held; and third, that Korea would release immediately Japanese fishermen whom it held. At the same time, without announcement, the United States would inform the ROK on behalf of Japan of Japanese willingness to forego claims against Korea and settle the fishery dispute along conservation lines. (694.95B/10–3153)