Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

FE files, lot 55 D 338, “Korean Political Conference, October 1953”: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief Far East (Hull)¹

top secret

Washington, October 31, 1953—[11:37 a.m.].

JCS 951671. From JCS for CINCUNC. Exclusive for Hull. Ref: A. C 65636² B. JCS 951018.³

1. At NSC meeting on 29 October it was decided to inform you concerning current agreed thinking for your information and guidance but not to be the basis of any action by you except as subsequently instructed.

2. It is presently the consensus of the NSC that:

a. At an appropriate time in the approximate future President Rhee will be informed unequivocally that in the event of renewal of hostilities in Korea through unilateral ROK action the UN forces will not support the ROK military forces either directly or indirectly, that all economic aid to the ROK will immediately cease, and that the UN Commander will take any action necessary to avoid becoming involved and to provide for the security of his forces.

b. All possible measures will be taken, both overt and covert, to gain the earliest possible knowledge of a decision on the part of President Rhee to issue orders to the ROK forces to attack and, in the event of such decision, to prevent such an order from being issued or, if issued, from reaching ROK military commanders in the field; such measures should not exclude invoking martial law, as a means of controlling signal communications, transportation and police functions, and the seizure and detention of key ROK military and civil personages involved.

c. At the appropriate time, all possible measures will be taken to reduce the probability that such an order, if received by field commanders, would be carried out.

d. If Rhee should ask whether or not UNC forces might be withdrawn from Korea, he will be told that if he ceases to cooperate with UNC, the UNC will decide its course of action purely in terms of its own interest, and without consulting him.

e. Every effort will be made to secure a commitment from President Rhee that he will not undertake unilateral aggressive action at any time. Unless he is willing to give such commitment, our position shall be that we, also, must then act independently and our plans or intentions will not be disclosed to him.

3. It has not yet been decided who shall present these governmental views to President Rhee nor have the manner and timing been decided. Consideration being given here to directing Vice President Nixon as governmental spokesman to present position outlined in para 2a above to President Rhee. You will be notified when this decision is made.

4. Meanwhile, confident here at highest level that your plans and dispositions will permit maximum flexibility in meeting any eventuality.

5. NSC continuing consideration of U.S. Courses of Action in Korea in the Absence of an Acceptable Political Settlement.⁴ When final decisions are reached on this subject you will be informed.

1. The source text was a draft copy, approved by Dulles, Wilson, and the JCS, on which a note was written indicating that this draft was approved by the President and sent to Hull on Oct. 31. The time of transmission is taken from the JCS copy.
2. Dated Oct. 21, p. 1543.

3. In this telegram, Oct. 23, the JCS informed CINCFE that their response to recommendations contained in telegram C 65636 was deferred pending NSC consideration of the issue scheduled for Oct. 29. (FE files, lot 55 D 338, “Korean Political Conference, October 1953”)

   For a report of the NSC consideration, see the memorandum of discussion at the 168th meeting of the NSC, Oct. 29, supra.

4. NSC 167, Oct. 22, p. 1546.