Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/11–153: Telegram

The Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Munsan-Ni, November 1, 1953.¹

20. Repeated information Seoul, Tokyo, New Delhi, CINCUNC unnumbered. From Dean. Limit distribution. Following summary first week’s negotiations:²

1. Commie agenda obviously unacceptable but during first week they have unyieldingly adhered their demand we accept their proposed agenda and that first item on it, composition, be discussed and settled before discussion other items.

2. While adhering to our basic position we have made several proposals aimed at by-passing problem of agenda in order get on with substantive discussion without commitments on settlement of any one item.

3. Communists have made no effort whatsoever respond our constructive proposals even by gesture.

4. If propitious we may broach proposition contained Deptel 10,³ provided I can satisfy Rhee, as MSA’s [meansl] getting away from agenda problem.

5. In event Communist reaction is one of willingness to pass directly to discussion of substantive items or of willingness to modify agenda in manner satisfactory to us, would like to be prepared with clearcut idea our minimum position on composition since it seems improbable Communists will give final agreement on time and place without some understanding as to composition and I shall attempt reach such understanding at current meetings.

6. Apart from clearance with Rhee essential that I have Department’s thinking on what is furthest we can go on this matter ourselves in order that our tactics in the meetings can be properly planned.

7. There are number of possibilities open to me here for agreement re composition within terms of paragraph 60 and August 28 resolution:

(a) Ex officio or observer status for India, India and Sweden or all members NNRC.

(b) Each side to designate mutually agreed third party or its own additional party to participate in conference with or without vote.

(c) Conference itself to meet and put composition at end of round for decision only when other agenda matters agreed to.

(d) Composition not to be on agenda of political conference but conference being plenary free to take it up after progress made on Korean item or if necessary to make progress Korean item or when other than Korean items are raised.

(e) Seven-power conference—note this has disadvantage including Communist China with Big Four.

(f) Seven-power conference with India and Sweden or Switzerland and Czechoslovakia or Poland in ex officio capacity as members NNRC—latter has advantage of fuzzing up precedent of including Communist China on Big-Five basis.

8. Reference US atrocity charges in UNGA (Deptel 9),⁴ they may have some pattern on negotiations here. How much is too early tell but see no reason here not to pursue in UNGA if advisable domestic situation. May make Commie line here even harder and less subject to any modification. Commies may assume direct tie-up between our UNGA charges and my tactics here. Having already put forward reasonable proposals for ending agenda impasse before these charges made, I believe best tactic is continue stress my proposals here for few days and hold brief meetings if neither side has anything to say.

Dean

1. There was no time of transmission indicated on this telegram which was received in the Department of State at 11:09 a.m., Nov. 1.
2. Talks between Dean and his North Korean and Chinese counterparts, Ki Sok Pok and Huang Hua, began on Oct. 26 at Panmunjom.
3. In this telegram, Dean received authority to state that as to some aspects of the proposed Korean Political Conference, the United States would not object to the presence of some nonbelligerents, as in the case of India as the Chairman of the NNRC when the prisoner question was before the conference. However, the proposal, if made, should be limited to India. (795.00/10–2953)
4. In telegram 9 to Munsan-ni, the Department of State repeated for Dean’s information telegram Delga 184, Oct. 29, in which Lodge suggested that the issue of atrocities committed by the Chinese and North Koreans against American and other UN POWs should be placed as an item on the UN General Assembly agenda, and telegram Gadel 49, same date, in which the Department of State agreed with the suggestion. (695A.0026/10–2953)