Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 168th Meeting of the National Security Council Thursday, October 29, 1953¹

top secret
eyes only

October 29, 1953

Present at the 168th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President did not attend the meeting because of his absence from the country. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 2 and 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 2 and 3); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (for Item 2). The following were present for Items 2, 3 and 7: the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Acting Chief of Staff,. U.S. Air Force; and the Acting Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps. Others also present were the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert Bowie, of the Department of State; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion on items 1. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”, 2. “Review of Basic National Security Policy”, 3. “FY 1955 Budget Considerations”, 4. “Continental Defense”, 5. “Near East Oil Situation”, and 6. “Safeguarding Official Information in the Interest of the Defense of the United States”.]

7. U.S. Courses of Action in Korea in the Absence of an Acceptable Political Settlement (NSC 167;² Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 28, 1953;³ NSC Action No. 794⁴)

Mr. Cutler took great pains to explain the sensitive nature of this paper and, in order to clarify the problem and to emphasize the content and significance of the alternative courses of action, read paragraphs 1 through 8 of the paper. He explained the urgency of Council action in the choice of an alternative, since General Hull was in need of guidance and also because the Vice President would reach Korea on November 12 and might be very helpful in bringing pressure on Syngman Rhee to avoid unilateral resumption of hostilities. Mr. Cutler also called the Council’s attention to the JCS comments on this report.

At the conclusion of Mr. Cutler’s lengthy exposition, the President interposed to observe that when the Council had earlier discussed action which the United States would take if the Communists broke the armistice and resumed hostilities, it was agreed that we would use atomic bombs to meet the situation. We were therefore supposed to discuss the use of atomic weapons with our allies. The President wanted to know whether such discussions had taken place and whether our allies fully understood our position respecting atomic weapons.

Secretary Dulles said that he was quite certain our major allies did understand our view, even though there had not been formal discussions with them.

Mr. Cutler then brought the discussion back to the written comments of the Joints Chiefs of Staff.⁵ He noted that the Joint Chiefs had thrown out the fourth alternative, namely, of joining in with the ROKs if they resumed hostilities. He also pointed out that the Joint Chiefs felt that any threat to withdraw from Korea was inadmissible. In substance, Mr. Cutler believed that the Joint Chiefs’ proposal was a combination of Alternatives A and C of NSC 167, but in any case he asked Admiral Carney to summarize the JCS position.

Admiral Carney stated that the Joint Chiefs favored putting every practical pressure on Rhee at once in order to prevent him from resuming hostilities. They did not, however, believe that we should even indicate a possibility that we might withdraw from Korea. If these efforts to dissuade Rhee failed, continued Admiral Carney, the Chiefs made certain recommendations as to how to proceed, but they did not forecast the precise courses of action which it would be necessary to follow in order to carry out these recommendations. Admiral Carney then read the recommendations contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the JCS comments.

At the conclusion of Admiral Carney’s statement, the President said that he assumed that we were gradually concentrating our own and other UN forces in Korea in such a way that an attack by the ROK on the Communists would not automatically involve our own forces. When General Bolte replied that such changes in disposition of our forces were mostly complete, the President went on to express a conviction that we must avoid any course of action which played into the hands of the Communists while attempting to restrain Rhee. If we stay in Korea, said the President, it was above all essential to avoid allowing the Communists to eliminate the ROK forces, after which they could turn upon the UN forces and administer a crushing defeat. In short, said the President, the Communists must be made to understand clearly that any attack on the UN forces would mean general war. After further discussion of the JCS views, the President called on the Secretary of State to read the statement⁶ which he had prepared on this subject and which had been circulated to the members of the Council (copy in Minutes of 168th NSC meeting).

The Secretary of State said that he would prefer not to read from his written statement, but to speak extemporaneously. He said he believed that the consequences of any renewal of the war in Korea by a unilateral Rhee initiative would be so disastrous that all our efforts must be to forestall such a renewal. For if this does happen there was really no good alternative to choose from. We certainly could not follow Course D and join Rhee in a flagrant act of aggression. Yet neither do we want to see, first, his ROK forces defeated, and then our own, nor, finally, could we bring ourselves to abandon the peninsula.

In view of what faced us, continued Secretary Dulles, the State Department believed that there were two main approaches to what should be done to forestall a Rhee initiative. First, measures to persuade Rhee not to undertake the action. Secondly, measures to replace Rhee if he nevertheless initiates the action. In order to accomplish the first of these we in the State Department feel that it is essential to confront Rhee with the direct question as to whether he would cooperate with us or not, and to secure from him an answer in writing to this question. It is essential that we know his answer in advance in order to allow time to make our plans. At this time we would also tell Rhee what we would do if he proceeds to go it alone. In essentials, continued Secretary Dulles, State and Defense are agreed on what we should say to Rhee, except on the point as to whether we threaten him with the possibility that we would withdraw from Korea. This latter issue had been fully debated in the State Department, and Secretary Dulles said that he was now willing to agree with Defense that [what?] we should not say to Rhee or prepare to get out of Korea. We would simply be silent on this point, and inasmuch as Rhee was going off on his own, we would simply tell him that we will do what we think best if he jumps off.

On the second matter, that of replacing Rhee if he does nevertheless start hostilities, there was no great difference between the views of State and Defense. If Rhee refuses to agree to cooperate with us, or appears about to break such an agreement, Secretary Dulles said that we should have measures ready to replace him as head of the ROK. Without minimizing the very great difficulties involved in this task, Secretary Dulles pointed out that in recent days it appeared that certain significant elements in the ROK Government now seemed less likely to rally to Rhee on a course of national suicide. Accordingly, it was not necessarily hopeless to find a replacement for Rhee. On the other hand, Secretary Dulles pointed out that the replacement of Rhee was not merely a matter of technical measures. We must also have a strong moral case before the world, so that we do not appear to be treating the Republic of Korea in the same fashion that the Soviets treat the governments of their satellites. This case could surely be made, since such an act of aggression by Rhee would certainly be fully as reprehensible as the initial North Korean attack on the ROK in June 1950.

The President was most emphatic in stating his agreement with this latter statement by the Secretary of State, and pointed out the advantages which would accrue from a declaration of martial law in the event that Rhee went off on his own.

In any event, continued Secretary Dulles, with his qualification on the subject of withdrawal from Korea, there was a considerable similarity between the positions taken by State and Defense on how to proceed. Even so, it might prove useful to pull some of our forces back from the front in order to create apprehensions in South Korea that we might actually withdraw from the peninsula.

Secretary Wilson said that he wanted to call to the attention of the Secretary of State one other important point in which Defense still differed from State in its approach to this problem. Defense seriously questioned the desirability of trying to get 90 days notice from Rhee before he acted.

Secretary Dulles replied that the State Department no longer held to this time interval. All that State wanted was a written promise from Rhee not to resume hostilities unilaterally. Of course, it would be highly advantageous to get such a commitment in time to be able to act effectively if Rhee violated his promise.

Speaking to General Bolte, the President said that if, as he assumed, the UN Command was in complete control of communications to all the divisional headquarters, he didn’t see how Rhee could possibly send a message ordering renewal of hostilities without our Commanders having almost instant knowledge that it had been sent. General Bolte concurred in the President’s judgment.

Secretary Dulles spoke with regret and concern of the present impasse on economic aid, which deprived us of this factor as a means of influencing Rhee to behave himself. Actually, neutral observers had made it plain that the Soviets were forging far ahead in the rehabilitation of North Korea, while we were doing next to nothing, thanks to Rhee’s stubbornness, in restoring South Korea. After all the money which we had appropriated for rebuilding South Korea, we had virtually nothing to indicate visible results of the advantage of U.S. friendship to the population of the ROK.

Mr. Rand explained that the impasse in our aid progress had developed because Rhee and Mr. C. Tyler Wood has been unable to agree on a currency exchange rate. Rhee had quit their last conference on the subject in a huff.

Secretary Dulles said that whatever the facts of the matter, our economic leverage is at the moment worthless.

Mr. Dodge noted that this was merely the last in a long line of agreements on exchange rates which President Rhee had broken, while Secretary Dulles said that some way must be found to impress the people of South Korea with the advantage of our economic assistance. Otherwise a threat to withdraw such economic assistance would have no effect whatever.

The President expressed warm agreement, as he said, “with every word the Secretary of State had uttered”, and stated his irritation that so much effort and expenditure to assist in the rehabilitation of South Korea had thus far produced no visible result.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the hour was late, and that he was still uncertain what kind of a response should be sent to General Hull for his guidance, and furthermore, what decision the Council would make in the choice of the alternatives in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the somewhat changed position taken by the Secretary of State.

Secretary Dulles expressed the view that the Council was not really yet ready to make a decision now among these four alternatives. We were close, however, to an agreement, and if a special meeting could be arranged within the next few days, it would be possible to reach a decision.

The President replied that he wholly approved of the courses that General Hull proposed to take, and that what we needed to tell him in addition was to secure maximum flexibility and maximum security in the deployment of the UN forces. The President agreed, he said, also with Defense that it was impossible to deploy our forces in front of the ROK forces in order to forestall an ROK attack. In this case he found himself on the side of Secretary Wilson.

Secretary Dulles answered that the State Department had felt that such a deployment would have great psychological advantages, but if it was the judgment that it was unsound militarily, he would drop it.

After further discussion of what interim action the Council should take at this time, the President pointed out that it would take some few days at least to reach agreement as to measures to dissuade Rhee from taking unilateral action or of measures to be taken in the event that Rhee initiated hostilities despite all our efforts to dissuade him. These measures should be worked out by the Secretaries of State and Defense with the assistance of CIA. Meanwhile, we should inform General Hull of what we had agreed to, including the decision that we are making plans for the eventuality of seizing Rhee. The President expressed agreement with Secretary Dulles’ doubts as to whether a General (General Hull) was the appropriate person to approach Rhee on this problem, and it was suggested by a number of other Council members that the Vice President might be a logical choice for this task.

Mr. Allen Dulles, at the conclusion of the meeting, pointed out his doubt whether Rhee would ever be convinced of our determination to prevent him from renewing hostilities unless at some point we issued a public statement of our position.

The National Security Council:⁷

a. Discussed the reference report on the subject (NSC 167) in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of October 28 and of the memorandum of the Secretary of State of October 28.

b. Agreed that the Secretaries of State and Defense should prepare an interim message⁸ on the subject to the Commander in Chief, UN Command, along the lines discussed at the meeting, for approval by the President.

c. Requested the Departments of State and Defense, with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency, to prepare, in the light of the discussion, for Council consideration at its next meeting, a summary of courses of action to dissuade or prevent the Republic of Korea from initiating unilateral renewal of hostilities, or to deal with the situation if, despite our efforts, the ROK renews hostilities.

d. Requested the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency as appropriate, to review urgently the military arid diplomatic measures provided in NSC Action No. 794, and to report the results thereof to the Council at its meeting on November 19, 1953.

e. Noted the President’s desire urgently to expedite the program for strengthening the Korean economy in accordance with NSC 156/1;⁹ having in mind that the carrying out of this program will provide concrete evidence to the people of the Republic of Korea of the benefits of cooperating with the United States.

f. Noted that the NSC Planning Board would prepare an over-all statement of policy on Korea for Council consideration at its meeting on November 19, 1953.

Note: The actions in b, c and d above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence for implementation. The action in e above subsequently transmitted to the Director, Foreign Operations Administration, for implementation.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Drafted by Gleason on Oct. 30.
2. Dated Oct. 22, p. 1546.
3. Presumably this memorandum, not printed, transmitted a memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, Oct. 27, p. 1563.
4. For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 145th meeting of the NSC, May 20, p. 1064.
5. See footnote 3 above.
6. Not found, but the proposed Department of State position is summarized in a memorandum by Bowie to Dulles, Oct. 28, p. 1567.
7. The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 949, a record copy of which is located in S/S–NSC(Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.
8. Sent as JCS telegram 951671, infra.
9. Dated July 17, p. 1384.