S/SNSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 167 Series

Memorandum by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Scott) to the Secretary of State1

top secret

Subject:

  • Revised plan Ever Ready

In an “exclusive” message to General Ridgway, General Hull has tentatively approved the following revised plan Ever Ready.2

Ever Ready provides for the safeguarding of UNC forces and supplies and insures that the UN position, relative to the armistice, is maintained in the event operational control of the ROK forces is weakened or lost prior to, during, or following the political settlement.

The plan is conditioned by four assumptions:

  • One, the political settlement has been, will be, or is being negotiated.
  • Two, UN forces maintain the status quo of their positions and strength as of October 14, 1953.
  • Three, the ROK reluctance to accept the armistice terms may produce:
    • Condition A: ROK Government or military is unresponsive to UNC directives.
    • Condition B: ROK Government and military take an independent course of action.
    • Condition C: ROK Government, military or people are overtly hostile.
  • Four, the present favorable UNC/ROK relationship may deteriorate suddenly.

The over-all assigned tasks remain substantially the same; however, the revised plan Ever Ready enumerates countermeasures which the Eighth Army Commander may invoke under conditions A, B, or C, as follows: [Page 1570]

1.
Instruct the ROK Army Chief of Staff to enforce UN countermeasures.
2.
Relieve disloyal ROK commanders.
3.
Withdraw all logistical support and delay ROK Army expansion.
4.
Withdraw air support, ground the ROK Air Force, and bomb designated ROK ammunition-supply points.
5.
Secure custody of dissident military and civilian leaders.
6.
Secure control of Korean transportation and electric power facilities.

The Eighth Army Commander may also recommend to CINCUNC (General Hull) the following:

1.
Demand that Rhee comply with the UNC declaration of policies and disseminate this decision to the ROK Army, et al.
2.
Reduce military and economic aid.
3.
Withdraw recognition of the Rhee government and expel ROK forces from the UNC.
4.
Establish a naval blockade.
5.
Block the ROK dollar-sterling accounts.
6.
Initiate an anti-Rhee publicity campaign.
7.
Proclaim martial law.

The countermeasures outlined above (which the Eighth Army Commander can carry out or recommend to CINCUNC) are principally intended for use under condition C, wherein relationships have deteriorated beyond the point of a containment by the UNC of an acceptable situation and the Eighth Army Commander deems the conditions of a phased withdrawal imminent or advisable.

WKS
  1. This memorandum was also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.
  2. Telegram CX 65694, Oct. 24, not printed. (JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea(3–1953))