S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 167 Series
Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State1
Subject:
- Comments on JCS views regarding NSC 1672
- 1.
- The JCS flatly reject any UNC participation in a reopening of hostilities to unify Korea by force (Alternative D).
- 2.
- The JCS state that the basic objective must be to dissuade or prevent Rhee from initiating unilateral action by the ROK forces and to reduce the likelihood that they would carry out any orders for this purpose.
- 3.
- The course of action recommended by the JCS differs from that recommended in our paper in the
following respects:
- a.
- In the warning to Rhee, the JCS would not threaten possible withdrawal of UNC forces from Korea.
- b.
- To prevent issuance of orders for unilateral ROK action, the JCS would take all necessary measures, including seizure and retention of key ROK personnel.
- c.
- The JCS would inform the Communists that the UNC, if endangered by Communist operations against the ROK forces, would undertake counteraction against the Communists, and that if the Communists attacked UNC forces, the counteraction would not necessarily be confined to Korea.
- 4.
- The main objections to this course of action are as follows:
- a.
-
The refusal to threaten Rhee with the possibility of UNC withdrawal eliminates the most effective weapon at our disposal for either dissuading Rhee from taking unilateral action or for mobilizing other ROK opposition to such unilateral action. Under the JCS plan, Rhee would conclude and convince other Koreans that he would be able ultimately to draw us in. We could never convince Rhee that if we intend to remain, we could afford to wait until the ROK forces were destroyed before intervening.
The only way over this obstacle is to make clear that we are prepared to withdraw in order to avoid intervention. This gamble offers much better hope of not having to withdraw than does a temporizing approach.
- b.
-
The JCS proposal would not lay the necessary basis for taking Rhee and other leaders into custody. Under the JCS plan, the reasons for our action would not be apparent to most of the Korean people or to the outside world. Many South Koreans and Asians would feel that such action was an unjustified interference with Korean independence in the interest of a U.S. military position. Under these conditions, many Koreans would remain loyal to Rhee with the serious risk of chaos and civil war. Such an outcome would itself undermine the capacity of the UNC forces either to defend themselves or to withdraw.
The State proposal seeks to minimize these hazards. Under it, the South Koreans would face the clear-cut choice between following Rhee to national suicide or taking steps in the Korean interest to prevent Rhee’s action. Under those conditions many patriotic Koreans could be expected to oppose Rhee and to take the necessary steps to change the ROK course. Then the U.S. support would appear as promoting Korean interests and would be much less likely to create confusion or conflicts of loyalty.
Furthermore, if our action is clearly based on the need for protecting UNC forces from the consequences of Rhee’s unilateral action, our position would be far more defendable and far more likely to receive support from our allies and others.
- 5.
- Any course of action will involve a gamble.
- a.
- The JCS course risks the security of our forces and their ability to defend themselves after serious ROK reverses. It does not create the [Page 1569] conditions most likely to deter Rhee from taking the unilateral action. Moreover, if, under the JCS plan, ROK forces were destroyed and chaos and civil war resulted in Korea, the UNC might still have to withdraw but under conditions which would make it extremely costly both in men and in prestige.
- b.
- The State plan frankly takes the risk of having to withdraw, but it uses the possibility in a way which should minimize the risk of having to carry it out and maximize the chance that Korean and other forces will prevent or deter ROK unilateral action.