Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

top secret

Washington, 27 October 1953.

Subject:

• United States Courses of Action in Korea in the Absence of an Acceptable Political Settlement (NSC 167).¹

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views on a report by the National Security Council Planning Board entitled “United States Courses of Action in Korea in the Absence of an Acceptable Political Settlement”—NSC 167.

2. In connection with the draft statement of action to be taken by the United States in the event there is no resumption of hostilities by either side, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor the retention of subparagraph 5 b as now stated, in preference to the wording proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adviser to the Planning Board as a substitute for this paragraph. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not at this time take issue with the proposed substitute wording, they consider that it would serve to prejudge the outcome of a Joint Chiefs of Staff study which is now in progress.

3. In their study of NSC 167, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have addressed themselves primarily to the possible alternative United States actions in the event the Republic of Korea (ROK) takes, or clearly demonstrates an intention to take, the initiative in unilaterally renewing hostilities. They are in general agreement with the assessment of the hazards that would attend the adoption of any of the four alternative lines of action. In addition, there is an important consideration not touched upon in the report which would serve further to complicate this problem; i.e., the possibility that some, but not all, of the ROK forces might refuse to carry out President Rhee’s orders and choose to stand with the United Nations Command (UNC) in continuing to observe the armistice. Under these circumstances, the ultimate disposition of the ROK units which had aligned themselves with the UNC would present a most serious problem should the Communists overrun South Korea and the UN forces be eventually evacuated from Korea. The United States might well be faced with the alternative of abandoning large numbers of ROK military personnel to their fate in Korea or of attempting to evacuate, relocate, and support them indefinitely outside of Korea. The enormous difficulties which could result from this situation are obvious.

4. An assessment of the consequences which would in all probability attend the adoption of any of the alternative courses of action, or combinations thereof, leads to the conclusion that these consequences would be so damaging to United States security interests as to require that the United States, both in its own behalf and, as executive agent for the UN, in concert with its principal Allies, make every possible effort (a) to dissuade or prevent President Rhee from issuing orders for unilateral action by the ROK forces and (b) to reduce the likelihood that ROK commanders would carry out such orders if received.

5. In evaluating the alternative general lines of action set forth in the report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Alternative D; i.e., United States participation in the reopening of hostilities and in combined action to unify Korea by force of arms, would not be acceptable and should not receive further consideration. Should the United States voluntarily join the ROK in such a deliberate military move, it would not only involve the risk of general war, the probable loss of our major Allies, and the branding of the United States as an aggressor and a violator of the armistice agreement, but in all probability, would not have the support of the people of the United States.

6. If Alternative D is discarded, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States freedom of action is primarily in the direction of those steps which might be taken in endeavoring to prevent the reopening of hostilities by the ROK. Once the ROK has initiated such action, the measures taken by the United States would be those dictated primarily by the counteraction of the Communists and by the necessity of safeguarding the security of its forces. It is not possible to determine whether any measures now open to the United States would be effective in dissuading President Rhee from initiating unilateral action. Nevertheless, under the assumption that the United States would elect not to participate in such action, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that President Rhee must be informed in unequivocal terms that the United States will not support any unilateral action on the part of the ROK in violation of the armistice.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that no one of the courses of action would of itself be suitable for adoption as United States policy. They feel rather that if the ROK takes, or clearly demonstrates the intention to take, the initiative in unilaterally renewing hostilities, elements of the three courses of action stated in Alternatives A, B, and C would have to be adopted to meet the requirements of the situation with which the United States would then be faced. Again, the reaction of the enemy to unilateral action by the ROK in renewing hostilities would be a large factor in determining the courses of action which would be applied after hostilities begin.

8. In the situation with which we are now confronted in Korea, any selection of courses of action must, of necessity, make reasonably adequate provision for the most adverse combination of factors and possible eventualities. The courses of action recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are based upon the following considerations:

a. It is assumed that in the event hostilities in Korea are renewed through unilateral ROK action, the UN forces will not join with nor support the ROK Army but will continue to abide by the terms of the armistice until attacked or dangerously threatened;

b. An unsupported offensive by all or part of the ROK Army would soon be halted and might be followed by a Communist counteroffensive which could within a relatively short time defeat the ROK Army, and if unopposed by UN forces, could place Communist forces astride UN land lines of communication, dangerously envelop UN forces, and ultimately overrun all of South Korea except UN enclaves;

c. The Communists may at any time after the renewal of hostilities elect to initiate attacks against UN forces; in any event the possibility of hostile incidents will be great;

d. In the event of renewal of hostilities by the ROK, it may be expected that the Allies of the U.S. now fighting in Korea would, with few if any exceptions, regard themselves as relieved of all obligations toward the ROK, including those obligations associated with the Joint Policy Declaration, and would favor withdrawal of their forces from Korea at the earliest practicable date;

e. Some ROK Army units may elect at the outset not to join in the unilateral action of the ROK Government but to remain under UN command; such units might or might not be in positions adjacent to UN forces;

f. It is almost certain that once the tide turned against the ROK Army, large numbers of ROK Army stragglers would attempt to seek refuge within the UN lines;

g. It may be expected that every conceivable attempt would be made by the ROK Government and military forces to involve the UN forces in the fighting;

h. The ROK Army might attempt to attain possession of UN military supplies by forceful means; and

i. If fighting between ROK and Communist forces reaches large-scale proportions despite appropriate UN efforts to prevent the renewal of hostilities, it would be in the best interest of the United States and the UN forces not to employ military force to block or obstruct ROK military action beyond those measures necessary in the interest of the security of UN forces.

9. It is recommended that a U.S. governmental decision be made at this time to adopt the following courses of action, which in the aggregate represent a combination of Alternatives A, B, and C:

a. At an appropriate time in the proximate future, and preferably in concert with our principal Allies, inform President Rhee unequivocally that in the event of renewal of hostilities in Korea through unilateral ROK action the UN forces will not support the ROK military forces either directly or indirectly, that all economic aid to the ROK will immediately cease, that the UN Commander will take all necessary action to safeguard the security of his forces including all possible measures consistent with their security to avoid their involvement in the fighting;

b. Take all possible measures, both overt and covert, to gain the earliest possible knowledge of a decision on the part of President Rhee to issue orders to the ROK forces to attack and, in the event of such decision, to prevent such an order from being issued or, if issued, from reaching ROK military commanders in the field; such measures should not exclude the seizure and detention of key ROK military and civil personages involved;

c. At the appropriate time, take all possible measures to reduce the probability that such an order, if received by field commanders, would be carried out;

d. Depending upon the results obtained from the measures set forth above, consider the advisability of making public the statement of intent contained in subparagraph a above; and

e. If and when hostilities are renewed through unilateral ROK action, take the following actions:

(1) Cease all economic and military assistance to Korea;

(2) Discontinue all logistic or other support to ROK forces;

(3) Evacuate United States civilians;

(4) Announce to the Communists that the UNC will continue to abide by the armistice terms, will defend UN forces against any Communist attack, and will be prepared, if a Communist counterattack against the ROK threatens the security of UN forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of UN forces;

(5) Announce to the Communists, preferably in concert with our principal Allies, that if the UN forces are attacked by the Communists, the counteraction will not be confined to Korea;

(6) Renew general hostilities only if forced to do so.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that while President Rhee should be informed unequivocally that the UNC will not support unilateral ROK action in violation of the armistice and would take all possible measures to avoid involvement of UN forces in the ensuing hostilities, such a statement to President Rhee should not include a threat to withdraw UN forces from Korea in such an eventuality.

11. It is recommended that the foregoing views be reflected in the Department of Defense position to be presented to the National Security Council.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Edwin H. J. Carns

Brigadier General USA Secretary

1. Dated Oct. 22, p. 1546.