Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman
file
Memorandum by the Secretary of
State to the President
top secret
[Washington,] October 21, 1953.
Subject:
[Page 1543]
If the attached cable from General
Hull has not otherwise come to your attention, I suggest
that you read it.
I think this whole subject of Korea should be urgently considered,
particularly having regard to the prospective presence there of Vice
President Nixon on November
12.
If Nixon gets the same line from
President Rhee that he gave to
General Hull and is merely
acquiescent, it will be difficult to prevent Rhee from believing that we are secretly disposed to
support him.
[Attachment]
The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
(Hull)
to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff
top
secret
priority
Tokyo, October 21, 1953—4:20
p.m.
C 65636. Ref: A. JCS 949814.1 B. CX 65143. C.
CX 65208.2 D. AmEmb Seoul nr 237 to State.3 E.
CX 63652. F. CX 63731.4 G. AmEmb Seoul nr 332 to State.5
- 1.
- Fully recog possible eventuality stated in para 3, ref A. As
pointed out in paras 4 and 5, ref B, and in ref C, there is a
degree of urgency for a satisfactory arrangement between United
States and ROK on mil, economic
and political matters. A “package” arrangement has obvious
advantages as pointed out in ref D.
- 2.
- On my recent trip to Korea I spent over an hour with Pres
Syngman Rhee, there
being no one else present at the conference. Pres Rhee was most cordial and our
discussion was conducted throughout in a very friendly
manner.
- 3.
- Pres Rhee discussed at
some length the action of the Indian Govt and his objection to
the presence of Indian trp on Korean soil. He stated that
Nehru was
pro-Communist if not a Communist in fact, that everything he had
done so far had demonstrated his pro-Communist line. I told Mr.
Rhee that I felt he
was wrong regarding the Indian trp
[Page 1544]
and their commanders, that I had not as
yet met Gen Thimayya
and Gen Thorat personally but that I had
made it a pnt to check with others, Americans as well as certain
foreigners, who knew them and their ability; that all the info I
had red had led me to believe that both Gens Thimayya and Thorat were good
soldiers and were trying to be impartial.
- 4.
- Pres Rhee discussed at
considerable length his pessimistic views on any result coming
from a political conference. He maintained that even if one were
held, which he doubted, there was no ques in his mind that it
would not accomplish any reasonable solution. He stated that
unless there were a unified Korea, Korea would ultimately fall
to the Communists. He insisted that if the political conference
fails to unify Korea, and there is no doubt in his mind that it
will fail to do so, he could not accept it. He would insist on
adv to the Yalu and unifying Korea by force. He said that the
Korean people would demand this. He has hopes that the United
States would support such action, certainly to the extent of
providing Nav and Air support to the South Korean armed forces
engaged in such an adv, but if the United States would not
support such action, he felt it essential that he do it alone
with Korean trp. In replying to this I stated to Pres Rhee that he was discussing natl
suicide for Korea. I told him that in my opinion unless the
Chinese Communist forces had been withdrawn from North Korea and
he faced only North Korean forces, he had no chance whatever of
gaining a success, and further that if operations of the type he
described were undertaken against the Chinese Communist forces
and North Korean Peoples Army, it would bring disaster to his
own mil for and result in their annihilation. I told him further
that although I was not in position to speak for my govt on a
ques of this nature, it was my firm personal belief that my govt
would not support any such undertaking.
- 5.
- Pres Rhee spoke of the
reduction in the population of North Korea from 8 million to 3
million persons and the settling by the Chinese in North Korea
on what appeared to him to be a permanent basis. He stated that
the remaining people in North Korea were still Koreans and “we
must save them”. He went on to say that it would be better for
Korea to be unified under Communist rule than to be divided as
it is today.
- 6.
- Throughout his conversation with me, Pres Rhee spoke with what appeared to
be the utmost sincerity. Although he was emphatic in his
statements, I would not say that he was emotional. We ended our
conversation with the same friendly attitude which had existed
throughout it, both agreeing to discuss this matter further as
the opportunity presented itself in the future.
- 7.
- My estimate of the problem we face with Pres Rhee is that there must be no
ques in his mind as to the attitude of our govt should he elect
at some time in the future to take action along the lines
indicated
[Page 1545]
in his
conversation with me. I believe if he really understands that
the United States will not support him in any such venture,
there is a reasonable chance that he will not resort to such
action. On the other hand, it would appear that he feels that
the United States is committed so far in Korea that it cannot
pull out. It is quite possible, and I am inclined to think it is
probable, that he will make every endeavor to pull the United
States into further mil action in Korea should the political
conf fail to unify Korea. I believe therefore that it is very
important that Pres Rhee
understand the limits beyond which the US will not go should he
undertake any action inconsistent with our own natl
policy.
- 8.
- I have discussed this problem with Ambassador Briggs and I feel that the only
effective way of influencing Pres Rhee not to attempt some disastrous plan like
the one discussed above is for both Ambassador Briggs and myself to be in a
position to state categorically to Pres Rhee as soon as practicable that
the US will support no such action. Specifically, I recommend
that I be auth to inform Pres Rhee that:
- a.
- US air, ground and sea forces will not support mil op
by South Korean forces to unify Korea by attacking
Chinese or North Korean forces in or North of the
demilitarized zone.
- b.
- The US govt will not furnish any mil sup for such an
operation.
- c.
- UNC forces on
initiation of such aggressive action will not only not
become involved in assisting the South Korean forces,
but will take any action nec to avoid becoming involved
and to provide their own security.
- d.
- US economic aid to Korea will cease immed under such
conditions.
- 9.
- When Vice Pres Nixon
visits Korea I believe Pres Rhee will talk to him along the same lines that
he talked to me. If the Vice Pres is properly briefed on this
matter before his conf with Pres Rhee and informs Pres Rhee just how far the US will go or will not go,
in support of any action Pres Rhee might contemplate, it might help to solve
this problem to our advantage.
- 10.
- I recommend, therefore, that Vice Pres Nixon, prior to his arr in
Korea, be briefed on these matters and be prepared to inform
Pres Rhee in his
discussions with him of the position of the US Govt as set forth
in para 8a, b, c, and d, above. I would be glad to meet Vice Pres Nixon, or send my Chief of
Staff, Gen Harrison,
to meet him and brief him on this problem at any place and time
he desires prior to his arr in Korea.
