Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 167

Report by the Planning Board to the National Security Council¹

top secret
NSC 167

Washington, October 22, 1953.

U.S. Courses of Action in Korea in the Absence of an Acceptable Political Settlement²

scope of this report

1. This report deals with determination of U.S. courses of action to be followed in view of the contingencies that might arise should the political conference on Korea fail or be indefinitely delayed. The report does not deal with matters covered by the following NSC approved policies:

NSC 154/1, “United States Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea”, approved July 3, 1953,³ which sets forth interim courses of action on pressures against Communist China, UN military strength in Korea, the security of UN forces, aid to the Republic of Korea, the political conference, and persuasion of allies. These courses are to be pursued during the political negotiations for a peace and until a review of basic U.S. policies toward China and toward Korea is completed.

NSC 156/1, “Strengthening the Korean Economy”, approved July 23, 1953,⁴ which provides for the initiation of an expanded program of economic assistance for the Republic of Korea, conditioned upon certain economic, military and political requirements, including the requirement that the Republic of Korea must cooperate satisfactorily in carrying the armistice into effect.

NSC 157/1, “U.S. Objective with Respect to Korea Following an Armistice”, approved July 2, 1953,⁵ which states that following an armistice it should be the U.S. objective to secure a unified and neutralized (but not disarmed) Korea under a substantially unchanged ROK, oriented toward the U.S., and with guaranteed political and territorial integrity.

“Additional United Nations Forces for Korea”, Memorandum dated July 17, 1953, as approved July 23, 1953,⁶ which states a policy of obtaining maximum contributions of effective manpower from our allies in Korea and establishes a new formula for reimbursement for U.S. logistic support of other UN forces in Korea.

general considerations

2. The failure of the Communists to agree to hold a political conference, or to agree to any reasonable proposals at the political conference, would strongly indicate that the Communists have no intention of abandoning their hegemony over North Korea or their basic objective of obtaining control of all Korea by whatever means possible.

3. President Rhee has agreed that until the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea comes into force and effect, the armed forces of the Republic of Korea will be subject to the United Nations Command, which will comply with the armistice terms.^* However, President Rhee and other authorities of the Republic of Korea have frequently stated their firm intention to resume hostilities to unify Korea by force if the Political Conference fails to achieve unification acceptable to them, by peaceful means, within a reasonable time. The Government of the Republic of Korea has requested the United States to agree in advance to assure its military or logistic support to such a resumption of hostilities. The Government of the United States has repeatedly informed the Government of the Republic of Korea that it could not and would not give any such advance commitment, and is opposed to seeking unification of Korea by force.

4. Thus, the possible failure or indefinite delay of a political conference presents the United States with the urgent problem of determining what courses of action to follow in view of the following three possible contingencies:

a. The Communist forces take the initiative in renewing hostilities in Korea;

b. Both the Communists and the Republic of Korea continue to observe the terms of the armistice and there is no resumption of hostilities in Korea from either side; or

c. The Republic of Korea takes or clearly intends to take the initiative in unilaterally renewing hostilities in Korea.

Either the Communists or the Republic of Korea, if they chose to renew hostilities, would seek to confuse responsibility therefor. It is believed, however, that the United States would be able to determine promptly the responsibility for renewal of hostilities.

policy conclusions

U.S. Courses of Action under the First Two Contingencies

5. In the case of the first two contingencies, the policies which the United States should adopt are clear:

a. In case the Communists take the initiative in renewing hostilities in Korea, the United States should invoke the Joint Policy Declaration and take military and diplomatic measures along the lines provided in NSC Action No. 794 of May 20, 1953.⁷ (Urgent review of these measures is required to permit advance planning and preparation.)

b. In the case of no resumption of hostilities from either side, the United States should continue for the time being, and pending a review of its policy toward Korea, the measures set forth in NSC 154/1, 156/1, 157/1, and Memo for the NSC, “Additional United Nations Forces for Korea”, July 17, 1953.^†

Alternative General Lines of Action under Third Contingency

6. The third contingency—i.e., the Republic of Korea, despite our efforts to dissuade it, takes or clearly intends to take the initiative in unilaterally renewing hostilities—would pose for the United States four possible alternative lines of action:

• Alternative A. Cease all economic and military assistance to Korea; refuse logistic or other support to ROK forces; maintain UNC positions; announce to the Communists that the UNC will continue to abide by the armistice terms; defend UNC forces against any Communist attack; and be prepared, if Communist counterattack against the ROK threatens the security of UNC forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of UNC forces. (See Annex A)

• Alternative B. Cease assistance and refuse support as in Alternative A above; evacuate U.S. civilians; initiate the withdrawal of UNC forces, either to a beachhead around Pusan, or completely from Korea, terminating the withdrawal only if the Republic of Korea reverses its policy, and renewing general hostilities with the Communists only if the security of the withdrawing UNC forces is jeopardized. (See Annex B)

  . . . . . . .

• Alternative D. Accept renewal of hostilities and concert plans with the Republic of Korea for the most advantageous timing and strategy for combined action to unify Korea by force of arms. (See Annex D)

(If the United States should be compelled to carry out any one of the above alternatives, it may be opportune to incorporate in such action elements of other alternatives.)

Undesirability of all Alternatives under Third Contingency

7. Each of the four general lines of action open to the U.S. under the third contingency (para. 4-c above) carries such political or military costs and hazards that no one of them would be acceptable U.S. policy unless it were absolutely imperative that one of them be adopted.

a. Sitting tight in the present UNC positions while denying the ROK logistic or other support, would involve risks that the UNC might have to protect itself from Communist attack after Allied support had been dissipated by the initial ROK breach of the armistice and after ROK forces had been badly mauled by the Communists.

b. Withdrawal from Korea would mean loss of Korea to the Communists, and would involve grave consequences for the general U.S. position in the Far East.

. . . . . . .

d. A decision to participate in the renewal of hostilities would be, in effect, to permit President Rhee to exercise the powers of deciding on war or peace for the United States, would encounter difficulties in U.S. public opinion, would alienate the allies of the U.S., and would risk UN action against the U.S.

Accordingly, the United States should urgently undertake all possible measures to dissuade the Republic of Korea from undertaking unilateral military action. However, the nature of these measures will be largely governed by the ultimate line of action selected by the United States for implementation in the event the Republic of Korea, despite our efforts to dissuade it, takes or is about to take the initiative in renewing hostilities. Therefore, in order to be as effective as possible in dissuading President Rhee from taking unilateral action, it is necessary to decide now which of the four alternatives (para. 6 above) to adopt as a last resort in case our efforts at persuasion fail.

8. In considering the effectiveness of these alternatives, it should be borne in mind that the principal determinant of his decision will be his estimate as to whether he could take action in such a way that the U.S. would be involved in a full-scale resumption of the fighting in Korea. At the present time Rhee is apparently convinced that the U.S. does not have the capability to prevent him from unilaterally initiating military action against the Communists. Furthermore, he estimates that the U.S. probably could not in present circumstances dissociate itself from military support of the ROK in the event that his action provoked a significant Communist military reaction. If Rhee retained these convictions at the time of decision, he would probably initiate armed attack against the Communists. Even if he felt there were only a slight chance of involving the U.S., he might initiate such action, hoping to gain the eventual full support of the U.S. If, on the other hand, Rhee had become convinced that he could not hope to involve the U.S. in a resumption of the Korean fighting, he would not initiate unilateral military action.

Annex A

Alternative A

cease all economic and military assistance to korea, refuse logistic or other support to rok forces, maintain unc positions, announce to the communists that the unc will comtinue to abide by armistice terms, defend unc forces against any communist attack, and be prepared, if communist counter-attack against the rok threatens the security of unc forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of unc forces

Probable Communist Reaction to Alternative A

1. If the ROK forces initiated hostilities, the Communists would certainly take action to restore their positions, and perhaps would seek to push their front forward in the areas of the attack to an extent they could plausibly justify as necessary for continuing security of their forces. Beyond this they would probably seek to inflict maximum casualties on the ROK forces, but initially probably would avoid forward movements involving any chance of large-scale contact with U.S. forces, or threatening serious envelopment of the non-ROK held sectors of the present line.

2. In the initial stages the Communists would probably observe closely the reaction of U.S. allies to the situation, and the Soviet Bloc would certainly make every propaganda effort to split the United States and its allies, and to brand the ROK as aggressors. If it appeared that the general free world reaction was hostile to the ROK, the Communists might be tempted to take increased military risks in the belief that the U.S. could not retaliate without putting itself in a most difficult situation with its allies.

Military Advantages and Disadvantages

a. At the moment dispositions of U.S. forces are such as to facilitate this course of action.

b. If the Communists were content merely to repel ROK attacks, and the ROKs did not undertake major attacks against U.S. forces controlling ROK supplies, this U.S. course of action might result in a shortlived ROK assault on the Central and Eastern sectors of the Communist lines, and an eventual cessation of ROK unilateral action after the ROKs ran out of supplies. In such circumstances, if ROK casualties and disorganization did not critically disrupt the general strength of the anti-Communist military position in the peninsula, the situation might be stabilized eventually but with a diminution of allied capabilities.

4. There would be, however, major military risks in such a course of action. If the Communists launched extensive counter-attacks which carried them deep into South Korean territory, the U.S. would have to either join the battle and attempt to throw the Communists back, in which case full-scale hostilities would almost certainly be resumed, or sit back and risk being surrounded and cut off from essential supply and port areas. The decisive defeat of the ROKs would gravely reduce possibilities that UNC forces could retrieve the situation by a general offensive against the Communists. In a situation where the ROK corps were faced with defeat by reason of UNC denial of logistical support, there would also be obvious risks that, in the course of their action against the Communists, the ROK would attempt forcible seizure of U.S. controlled supplies, with attendant possibilities of major disorganization of the situation of both the ROK and the non-Korean UNC forces. Communist air capabilities, if exercised, could, moreover, immediately complicate the situation. Communist air attack would immediately threaten the supplies and line of communications of the UNC as well as the ROK. The distinction between Communist air attack against the ROK and air attack against the UNC might be impossible to draw, and some degree of involvement might accordingly be almost immediate. The risk involved in this general course of action would be considerable since its advantages would rely upon favorable Communist reactions.

Political Implications of Implementing Alternative A

5. It is probable that unilateral military action by the ROK forces would immediately dissipate allied and UN support for the ROK, and that whatever the military outcome, the U.S. would be without further major international support for its actions in Korea. With but few exceptions most free world countries would regard themselves as relieved of all obligations, including those involved in the Joint Policy Declaration, toward the ROK if that government unilaterally breached the armistice. There would be strong possibilities of UN action, probably initiated by the neutralist bloc, to rescind UN support of the ROK and possibly to declare it an aggressor. Aside from withdrawal of the non-U.S. contingents from the UNC forces, such action might lead to difficulties with Japan over continued use of Japanese bases for support of what could no longer be characterized as a UN mission. The U.S. would be held accountable by its Allies for the actions of its Korean protegé, and the effects on the U.S.-led coalition could be seriously divisive.

6. Should the ROK breach of the armistice result in no more than a Communist repulse of the ROK attack, it is probable that the failure of the ROK action would lead to such discrediting of the leadership of President Rhee as to result in an overturn of his government or a reversal of his policies by South Korean military and political leaders. Such a result, even under these circumstances, could not, however, be firmly relied upon. For President Rhee might have such opportunities for ascribing ROK failure to U.S. non-support as to create some possibility for him to direct the animus of the South Koreans against the United States, rather than against himself. Should the ROK breach of the armistice result in major clashes between the ROK and U.S. forces, or in eventual U.S. renewal of hostilities against the Communists, the political repercussions in South Korea would be essentially unpredictable and would depend primarily upon the outcome of military events.

Utility of Alternative A as a Deterrent

7. If the United States undertakes measures to convince Rhee and other Korean leaders that it has selected and will pursue this alternative in the event that the ROK unilaterally resumes hostilities, there is a chance that these measures could succeed in deterring the ROK from initiating hostilities. Such measures would include: high level representation to reiterate categorically to Rhee that the United States will cease economic and military assistance and will not join or support ROK forces if they unilaterally resume hostilities; efforts to convince other ROK leaders of the firmness of this U.S. intent; vigorous implementation of U.S. economic assistance to the ROK; continued stress on the value to the ROK of this assistance; prompt steps to ratify the Mutual Defense Treaty; steps to so deploy U.S. forces and strengthen U.S. control of military supplies as to reduce ROK capabilities for independent action.

Annex B

Alternative B

cease assistance and refuse support as in alternative a; evacuate u.s. civilians, initiate the withdrawal of unc forces, either to a beachhead around pusan, or completely from korea; terminating the withdrawal only if the republic of korea reverses its policy, and renewing general hostilities with the communists only if the security of the withdrawing unc forces is jeopardized

Probable Communist Reactions to Alternative B

1. It must be assumed that a U.S. threat of withdrawal, even if communicated privately to Rhee, would be almost certain to become known to the Communists, who would regard it as an indication that the United States definitely desired to avoid a renewal of hostilities.

2. Actual U.S. withdrawal, in event of ROK initiation of hostilities, would confront the Communists with the choice of permitting withdrawal, harassing U.S. forces, or engaging in large-scale hostilities against U.S. forces to inflict maximum casualties. On balance, we believe the Communists would most likely choose initially to permit U.S. withdrawal, with minimum follow-up action. Any other course would, in the judgment of the Communists, involve a greater risk of enlarged hostilities, or even general war, than we now believe they are prepared to assume. However, it must be recognized that as the withdrawal progressed, and as U.S. military capabilities in Korea diminished, the Communists would have tempting opportunities to inflict heavy casualties. Moreover, the possibilities of incidents would be great in any event.

Military Advantages and Disadvantages

3. If Rhee abandons his plans as a result of this threat, certain military advantages would accrue to the United States. Rhee’s forces would avoid suicidal action, ROK-U.S. military cooperation would proceed apace, and the United States eventually could withdraw the bulk of its forces from the fighting areas as ROK army capabilities are exploited to the maximum. Since the UN defense line would remain intact, the threat of a treacherous Communist attack in violation of the armistice would be minimized. Some military advantages might be gained even if Rhee persisted in his determination and we were compelled to carry out our threat to withdraw, assuming we escaped involvement in the renewed hostilities. Once out of Korea, the United States would be in a much better position to meet the Soviet threat in Europe, the Middle East, and possibly Southeast Asia. This advantage would largely disappear, however, if the United States made the disentanglement from Korea the occasion for large-scale reductions in its military establishment.

4. The disadvantages in an alternative that might eventually result in a U.S. decision to withdraw from Korea are staggering:

a. If the United States managed to successfully withdraw its forces while avoiding involvement in the Rhee-instigated hostilities, it would be merely a question of time before the Communists completely overran all of Korea. This prospect would mean a loss of U.S. military position in Asia of great magnitude. The security of Japan would be jeopardized as the Communists took control of airfields within easy fighter range of the main islands, as well as important harbors and port facilities for naval and amphibious operations. The loss of the 600,000 ROK fighting men, now trained to a high-level of proficiency, and their equipment, would be a blow to the non-Communist military position in the Far East. This loss would be especially costly if general war occurred soon thereafter. Considerable new requirements would be immediately generated for the defense of Japan.

b. Moreover, the assumption that U.S. forces could escape involvement while withdrawing from Korea as the ROK engages the enemy is open to serious question. Since the nature of the Communist reaction to the situation could not be determined in advance it would be mandatory for U.S. forces to withdraw with sufficient equipment and in such a manner as to be prepared for immediate large-scale combat. This would take at least six months, during which the course of the ROK-Communist engagement could take many turns depending upon Communist actions. If the Communists chose to assume a defense posture until the United States completed its withdrawal, the United States would be faced only with ROK attempts to involve us. These might run the gamut from passive resistance, such as bridge and vehicle sabotage, port strikes and disturbances, etc., to actual armed resistance. A vigorous application of all ROK capabilities could make an orderly withdrawal of UN forces infeasible. On the other hand, if Communist counter-attacks successfully penetrated deep into South Korea, chaotic conditions fraught with explosive possibilities for U.S. involvement would result. If the Communists chose to press the advantage offered by a situation where UN military capabilities are seriously impaired by the loss of the ROK forces, the abandonment of prepared positions and the loss of forward fighter bases, they would possess the capability of striking a paralyzing blow at the UN forces, involving serious loss of life, and substantial loss of equipment that could be replaced only after considerable delay. In such case, the United States might be compelled to use atomic weapons to avert disaster. However, this would expose concentrations of U.S. forces to possible atomic bombing by the Communists, if they were prepared to risk general war.

c. From a military standpoint the risks inherent in this alternative depend to such a great extent upon a favorable Communist reaction for its success that it is a calculated risk of great magnitude.

Withdrawal to a Beachhead in the Pusan Area

5. To eliminate the disadvantages resulting from a complete withdrawal from Korea it might be suggested that the United States withdraw to a beachhead in the Pusan area. This course poses military problems of such magnitude as to rule out its consideration. Having eliminated the ROK resistance the Communists would in all probability speedily deploy to positions opposite those of the UN Command. The UN forces would then be faced with an enemy force in possession of virtually all the food resources and transportation facilities of Korea as well as the key naval and air bases. The denial of the major air facilities to the UN forces and their acquisition by the Communists would place an intolerable burden upon the UN air units which would be largely restricted to operations from aircraft carriers and bases in Japan. Furthermore, the length of the defense line of the beachhead would closely approximate that of the present deployment. Since the ROK forces would be absent from this line a substantially weaker defense would result. The absence of defense in depth, maneuver room, and adequate facilities of all kinds, would seriously jeopardize the UN military capability for a resumption of full-scale hostilities.

Political Implication of Implementing Alternative B

6. General The obvious effects on U.S. public opinion of a clear failure to achieve beneficial results from intervention in Korea would reduce allied confidence in, and the deterrent value against local Communist aggression of, potential U.S. military intervention.

7. Reaction in the Far East. If the United States should withdraw from Korea even under circumstances in which the Republic of Korea initiated hostilities against the Communists, the consequences would be extremely grave for the United States position in Asia. The Republic of Korea forces alone would face certain defeat by combined Chinese Communist and North Korean armies. Were Korea to be lost to the Communists, the French would be likely to give up the struggle for Indochina and that area would fall to the Communists. Thailand in these circumstances might not hold to its alliance with the Free World, and Malaya and Burma would be seriously threatened. The morale of the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa would be undermined by what they would consider to be evidence of U.S. unwillingness to prevent Communist territorial expansion. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea would advance Communist air and naval forces to the Tsushima Straits and would seriously affect Japan’s confidence in the U.S. and cause it seriously to question, and possibly to veer away from, its western alliance.

8. Other Reactions. A U.S. threat to withdraw from Korea as a move to save the armistice and to avoid resumption of hostilities at Rhee’s initiative would initially be welcomed by non-Far Eastern countries of the Free World. Europeans and the neutralist countries would interpret such a U.S. course of action as indicating firm U.S. intentions to avoid involvement in general war, and accordingly would be encouraged. Actual withdrawal, however, would tend to shake the general confidence of the Free World. Other countries would lose confidence in the strength of American intentions and capabilities to prevent and resist other local aggressions by the Communist bloc. There would also be an inclination toward accommodation with the Communist bloc in general, and toward increase of political and economic relationships with Communist China in particular.

Utility of Alternative B as a Deterrent

9. If President Rhee were to estimate that the U.S. would and could withdraw without becoming involved in resumption of fighting in Korea, he would be deterred from initiating hostilities. A threat of U.S. withdrawal, if convincingly made, probably would bring Rhee to this conviction. It is even more likely that such a threat would be effective with the ROK military leaders who, if faced with the danger of unsupported ROK military action, might well choose to refuse to obey an order from their President. Thus, while the prospects of success of the threat of withdrawal are reasonably good, they hinge on the sincerity with which the U.S. presents its position, in its actions and in its public statements, and in private conversations with Korean leaders. It is doubtful that President Rhee would commit his country to what he considered a suicidal course of action; it is almost certain that many important Korean political and military leaders would not respond to orders which they considered suicidal for the nation. If, in spite of this Rhee actually initiated hostilities, it would be probable that possibilities of successful implementation of the type of coup described under Alternative C would be greatly enhanced.

Annex D.

Alternative D

accept renewal of hostilities and concert plans with the republic of korea for the most advantageous timing and strategy for combined action to unify korea by force of arms

1. If it is determined that the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea is not feasible or desirable, and if “preventive measures” are not considered acceptable as a means of deterring President Rhee from taking military action to unify Korea, the United States Government might consider voluntarily joining the ROK in an all-out military effort to unify Korea by force. Joining the ROK in such an action would entail deliberate planning with the ROK, together with a build-up of the necessary military force to defeat Communist forces in Korea. Military action would be along the lines of courses referred to in NSC Action No. 794 of May 20, 1953.

Probable Communist Reaction to Alternative D

2. The possibilities of Soviet intervention in the event of US-ROK effort to unify Korea by force have been estimated in NSC 147.⁸ It must be emphasized, however, that under circumstances in which the U.S. and ROK took the initiative in breaching the armistice, the likelihood of Soviet intervention would be materially increased.

Military Advantages and Disadvantages

3. Assuming Rhee agrees to a delay in the initiation of hostilities, the UN Command could complete preparations for a campaign to defeat the enemy in Korea along the lines discussed in courses D, E and F of NSC 147. In the absence of USSR intervention, such a campaign would have a high probability of inflicting a crushing local defeat on the enemy. Avoiding as it does the costly loss of the excellent ROK fighting forces, it would present a maximum opportunity for the United States to remove the growing threat to the entire off-shore island chain and Indochina now posed by Communist China. The successful out-come of such a campaign would not only severely damage Chinese Communist military prestige among Asiatics but conversely would reestablish the prestige of the United States as a military power. Such a course of action would provide the fighting forces with a clear-cut military objective heretofore denied them. From a long-range standpoint it would make possible the eventual redeployment of considerable numbers of U.S. forces now tied down in Korea.

4. Disadvantages of this alternative include the fact that for the period of the resulting hostilities the present degree of strategic maldeployment would be materially aggravated. There would likewise be a marked effect on our ability to meet our MDAP commitments particularly to NATO. These disadvantages are discussed in considerable detail in NSC 147. If this course of action led to a general war through Soviet intervention, the degree of involvement probably would render more difficult the redeployments made necessary by the requirements of global war, and the possible denial to the U.S. of European bases and cooperation might make more difficult the conduct of global war operations.

Political Implications of Implementing Alternative D

5. A military defeat of Communist forces in Korea would greatly enhance U.S. prestige in the Far East and in the remainder of the world, particularly if U.S. and ROK military efforts were successful in quickly unifying Korea. The growing influence of Communist China in the Far East might be slowed and possibly halted. A severe defeat of Communist forces in Korea and air and naval attacks against Communist China could so weaken the Chinese Communist regime as possibly to lead to its overthrow.

6. From a political viewpoint, however, it would border on the impossible for the United States voluntarily to join the Republic of Korea in a deliberate military move to unify Korea by force. Specifically, such an undertaking by the United States would:

a. Quite possibly result in general war under conditions where Allied support would be doubtful.

b. Probably result in the United States and the Republic of Korea being branded by the United Nations as “aggressor nations”.

c. Result in a loss of political and military support in Korea from our major allies.

d. Cause a cleavage in the free world leading to possible collapse of NATO and loss to the United States of its present position of leadership in the non-Communist world.

e. Not have popular U.S. public support for a deliberate resumption of hostilities, particularly with respect to the sacrifice in American lives and wealth that would accompany such an effort.

1. According to a covering memorandum by Lay, this report was to be transmitted to the NSC for its consideration at an Oct. 29 meeting. Lay requested that special security precautions be observed in handling this report and it be “very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis.” Included with the memorandum was a table of contents of NSC 167. Annex C to NSC 167 is not printed.
2. This report was drafted originally by Stelle of the Department of State and revised by the Planning Board. A copy of Stelle’s draft, Oct. 20, is located in PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Korea”.
3. Dated July 7, p. 1341.
4. Dated July 17, p. 1384.
5. Dated July 7, p. 1344.
6. Dated July 17, p. 1394.
7. Joint Statement of August 8, 1953, issued by President Rhee and Secretary of State Dulles. [Footnote in the source text; for a text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 17, 1953, pp. 203–204.]
7. For text, see memorandum of discussion at the 145th meeting of the NSC, May 20, p. 1064.

8. The JCS Adviser proposes the following substitute for this paragraph:

   b. In the case of no resumption of hostilities from either side, the United States should build up and maintain Republic of Korea armed forces in a manner and to an extent that will permit the phased and orderly redeployment of United States armed forces from Korea at the earliest feasible date; make clear to the Communists our firm intention to honor our security commitments to South Korea and our determination to expand the war to China in the event of a Communist armistice violation; and continue vigorous efforts to rehabilitate and strengthen the economy of the Republic of Korea. The United States should continue to take such measures as are feasible and consistent with its agreements with the Republic of Korea to seek a unified and independent Korea. [Footnote in the source text. In a memorandum to Wilson, Oct. 27, p. 1563, the JCS favored retention of paragraph 5b rather than the substitute paragraph proposed here by the JCS Adviser.]

8. Dated Apr. 2, p. 838.