795.00/10–2053
Notes on a Meeting Held With the Secretary of State1
Present:
- Ambassador Dean
- Mr. Murphy
- Mr. Robertson
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Sandifer
- Col. Babcock
- Mr. Young
- Mr. Henkin
- Mr. Van Hollen2
Indian Participation
The Secretary asked what features of the armistice agreement might make it possible to bring India into the political conference, pointing out their possible presence when they report on the activities of the NNRC. If the Indians were there in some such capacity it might be possible for the Communists to use them as messenger boys with the [Page 1541] other side. In the Secretary’s opinion, the political conference would only succeed if it were possible to exchange private and confidential views at the appropriate time. In other words, the conference itself must be a public front behind which serious, confidential talks might take place leading to a possible settlement. India might be used as an intermediary under such circumstances without there being official Indian participation in the conference.
ROK Participation
Ambassador Dean reported that during his conversations with Pyun he received the decided impression that Pyun felt strongly about ROK participation in the preliminary meetings and that Dr. Rhee himself probably desired a speaking member since the conference would be held on Korean soil and the U.S. representative would be dealing with those whom Rhee considered as “rebels.” Mr. Dean felt that, on balance, it would probably be best to permit ROK attendance at the meetings but only in an advisory and non-speaking capacity. The Secretary agreed, saying that it would probably be wise to include a ROK representative in the Dean group and that, while it would probably not be advisable to tell the ROKs in advance that they could not speak, nonetheless, it should be pointed out to them that it would be quite awkward if they did speak. Mr. Robertson felt it advisable for Ambassador Dean to take the initiative on this question in his meeting with Dr. Rhee by telling Rhee that we would like to take along a ROK representative in an advisory capacity.
Duration of Meetings
In response to a statement by Ambassador Dean that he was thinking of remaining in Korea for a period of from ten days to three weeks, the Secretary replied that, while he agreed in principle, if it were discovered that the talks had become a de facto political conference he himself would not feel unduly concerned. He suggested that Ambassador Dean “play it by ear” and that he should endeavor to obtain as much information as possible as to the Communists’ future plans on such questions as unification. If, however, the Communists engaged in time-wasting, dilatory tactics, the talks should be broken off with careful regard to world opinion.
Site of the Conference
The Secretary said that, in every respect, Geneva appeared to be a good site for the conference. While Beirut had once seemed a possible site, in view of the recent Arab-Israel disturbances, it was no longer appropriate. The Secretary said that he had always been open-minded with regard to Ceylon although the complexion of the present government should be looked into.
With regard to the possibility of New York as a site, the Secretary said that his initial opposition to New York was based primarily on the [Page 1542] objection to having the political conference held at the same time that the UN was in session. However, should the UN adjourn before December 15 and should agreement be reached to convene the political conference on or after that date, he felt such a site might be worthy of consideration. After several comments by Messrs. Murphy and Sandifer about certain disadvantages in holding the conference at New York, the Secretary agreed that it would probably be advisable to avoid holding the conference in New York but pointed out the difficulties which would arise so far as world opinion were concerned if the Communists agreed to hold the conference in that city but we, on our part, refused. The Secretary also remarked that we should make every effort to ensure that the UN adjourned rather than suspended its sessions since, if the session were suspended, it would be easy for the GA to be called back into session thus causing the GA sessions to conflict with the political conference.
Unification
With regard to unification, the Secretary asked whether any thought was being given to the possibility of a transition status for Korea similar to that now prevailing in Austria, i.e., trade between the two areas and an arrangement under which citizens could move back and forth between the two areas. Mr. Young replied that a preliminary paper had been prepared which indicated that we would first have to start out on a barter basis, later move into a customs union, etc.
Practicability of a Fortification Line at the Yalu
In answer to a question from the Secretary, Colonel Babcock reported that the most advantageous place to fortify Korea was not at the Yalu River but rather just above the Korean waist since defense on the Yalu River would require that the defense forces be strung out thinly along a 450 mile line. Colonel Babcock pointed out, however, that the buffer zone concept created serious disadvantages from the Communist viewpoint since there was a vast network of fighter fields just on the other side of the river which the Communists would be forced to give up if agreement on a buffer zone were reached. He stated that, while the military do not like the idea of a buffer zone, such a buffer zone would not affect U.S. security.