Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

INR-NIE files

Special Estimate

secret
SE-48

[Washington,] 16 October 1953.

Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action of the Republic of Korea With Respect to the Armistice in Korea¹

the problem

To estimate the capabilities of the Republic of Korea (ROK) to disrupt the Korean armistice, and to estimate probable ROK courses of action with respect to the armistice.

conclusions

1. The prime objective of the present ROK government is control over the whole of Korea. This objective is held with fanatical intensity by President Syngman Rhee and in varying degrees by virtually all ROK leaders. The ROK government believes that the ROK can achieve neither real security nor economic viability so long as Korea remains divided.

2. The ROK has the capability, despite UNC surveillance and countermeasures, to initiate courses of armed action which would disrupt the armistice and might lead to the resumption of full-scale hostilities. We believe that despite some opposition there are enough ROK political and military leaders who would obey any orders President Rhee might issue to enable him to initiate unilateral military action.

3. We believe that President Rhee will continue to threaten unilateral renewal of hostilities to strengthen his general bargaining position with regard to international discussions of the Korean problem. Moreover, the possibility exists that President Rhee might initiate military action against the Communists at any time.

4. We believe it probable that the ROK will participate in the proposed political conference, provided that the conference is convened by the end of October or shortly thereafter, but will almost certainly withdraw from the conference after it has been in session for 90 days unless President Rhee considers that substantial progress has been made toward a settlement which would unify Korea under ROK control. However, if it appears to Rhee that the conference has reached or is reaching decisions unacceptable to him, he may withdraw the ROK delegation before the 90-day period has elapsed. In the event that the conference does not convene by the end of October or shortly thereafter, or if the conference is definitely cancelled, Rhee would almost certainly consider the 90-day commitment no longer binding on him.

5. Once Rhee has decided that continued ROK participation in a political conference is futile, or has otherwise determined that he has become free of his commitments to abide by the armistice, he will be faced with the decision whether or not to carry out his threats to resume hostilities. We believe that the principal determinant of his decision will be his estimate as to whether he could take action in such a way that the US would be involved in a full-scale resumption of the fighting in Korea.

6. We believe that Rhee is convinced at the present time that the US does not have the capability to prevent him from unilaterally initiating military action against the Communists. Furthermore we believe that he estimates that the US probably could not in present circumstances dissociate itself from military support of the ROK in the event that his action provoked a significant Communist military reaction. If Rhee retained these convictions at the time of decision, we believe that he would probably initiate armed attack against the Communists. Even if he felt there were only a slight chance of involving the US, he might initiate such action, hoping to gain the eventual full support of the US. If, on the other hand, Rhee had become convinced that he could not hope to involve the US in a resumption of the Korean fighting, we believe that he would not initiate unilateral military action, but would seek to halt the political conference in order to forestall any agreement unacceptable to the ROK and to insure the retention of US protecting forces in South Korea.

discussion

Relationship of the Korean War and Armistice to the Objectives of the ROK

7. The prime objective of the present ROK government is control over the whole of Korea. This objective is held with fanatical intensity by President Syngman Rhee and in varying degrees by virtually all ROK leaders. The ROK government Relieves that the ROK can achieve neither real security nor economic viability so long as Korea remains divided.

8. The ROK takes the position that the purpose of the UN action in Korea is to unify Korea under the ROK. President Rhee has attempted to convince the US that by accepting the armistice, the UN is forsaking this objective in that an independent and unified Korea could never be achieved by negotiation with the Communists.

9. Under pressure from the US, President Rhee reluctantly agreed to abide temporarily by the armistice on the conditions that no actions detrimental to ROK national survival are taken during the armistice, and that progress towards unification is made within 90 days of the opening of the political conference. In return for his provisional acquiescence in the armistice, Rhee obtained a promise that a mutual security treaty would be presented to the US Senate for approval and was given additional commitments for US political, military, and economic support. Moreover, the US agreed to join with the ROK in withdrawing from the political conference after 90 days if in US opinion no progress is being made.

10. In view of President Rhee’s statements and actions to date we believe that Rhee considers that the agreements between the ROK and the US do not clearly limit the courses of action open to his government. In deciding whether or not to abide by the armistice agreements, Rhee must balance his intense desire for unification against his realization that without US support the ROK cannot achieve its objective of unification or even attain security and economic viability within its present territory.

Capabilities of President Rhee To Control the ROK

11. President Rhee has achieved almost complete personal control of the ROK government. The national police and para-military organizations are directly responsive to his orders. He exercises complete control over the major South Korean political party and its associated organizations, which include terrorist groups. Rhee’s recent purges within his own party clearly indicate that even pro-Rhee leaders are virtually powerless to take action independently of the President. Intimidation by terrorist groups and the police have rendered the opposition parties impotent and fearful of publicly expressing opposition to President Rhee. Lastly, the President’s control over the primary media of public information virtually prevents the dissemination of opposition views by radio or press.

12. Despite operational control of the combat units of the ROK Army by the United Nations Command (UNC), President Rhee now has effective control over the ROK armed forces. ROK military leaders are under intense pressure to follow the wishes of President Rhee, since they realize that to do otherwise could result in relief of command or even arrest and trial. Moreover, by creating the Provost Marshal General Command—a military police command with wide powers of investigation, arrest, and detention over both civilian and military persons—Rhee has both increased his personal powers and created a channel for by-passing regularly established UN Command channels. Since, however, the ROK military leadership has been under US tutelage and direction since 1946, since they have potential preponderance of power in the ROK, and since the extent of President Rhee’s control over them has never been fully tested, they will continue to be a source of concern to President Rhee and an uncertain factor in his calculations.

13. President Rhee has great popular prestige within the ROK, and his name symbolizes the struggle for Korean independence and unification. His past successes in achieving his objectives despite seemingly overwhelming odds, including US resistance, have confounded his critics and greatly enhanced his stature as a leader.

14. In view of Rhee’s dominance over ROK institutions and policies, his prestige, and his past successes, we believe that there are enough ROK political and military leaders who would obey any orders he might issue to enable him to initiate unilateral military action against the Communists which might lead to a resumption of full-scale hostilities. However, such members of the top ROK military leadership as were convinced that US support would not be forthcoming would probably strongly urge President Rhee not to issue such orders; if the orders were given and unilateral military action initiated, they would continue their urging in an attempt to halt it, military circumstances permitting. However, we believe these efforts would be unsuccessful.

Capabilities of the ROK To Disrupt the Armistice

15. The ROK Army is an unbalanced force of approximately 580,000 men, organized into 17 infantry divisions and various supporting units. In addition there are approximately 28,000 Koreans attached to UNC units, 10,000 Security Troops, 2 separate infantry regiments, and 64,500 ROK National Police organized on a semi-military basis. The ROK Navy has a strength of 10,000 and a fleet of small naval vessels, the most important of which are 4 frigates. The ROK Air Force has an estimated personnel strength of 5,000 and a combat aircraft strength of 80 piston fighters (F–51). The ROK armed forces are deficient in artillery, vehicles, modern aircraft, and trained specialists. Moreover, they are almost completely dependent on the UNC for logistical support. They are therefore incapable of sustained, large-scale operations.

16. However, the ROK armed forces have the capability, despite UNC surveillance and countermeasures, to take one or more of the following actions which would disrupt the armistice and might lead to the resumption of full-scale hostilities:

a. Initiate and maintain for approximately three days an all-out attack against the Communist armed forces in Korea, utilizing the ROK divisions presently occupying the eastern sectors of the UNC defensive position and possibly the ROK divisions under US control in other sectors of the line. This capability would be somewhat enhanced if the ROK seized UNC supply dumps and other necessary supporting installations.

b. Launch hit-and-run air, naval, or small-unit raids against either the Communist main defensive line or rear areas, in an effort to provoke the Communists into resuming hostilities.

c. Launch covert operations designed to convince the UNC that the Communists were violating the truce by military action.

d. Attack, hinder, or obstruct the truce observation teams in South Korea or the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission personnel in the demilitarized zone, employing ROK armed forces, national police, militia, or para-military groups.

e. Attack Indian custodial forces to effect the release of anti-Communist POWs.

17. The ROK also has the capability to take a variety of political actions which might disrupt the armistice. Among these are:

a. Obstructionist tactics within the political conference.

b. Unilateral ROK withdrawal from the political conference or refusal to accept a settlement agreed upon by the other members of the conference.

c. Propaganda campaigns or political actions designed to convince the Communists that the US cannot control the ROK, such as the withdrawal of all ROK forces from the UNC.

Probable ROK Courses of Action With Respect to the Armistice

18. We believe that President Rhee will continue to threaten unilateral renewal of hostilities to strengthen his general bargaining position with regard to international discussions of the Korean problem. Moreover, the possibility exists that President Rhee might initiate military action against the Communists at any time.

19. We believe it probable that the ROK will participate in the proposed political conference, provided that the conference is convened by the end of October or shortly thereafter. If the conference is convened and the ROK attends, Rhee will attempt to make the conference an object lesson for the US on the futility of negotiating with the Communists. He will seek during the period of the conference to persuade the US that the unification of Korea under ROK control is the only acceptable solution for the Korean problem, and that this solution can be achieved only by force. Rhee will almost certainly withdraw from the conference after it has been in session for 90 days unless he considers that substantial progress has been made toward a settlement which would unify Korea under ROK control. However, if it appears to Rhee that the conference has reached or is reaching decisions unacceptable to him, he may withdraw the ROK delegation before the 90-day period has elapsed. In the event that the conference does not convene by the end of October or shortly thereafter, or if the conference is definitely cancelled, Rhee would almost certainly consider the 90-day commitment no longer binding on him.

20. Once Rhee has decided that continued ROK participation in a political conference is futile, or has otherwise determined that he has become free of his commitments to abide by the armistice, he will be faced with the decision whether or not to carry out his threats to resume hostilities. We believe that in reaching his decision President Rhee will give little consideration to the attitudes and reactions of nonCommunist countries other than the US, or even to fear of initial military reverses. We further believe that the principal determinant of his decision will be his estimate as to whether he could take action in such a way that the US would be involved in a full-scale resumption of the fighting in Korea. In reaching his estimate Rhee would have to consider possible opposition from ROK military leaders, possible warnings from the US, the effect of ROK action on pending US commitments to him, and whether Communist reaction would be such as to cause a full-scale resumption of hostilities.

21. We believe that Rhee is convinced at the present time that the US does not have the capability to prevent him from unilaterally initiating military action against the Communists. Furthermore we believe that he estimates that the US probably could not in present circumstances dissociate itself from military support of the ROK in the event that his action provoked a significant Communist military reaction. If Rhee retained these convictions at the time of decision, we believe that he would probably initiate armed attack against the Communists. Even if he felt there were only a slight chance of involving the US, he might initiate such action, hoping to gain the eventual full support of the US. If, on the other hand, Rhee had become convinced that he could not hope to involve the US in a resumption of the Korean fighting, we believe that he would not initiate unilateral military action, but would seek to halt the political conference in order to forestall any agreement unacceptable to the ROK and to insure the retention of US protecting forces in South Korea.

1. According to a note on the covering sheet, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on Oct. 13, 1953, with the exception of the FBI which abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside its jurisdiction. The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the CIA in the preparation of this estimate.