Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/10–3353

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)¹

secret

[Washington,] October 13, 1953.

Subject:

• Political Conference on Korea.

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Krishna Menon, Delegate to the United Nations from India
• Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Mr. Menon came in to see the Secretary today at 4 o’clock at his request.

The Secretary said that the United States hoped the political conference would convene in the near future. Mr. Menon replied that it would now depend on the Chinese Communist reaction to the United States note of October 12.² He frankly told the Secretary that he was disappointed in the last sentence of our note, regarding exchange of views on the composition of the conference, because our language appeared to restrict the American emissary.³ He wished that this language had been omitted. He was afraid that the Communists might react negatively to the note, either by insisting on further clarification before meeting at Panmunjom, or by rejecting the note.

He explained that, based on his personal experience, he felt the Communist reaction would depend on several things. First, he was sure, speaking only for himself, that the Chinese Communists really desire a political conference on Korea. He repeated his impression several times during the course of the conversation.

Mr. Menon noted that during the summer the Chinese Communists apparently had not strongly desired a conference and had taken an extremely rigid attitude that it could be held only on their terms. Mr. Menon told the Secretary that the Indian Government had persistently urged the Chinese Communist leaders not to adhere to such a rigid position and to try to find a meeting ground with the Americans in replying to our notes. He implied that the promptings of the Indian Government had persuaded the Chinese Communists to be flexible. Second, he emphasized that the Chinese Communists fear being led into a “trap” by agreeing to our note and by meeting in Panmunjom, which Mr. Menon did not explain. Third, he alluded to the concern of the Chinese Communists not to break their commitments regarding the Communist position on composition.

The Secretary asked Mr. Menon why the Chinese Communists were so insistent on having neutral nations as formal participants at the conference. The Secretary pointed out that the Communists had helped to draft and had accepted Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement long ago. Furthermore, they had made it quite plain during the armistice negotiations that they contemplated a conference just of the countries concerned on both sides. The Secretary wanted to know if Mr. Menon had any idea as to why the Communists have reversed themselves.

Mr. Menon replied that the United States interpretation of Paragraph 60 was entirely “legalistic” and that the question of composition must be considered in much broader frame of reference. While he could only guess at the motivations of the Chinese Communists, he felt that they were probably based on a complex set of factors. His rather long and round-about answer amounted to the view that the Chinese Communists desire to have neutrals present “to facilitate” or to “smooth out” discussions between the Chinese on the one hand and the United States on the other. He said that it was not a question of numbers, since the Chinese didn’t care how many nations were alongside the United States. The real point was that the Chinese felt that, since there was such wide divergence of viewpoint, such a different way of thinking, such a difficult atmosphere created by several years of warfare between both sides, it would be helpful to have at the conference some representation of some countries that were not subject to these drawbacks. Furthermore, the Chinese Communists, as the Soviets, are thinking of the Korean conference “in the context of world unity”. For this reason, they prefer to get away from the idea of two belligerent sides.

The Secretary commented that a peaceful settlement of the Korean question would not result from the persuasive oratory of any participant at the political conference but from private and confidential conversations held during the course of the conference. He did not feel that there would be any chance for the conference to succeed if it depended on just open sessions and speech-making. It would be necessary to take up with the Communists the difficult question of the unification of Korea. We would have to ask them on what terms they would agree. This would mean taking up such questions as elections, withdrawal of troops and the degree of Korea’s militarization. The Secretary emphasized that these were all questions that could hardly be settled in public. They would have to be negotiated in private by a smaller group. Therefore, he did not see why the formal presence of neutrals at the conference itself was so essential. However, it might be that the contribution of another party in some appropriate way might help these private conversations. The Secretary felt that, if the presence of intermediaries would facilitate settlement of these difficult questions during the course of the political conference, we would not oppose it. But he urged the importance of getting on with the conference with the composition as now contemplated, without delaying it for a long time over the question of neutrals. That might be taken up in another way.

Mr. Menon said that he was fully aware of and understood the American viewpoint on this, as Mr. Lodge had stated it and as Mr. Dean had elaborated on it to him. He agreed entirely with the Secretary’s comment on the necessity for private and confidential meetings on the real substance of a peaceful settlement in Korea. He said that it was obvious to him, and he was sure to the Chinese Communists, that there were really only two principals involved: the Chinese Communists and the Americans. The latter, of course, had to bring along President Rhee and the South Koreans, and to consider the views of the Western and South American countries, while the former had to account for the North Koreans. But, essentially, the Chinese Communists and the Americans would determine the outcome of the conference. In his view, this was the factor that made the whole question of a conference so difficult, since the Chinese Communists and the Americans had no contact with each other and had such divergent reactions. Mr. Menon felt that the Communists would be quite insistent on the question of neutrals.

The Secretary then asked Mr. Menon if he thought the reference in the Soviet note of September 28⁴ on the political conference on Korea indicated that the Soviet Government might be disposed to want the big powers to take up the political conference or to accept a different formula for the composition of the conference on Korea. In a discursive reply, Mr. Menon concluded that the Soviet note should not be considered a substitute for the political conference on Korea. He thought that the Soviets wished to keep separate a general conference on lessening of international tensions and specific conferences on Germany, Austria, or Korea.

In referring again to the United States note of October 12 to the Communists, Mr. Menon said that he had had very useful discussions with Mr. Dean and he thought that Mr. Dean could be extremely effective in discussions with the Communists on these difficult matters. He hoped that it would be acceptable for him to have another discussion as soon as possible with Mr. Dean about the possible Communist reaction to the United States note of October 12. He hoped that he could discuss this with Mr. Dean in order to get some clarification for his Government as to what we actually have in mind in the last paragraph and whether there is sufficient flexibility in our approach. He indicated that he would like to be in a position to inform his Government fairly authoritatively as to the degree of latitude and authority which Mr. Dean would have in Panmunjom. The Secretary stated that the American emissary in Panmunjom would, of course, have no authority to make any decisions regarding the composition of the political conference but that he would certainly listen to any and all views which the Communists might put forward regarding this matter. The Secretary indicated that Mr. Menon could see Mr. Dean again, either here in Washington or in New York, if he cared to do so.

Mr. Menon also today disavowed any desire of his Government to participate in the political conference or to push itself forward in this matter. However, he said that Prime Minister Nehru did wish to fulfill any obligation that India might have in the cause of peace.

1. A marginal note by O’Connor indicated that the Secretary of State approved this memorandum.
2. In its note of Oct. 12, transmitted through the Swedish Government to North Korea and China, the U.S. Government stated that its representative was prepared to meet with those of the Communist side on Oct. 26 on the understanding that agreement to Panmunjom as the site for these preliminary talks did not indicate that it was suitable for the conference site. The U.S. Representative was authorized to agree on time and place of the conference and to exchange views on composition consistent with paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and the UN General Assembly resolution of Aug. 28, 1953. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 26, 1953, pp. 550–551.
3. The last sentence read as follows: “Our representative therefore will be prepared to deal with such questions [procedural, administrative, etc.] and will also be prepared to exchange views on composition of the political conference to the extent consistent with the basis above set forth in the preceding paragraphs [references to composition as defined in paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and the UN General Assembly resolution of Aug. 28].”
4. For text of the Soviet note, see Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 26, 1953, pp. 548–550.