Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

695A.0024/10–1253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Seoul, October 12, 1953—6 p.m.

318. Repeated information Tokyo 147, information New Delhi 9. Tokyo for Ambassador Allen, pass CINCUNC for General Hull. For the Secretary.

This morning I delivered to President Rhee Secretary’s message contained Department telegram 234, October 10.¹ Rhee read letter aloud to acting Foreign Minister Cho and me and then embarked on oral statement along lines generally familiar to Department: His doubts whether any good can come of armistice; his distrust of Indians as “neutrals on Communist side”; his patience under repeated provocation (sic) by Nehru, including Bombay statement day before yesterday² to which ROK Government would shortly reply; and Rhee’s general discouragement over way things are going, including Secretary’s “disappointing letter”.

With reference Cho’s October 3 statement, Rhee denounced alleged conduct of Indians on NNRC as something about which Korea cannot remain silent. However, when text of statement produced, President declared last paragraph was “blunder” and that he accordingly disassociated himself from it. As Department will recall this is paragraph containing ROK threat to take up arms against Indians; as indicated my telegram 311³ (to Tokyo 141, New Delhi 5) I do not think unilateral move by Rhee against Indians is actually under consideration at this time.

Rhee asked that I inform you he would answer your October 10 letter at earliest opportunity.

I then gave President copy of your October 2 letter to Foreign Minister Pyun (Department telegram 233, October 9⁴) which evoked even longer statement by Rhee concerning Communist menace in Asia followed by plea for US to show “more leadership and less appeasement” in rallying anti-Communist world to defense of principles. Why does US keep referring to neutralization, he asked, when I explained to Secretary Dulles last August why we cannot accept it.

With regard latest Communist proposal for meeting at Panmunjom to discuss political conference,⁵ Rhee reiterated that however small are prospects for political conference success, they will be further diminished if we should accede to Communist demand for so-called neutral Asiatic representation as price for buying Communist attendance. This in turn led to observations on ROK position ninety days after beginning of unfruitful political conference (or, impliedly, ninety days after date, October 27, by which conference should have started). Implication of all these remarks was that if Chinese Communists are still in Korea on January 25, ROK may feel free to resume fighting and expect US to join. Rhee spoke again of “national suicide if necessary” as preferable to “national dishonor, or slow strangulation”.

President also sought to engage in detailed discussion of NNRC developments in demilitarized zone and alleged US responsibility therefor. I suggested that inasmuch as this subject has hitherto been treated as military matter, he consider it with General Hull, who was calling on him later today.

Rhee remained calm throughout ninety-minute interview which ended with further pleas on his part for American Government understanding of his conviction that, if we attempt to protract armistice while leaving Communists in possession northern half of his country, he would rather fight than accept that solution.

Briggs

1. Supra.
2. According to telegram 395 to New Delhi, Oct. 9, 1953, the Associated Press quoted Nehru as stating, inter alia, that developments in Korea since the arrival of the Indian custodial force “have given one the impression that the UNC does not want peace” and that the “South Korean Government is breaking solemn understandings frequently [and] is utterly irresponsible.” (795.00/10–953)
3. Dated Oct. 9, not printed. (611.91/10–953)
4. In this telegram, the Department of State agreed to Briggs showing Rhee a copy of the Oct. 2 letter. (695A.0024/10–953) The Oct. 2 letter has not been found in Department of State files.
5. The reference was to a message of Oct. 10 in which the People’s Republic of China reiterated that the political conference should include neutral participation, but announced that after consultations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the two governments were prepared to appoint representatives to meet with the U.S. representative at Panmunjom for discussions on place, time, and composition of the conference. For a text of the communication, see Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 26, 1953, p. 551.