Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/5–453

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nash) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)¹

top secret

Washington, September 3, 1953.

Subject:

• United States Policy in the Event of a Failure of the Korean Political Conference

1. Of increasing concern to the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in particular is the absence of any NSC policy with respect to United States action in the event of a collapse of the political conference on Korea.

2. NSC 157/1² while considering the United States position to be taken at the conference did not consider the alternatives open to us in the event our minimum objectives are not achieved. This deficiency is of concern to the Department of Defense which is attempting to plan for all contingencies including that which might involve a resumption of military operations in Korea.

3. While it is generally understood that the United States would react immediately with vigorous military measures to a resumption of hostilities by the communists if the conference failed, it is less clear what our reaction would be to a ROK initiated military action under the same circumstances.

4. It does not appear to be too soon to begin the drafting of a paper dealing with United States policies in the event of a failure of the political conference. Certainly, if anything like the courses of action outlined in NSC 147³ is to be considered, certain preliminary action should be taken at once, not only in the military field, but in the political, as well. The difficulty already experienced at the United Nations in attempting to organize the conference plus certain statements of the Soviet delegate all point to the fact that a conference failure is more than a remote possibility.

5. I would suggest that it may be appropriate for the State Department to table a draft of their views on this problem as soon as practicable. The Department of Defense is prepared to contribute its views on all proposals advanced to the Planning Board.

Frank C. Nash

1. According to a covering note by Bowie to Robertson, Sept. 4, this memorandum was an advance copy which would reach the Department of State by more formal channels later, but Bowie believed that S/P and FE should begin working on a draft paper as envisioned by Nash.
2. Dated July 7, p. 1344.
3. Dated Apr. 2, p. 839.