Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 163
United States Minutes of the Second Meeting, ANZUS Council: First Session1
[Extract]
2WAM M–1
. . . . . . .
Agenda Item 3—Surveys of Situations Affecting Security in the Pacific Korea
The Secretary stated that when this Administration took office the Korean armistice negotiations had been going on for a year and a half and were in a state of moribundness, if he could use such a word. We revived the negotiations, he said, by deciding on an alternative to the stalemate which was taking such a substantial toll in terms of lives and money—a more decisive effort. The decision of the President, set forth in his State of the Union message, to rescind the orders to the 7th Fleet to defend the China mainland by blockading Formosa was part and parcel of that alternative. With the Chinese Communists attacking us on the northern flank and strengthening their southern flank it was felt that there was no reason to have the 7th Fleet shielding their center for them. By lifting the orders on the 7th Fleet a possibility was opened up in the minds of the Chinese Communists which they had not had to consider before. We first felt them out by the prisoner-of-war exchange proposal. They responded to it and offered to reopen general negotiations. We refused until such time as the sick and wounded prisoners of war had actually been exchanged. The Secretary thought that the outcome had been helped by a discussion he had with Prime Minister Nehru3 in which he explained the U.S. position and policies, which in turn he believed Nehru may have explained to the Chinese Communists, particularly since, after that talk, they had dropped their insistence on forcible repatriation.
At this point the Chinese Communists were ripe for an armistice. Our position was that an armistice on honorable terms would give an opportunity of reuniting Korea, which we believe is a possibility. We could [Page 1506] not, however, continue fighting just for the Koreans’ sake. The Secretary stressed that we fight for principles common to all the free world and not as a crusader trying to remedy all existing injustices. If we pursued the latter course, it might well be difficult to avoid creating new injustices.
Two principles were at stake in the Korean war: to throw back the aggressor to his original boundaries or beyond; and the non-forcible repatriation of prisoners and political asylum for those not wishing to return. We were justified in fighting for these principles but not just for the unity of Korea. The Secretary emphasized that in the past there has been too great a tendency to ignore the Republic of Korea in our planning and in our actions in the UN. Rhee had been taken too much for granted. Suddenly he jolted us by the release of the prisoners he held. However, it is important to remember that we cannot have an armistice or a peace without him. His 500,000-man army of good and loyal soldiers conducted a courageous campaign and cannot be ignored. One of the most difficult tasks we have had has been to get Rhee to go along with an armistice. The Secretary noted that we had done some things in the common interest which we did not want to do but that we had to pay the price. He referred to the security treaty with Korea, which we were reluctant to make because we do not want to assume such responsibilities in regard to the Asiatic mainland, and to our contribution to the economic reconstruction of Korea. He mentioned the closer political relationship which this country has effected with Rhee and singled out his own recent trip to Korea as an indication thereof. He also paid tribute to Assistant Secretary Robertson and the job he had done in his negotiations with Rhee.
The Secretary next turned to the political conference and Indian participation therein. He said that we felt the correct interpretation of the truce agreement was not to bring in everyone in the area who had an interest there, but that there should be two sides—the UN and the Communist. Not only had Rhee accepted the armistice reluctantly and literally, but he had a most intense and bitter distrust of the Indians. The prospects for success of any political conference would be diminished if India were sitting on our side and if we should then make any proposals which the Republic of Korea might feel had been motivated even in part by what Rhee would consider Nehru’s “desire to appease Communist China”.
Mr. Casey said Korea’s distrust of India seemed unreal to the Australians and asked what motivations it had.
Mr. Robertson replied that this distrust arose from the Indian position on the non-repatriation of prisoners-of-war. Further, when Russia was proposed as a neutral, India had suggested Czechoslovakia or Poland instead. To the Koreans there was no difference between one [Page 1507] Communist country and another. He also cited the fact that when Stalin died Nehru had extolled him as “This great man of peace”.
The Secretary said he had no doubt that Nehru and the Indian Government were sincerely anti-communist and look on the communists as India’s enemies. They felt, however, that they must deal with the menace in quite a different way from ours. The Secretary had told Rhee that he believed he was wrong in his feelings about India.
The Secretary said that our position on India was motivated by the deep conviction that India’s participation would not be for the best. He recounted a call he had made to Lord Salisbury in which he had told him that we had exhausted the possibilities of persuasion with Rhee, but that if the UK were to take on the task of reconciling Rhee to the presence of India at the conference, we would vote for India. This seemed to have impressed Salisbury. The Secretary was certain our position was correct on this matter. While away, he had become aware of the intensity of feeling on the subject, but he did not think that the situation in the UN was solely our fault. The UK had made a commitment to India long before that it would vote for India, at a time when the delicate situation in Korea was not fully appreciated. We feel that some constructive results may well come out of the conference. In response to Ambassador Spender’s question as to what solutions might be considered, the Secretary mentioned the possibility of general elections in the whole area and Rhee’s plan to take North Koreans into the vacant places in the presently constituted Assembly. The measure of armaments to be allowed the new Korean Government will be discussed and their effect on the sensitive northern zone would have to be considered. However, any realistic settlement would have to take into account the fact that the Chinese Communists would not accede to any build-up on their boundaries. Rhee, on the other hand was anxious to keep a big army. These two issues will have to be resolved on our side. The Secretary also said that, in the long range outlook, Rhee is as much concerned with Japan as he is with Soviet Russia and Communist China. This was one reason for our having concluded a security pact with him.
Ambassador Spender asked if it were not true that the Communists would never agree to Rhee’s proposal and that Rhee would never agree to general elections. He asked if the Secretary could give any indication that Rhee might agree to such elections.
The Secretary said he did not want to make any forecasts and that we may never get to that issue if the Communists put barriers in the way of the political conference. It was not easy to see what the answer would be. The position we had taken on Indian participation was done partly to put us in a position in which we could in turn ask a concession from Rhee later on. He noted the danger from past experience of bringing the Communists into any Government. Rhee is, and we should [Page 1508] be, wary of that. However, the Secretary did not think the situation was hopeless.
Mr. Webb asked how far the other side had been approached.
The Secretary replied that they had been approached through Sweden, the Swedish Foreign Office and the Swedish Ambassador in Peiping. We had transmitted to the Chinese Communists the proposal for the date and site of the political conference as agreed on at the 17-power meeting on August 5 [1?]. There had been no response yet on their part. In answer to a question on the composition of the Communist side, the Secretary said that the UN side had been determined and that the Communists could invite anyone they want. We would not exert any influence or try to dictate who should be on their side.
The First Session recessed at 12:50.
- This ANZUS Council meeting was the only time in 1953 that the signatories of the Australia-New Zealand-United States security treaty of 1951 formally consulted. This regularly scheduled meeting of the ANZUS Council was attended by the Secretary of State and the New Zealand and Australian Ministers of External Affairs along with ranking military representatives of the three governments.↩
- Preceding this extract were discussions on administrative details (item 1) and a survey of the world situation (item 2).↩
- See memoranda of conversation by Dulles, May 21 and 22, pp. 1068 and 1071, respectively.↩