Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Minutes of Cabinet Meeting¹

[Extract]

confidential

[Washington,] August 27, 1954—9 a.m.

. . . . . . .

Report on International Developments—Secretary Dulles viewed his trip to Korea and discussions with President Rhee as a fulfillment of one of the inducements for getting Rhee to sign the armistice. During their discussions Syngman Rhee fought to the last to secure commitments from the United States for the unification of Korea by whatever means possible and for material support for Korea from the United States should South Korea attempt unification by force. Mr. Dulles commented that the communiqué at the end of the conference had been misinterpreted, and that actually the United States retained a free hand in determining if it should walk out on the political conference after ninety days. It was quite clear to Mr. Rhee that the United States would confer with its other associates. Mr. Dulles stressed the last sentence of the communiqué, to the effect that there were no agreements not represented in the communiqué. The terms obtained for the United States South Korea’s assurance that the ROK forces should remain under the control of the United Nations commander until at least next February. Also, there was a proviso that the United States would continue for six months to make use of Korean facilities presently available.

In regard to the debate in the United Nations on the Korean peace conference, Secretary Dulles outlined the background of the United Kingdom’s commitment to India to have it participate. The bitterness between India and Korea makes it impossible for the United States to persuade Syngman Rhee to accept Indian participation, particularly since our bargaining power with him seems exhausted. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the armistice agreement called for a conference of both sides, and that Rhee could use Indian participation as an excuse for withdrawing and thus wrecking the conference. He stated that the United States has put the burden on the British for persuading Rhee to admit India if Britain is insistent on having India participate. He commented that Lord Salisbury understood the situation sympathetically.

In regard to Morocco,² Secretary Dulles commented that the present situation had developed as a result of French efforts to play one faction against another getting out of hand. He noted that the interest of the United States lies in avoiding Security Council action on this situation because of our need for continued French effort in Indo-China. He recognized that the US position in this respect would cost the votes of the Arab-Asian bloc on the Korean question.

Secretary Dulles viewed the fall of Mossadeq³ as the presentation of a second chance for us in Iran.

Secretary Dulles commented on the increase of sentiment against the Bricker Amendment among the younger members of the Bar Association, who are ready to wage a national education campaign. Following his appearance before the Bar Association in Boston, he judged that the Administration is in a much stronger position now on this question than last January.

Following the Secretary’s presentation, the Vice President commented on our unfortunate position in regard to the UN Korean debate, whereby we have to take the blame for a situation which we cannot control yet cannot publicize without ruining present good relations with the British.

In response to the Vice President’s query on the possibility of achieving Korean unification, Secretary Dulles stated that the possibility at this conference was small, but that there might be success in establishing forces which would work slowly to bring final good results. Such forces would be the economic development of South Korea to attract the North Koreans, and the continued presence of United States troops which would encourage the opposition to bargain unification in return for US military withdrawal. Secretary Dulles saw as the most difficult problem Syngman Rhee’s desire for huge armaments which is inspired more by fear of Japan than of the Communists.

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Lam

1. These minutes were drafted by L. Arthur Minnich, Special Assistant to the White House Office. A note on the source text read: “(Reported by Minnich. Copies to Mrs. Whitman and Minnich.)” President Eisenhower did not attend the meeting; Vice President Nixon presided in his place.
2. For documentation on Morocco, see vol. xi, Part 1, pp. 599 ff.
3. For documentation on the Iranian crisis, see volume x.