Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

357.AD/8–2653: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State

confidential
niact

New Delhi, August 26, 1953—1 p.m.

389. Repeated niact London 55. Re Deptel 216 August 24¹ and Embtel 388 August 25.²

I saw Nehru at 9:15 this morning to urge India’s voluntary withdrawal from Korean political conference in accordance with Department’s instructions. Conversation was most friendly, in sharp contrast to yesterday’s outburst, and results were considerably better than I expected.

I emphasized that US had no objection to India as such, we appreciated India’s valuable and possibly decisive role in achieving armistice due to fact that India was not active participant in Panmunjom negotiations, possibility that India might play similar role outside political conference, and that our genuine objective, as that of India, was to achieve success of conference, whether our views as to how this might best be achieved were similar or not. I then pointed out that if Korean conference was successful and wider discussions on Far East eventuate, US would expect India as well as other countries to formally participate in discussions of matters of direct interest to them.

Nehru said he was confident US Government was not trying to “do GOI down”. He would be equally frank to say that in his personal opinion US had allowed itself to be tied down closely to ROK. He expressed appreciation for US Government’s views (I read from telegram in order to emphasize their official nature) and said these views would be given full consideration. He remarked that vote was expected to be taken in GA committee today,³ but that some time would elapse between committee vote and consideration of subject in plenary GA session. He said India was naturally in consultation with “other powers” on subject and he did not wish to be accused of going back on his word to them or acting behind their back. He would have to consult them again. He added that it was difficult in rapidly-developing situations of this kind to send categorical instructions to his delegation in NY and that certain amount of latitude was necessary.

I then said, on my own, that one reason for serious US concern in this matter was due, in all frankness, to fact that we had large number of troops in Korea whom we did not wish to see placed in jeopardy (Usito 10, August 24⁴ report was carried in today’s press). Nehru asked whether our concern was over possibility of further aggression by any one. I said if political conference failed, situation would be highly unsatisfactory and tension mount, in which case any spark might set off conflagration without premeditated aggression by anyone.

I expressed confidence that GOI participated in our view that while show of hands in UN might be necessary, we would much prefer to avoid this contingency, with attendant animosities, if at all possible. Nehru said he agreed fully.

Nehru did not refer to his statement to Congress Party caucus last night, reported prominently in today’s press, that India would not voluntarily withdraw under Rhee’s threats and I carefully avoided subject or any reference to Rhee’s attitude since such reference by me would have destroyed atmosphere of talk and merely brought forth further tirade of abuse against Rhee and against our allowing him to decide our policy.

Nehru did not explain “other powers” he would consult, but it is obvious he had Commonwealth principally in mind, although some consultation with Peking should also not be excluded. Australian High Commissioner has asked to see me this morning and I am seeing acting UK High Commissioner later.

I think it quite possible India will release Commonwealth from obligation to vote for Indian participation, Moreover, I do not believe India will participate in any case if we continue firm in our disapproval.

Allen

1. In this telegram, Allen received instructions to see Nehru and urge India’s voluntary withdrawal from the proposed Korean Political Conference. (357.AD/8–1553)
2. In this telegram, Allen reported that he was unable to see Nehru, who was tied up in a party meeting; meanwhile he conveyed the substance of telegram 216 to New Delhi to Pillai for relaying to Nehru that night so that the Indian Prime Minister could think it over before his meeting with Allen on Aug. 26. (357.AD/8–2553)
3. On Aug. 27 at the 625th meeting of the First Committee, the draft resolution to invite India to attend the political conference was adopted. (Yearbook of the United Nations 1953, p. 126)
4. Not printed.