795.00/7–553: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)
CX 63500. (Army message) To Secretary of Defense information DeptAr for JCS, CG AFFE Yokohama exclusive for Kendall, COMNAVFE exclusive for Briscoe, COMFEAF exclusive for Weyland, CGArmEight exclusive for Taylor, AmEmb Seoul exclusive for Assistant Secy of State Robertson (ArEight pls pass), Secy of Def exclusive for Kyes (DeptAr pls pass) Defense pis pass to State.
Reference: A. DEF 942613, dated 30 [29] June 1953,1 B. CX 63449, dated 2 July 1953.2
- I.
- To accomplish the aims set forth in paragraph 6b of reference A, I have already taken certain actions. In
summary, these are:
- a.
- Conferences of high level US Commanders.
- b.
- Movement of the 187 AB RCT and elements of the 24th Division to Korea.
- c.
- Consolidation of the Korean non-repatriate POWs.
- d.
- Slowdown of supplies and equipment to Korea so that only normal levels are maintained.
- e.
- Suspension of shipment of equipment for activation of last four ROK divisions.
- II.
-
Other courses of action which I propose to take are:
- a.
- Continued slowdown on 20th Division ROK program.
- b.
- Conduct surveys of new installations on routes from combat zone to Pusan area.
- c.
- Diversion into relief channel, for distribution by KCAC, relief goods which normally have been made available for sale by ROK Government to generate hwan for its use.
- d.
- Issuance of instruction to substantially reduce hwan accounts, and effect a reduction in the use of indigenous labor to fullest extent possible.
- e.
- Suspension of civilian construction which the military has sponsored for civilian economy.
- f.
- Suspension of certain military construction which would not prejudice combat operations.
- g.
- Contingency planning, in covert and clandestine fields, for withdrawal.
- h.
- Induce, through covert means, speculation as to UNC intentions at high ROK Government level.
- i.
- Release of certain indigenous persons currently employed in clandestine activities.
- j.
- Deployment to Inchon and Pusan, as standby station, certain task force 90 ships, and movement of the naval beach group and second amphibious shore brigade from Japan to Korea.
- k.
- Initiation of conferences, by Taylor, with ROK Chiefs of Staff and
Defense Minister during which plans for the following
contingencies would be discussed:
- (1)
- In event Communists reject current armistice proposals.
- (2)
- In event satisfactory armistice is arranged.
- (3)
- In event ROK abstains from armistice agreement and pursues independent course.
- l.
- Initiate discussions at the level of chiefs of ROKA, ROKN, and ROKAF concerning plans which will lead to the eventual turnover of training responsibilities from the advisory groups to the ROK services (to include logistical as well as tactical).
(Note)—Conference will be handled to avoid any implication that UNC definitely plans a withdrawal.
- III.
- I consider all of these actions consistent with security of UNC forces and with calculated ROK reaction. They are actions which can be logically explained or plausibly denied. Collectively, over a short period of time, they should have a definite impact on Rhee, and influential ROK military and political elements. I do not feel that any of these actions will have an adverse effect on Robertson’s negotiations, and I plan to take these actions, in desirable sequence, at the appropriate time. Planning for any logical steps to be taken in the future will continue and you will be kept informed. Signed Clark.