795B.00/7–653: Telegram
The Political Adviser for the Armistice Negotiations (Murphy) to the Department of State1
priority
49. From Murphy no distribution. Personal for Acting Secretary Smith eyes only. Robertson asked me to stay on with him at Seoul where I had gone to accompany Clark on his last trip. I remained until after Robertson’s July 3 meeting with Rhee which I attended. I returned to Tokyo after that having taken occasion to bid Rhee and his Prime Minister and Foreign Minister goodbye in a way to convey to them that I personally felt no useful purpose would be served by protraction of the conversations. I hoped this might help stimulate them to cooperate.
Most of July 3 meeting was absorbed by Rhee’s exposé of his reasons for opposing armistice and his standard review of Korean history with emphasis on his accuracy of judgment in past with ample reference to American mistakes in 1904 and 1945. While this record has been well grooved with constant repetition, it is more recently endowed with an overtone of doubt regarding American future reliability—“How can we know what the US will do, Americans change their minds so often”? Rhee scarcely read Robertson’s letter and the aide-mémoire it enclosed2 which outlines present US position.
My purpose in this telegram is to give you my personal slant for what it is worth. I think Robertson dealing with difficult subject has done first class job of gentle persuasion. It is hard for Robertson to decide that he should depart because at end of each meeting there is neat formula that requires another talk or another exchange. Following a classic pattern of seeming to settle or temporarily waive differences except one and in stating present final condition that US promise to resume hostilities to military victory after eventual breakdown of political conference, Rhee, who had specialized in political science in the US for many years, knew he was stating condition US could not possibly fulfill. In my opinion that is only cover plan for his determination to defeat armistice. I believe Rhee’s inflated ego causes him to project himself into historical future in shining mail and on white horse, the hero who alone was right and who singlehanded slew Communist Goliath using Korea as stage. He wants record to show his reasons for opposition.
That is why he is deaf to details like UNC casualties during June. Fact that UNC suffered 4861 killed and some 16,000 wounded in action and 2300 missing in action most of whom ROK’s leaves him undisturbed [Page 1335] as to arguments about economic and military assistance. Our present error he says will inevitably lead to millions of casualties. He is convinced he has us over barrel and that we won’t dare to quit Korea and can’t let him down. That was part his philosophy in releasing North Korean prisoners of war after verifying US would not use fire power. He knows we have made no effort to undermine his personal position in Korea and he is doing what he can to consolidate it. As I analyze it, Rhee’s attitude towards us is disdainful because he feels we have made mistakes in past, are making grave one now, but he is cynically confident his ability manipulate US representatives. Supremely assured he alone knows how to deal with world communism, Rhee doubts US ability to do so and even suspects we may sell out. In connection these talks regarding armistice he even finds it necessary to accuse us of rearming Japan so that it may eventually attack Korea. His attitude apparently has developed over long time during which he has become overconfident US support and it has been bolstered by individual Americans. I am sure he feels Robertson’s mission is fairly low level and later will be succeeded by something more important and also that Clark will be removed before long and replaced by someone perhaps more amenable to his views.
During these talks at Seoul our mission has been disinclined to utilize the press in support of our objective although Rhee–Pyun and company use it freely following their custom. Robertson asked why concurrence in his objection to publication Secretary’s letter June 223 for period 24 to 36 hours which I gave reluctantly as I believed it might be useful to publish letter promptly. I see no earthly reason why letter should not be published and why effort should not be made to inform Korean people of the issues. There was also unwillingness to use any form of hint of withdrawal or independent action.
Present moves by CINCUNC and Taylor to indicate planning for independent action with hint of withdrawal are salutary. It has not mattered much whether Robertson stayed few days longer as it filled in time we are waiting for Communist reply to Clark’s June 29 letter.4 As we kept Communists waiting for reply their letter about 9 days no doubt they would feel we should be kept waiting about same length time. Fact their engineers 2 days ago had look at Panmunjom building foundation where signature to take place, construction having been arrested after POW escape, may be encouraging sign.
My conclusion is that best now obtainable from Rhee is position where he will reserve his freedom of action and will only passively oppose armistice agreement. That may not be unhappy. Once battle is off our backs we should be much better position cope ROK problem. [Page 1336] For longer term I believe that really serious study should be given question what support we could give Rhee’s successor and what aid might fairly be provided whatever spontaneous Korean movement may develop to replace him. I do not intimate any disrespect for ROK sovereignty but merely protection for extremely important American equity resulting US investment blood and treasure, together with strategic needs.
- A marginal note on the source text indicated that Dulles saw this telegram and Smith’s initials appeared on the source text indicating he also saw it.↩
- For texts, see telegram 021750Z from Seoul, July 3, p. 1312.↩
- Ante, p. 1238.↩
- For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 13, 1953, pp. 46–47.↩