795.00/7–553: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea1
16. From Acting Secretary. Embtel 14.2 While Philippine formula preferred, if agreement could quickly be reached with Rhee and confidence restored some alternative termination language such as Article 4 Japanese Treaty should be possible. Further comment on other possible alternatives will follow.
However, I am impressed with fact that if we are to get best for Korea we cannot allow present situation be protracted much longer. Whereas, three weeks ago overwhelming support could have been obtained from Congress for almost any program for Korea proposed by the President, growing sense of frustration and lack of confidence in Rhee is causing support to diminish. Longer present situation continues greater feeling impossible depend in long term on ROK Government.
You can within your discretion tell Rhee my conversations last few days with Senator George3 and other influential senators on whom we will have to depend strongly for support for any program for Korea have convinced me of this growing lack of confidence. This applies with equal for [force?] to attitudes U.S. public. Rhee ought to realize that while Congress and public are sympathetic with him, this does not compensate for lessening confidence in ROK for future. “Hope long deferred maketh sick the heart.” More than ROK confidence in US is involved. Confidence is two way street that requires ROK as well as US action.
You can also, in your discretion inform Rhee that as I have read his messages and your reports of conversations with him, I have been increasingly impressed by lack of realism of some of his advisers. It would be folly for them to be misled regarding real US attitudes by a few vocal but essentially not influential persons. The most articulate [Page 1332] members of Congress are not necessarily the most influential. Therefore, Rhee should fully realize that every day possibility armistice further delayed because attitude ROK Government our chances for best possible solution for Korea diminish.
Embtel 15.4 You can categorically assure Rhee that no further envoys are contemplated if your mission fails. Will do best prevent further damaging rumors this regard.
- This telegram, drafted by Smith and Johnson, was sent to Seoul for Robertson and repeated to Pusan as telegram 14 and to Tokyo for Murphy and Clark as telegram 43.↩
- In this telegram, dated July 5, Robertson noted that the final article of the draft security treaty with Korea allowed for one-year termination on the notice of either party (as in the Philippine Treaty of August 1951). This, in Robertson’s view, might give Rhee concern and he asked for guidance on alternative language, citing the Japanese Treaty of September 1951 as an example, where the treaty could be terminated when, in the opinion of Japan and the United States, satisfactory individual or collective security arrangements would provide for the peace and security of the Japan area. (795.00/7–553)↩
- Walter F. George of Georgia.↩
- In this telegram, July 5, 1953, Robertson reported that the press in Seoul carried stories that Eisenhower was being urged by Republican Senators to send another envoy to Korea such as Generals MacArthur or Van Fleet. Robertson stated he knew of no better way to insure failure of what he and Clark were trying to do than to allow such reports to persist. He asked Dulles and Johnson to “try to persuade our Congressional friends to let me keep the rug under my feet until I myself am ready to throw in the towel. That time has not arrived.” (795.00/7–553)↩