795.00/7–353: Telegram
The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State
priority
10. Eyes only for Secretary from Robertson. Re Deptel 1 to Seoul.1 Briggs feels it inadvisable to sound out Rhee on neutralization guaranteed by US and other great powers for following reasons:
- (1)
- Rhee would interpret such indication of interest as sign US planning to desert Korea at first opportunity;
- (2)
- Rhee might regard our raising subject as indication we seek to exchange specific major guarantees contained in defense pact for diluted minor guarantee representing US share of multilateral commitments;
- (3)
- The fact that neutralization would also involve reducing Korean armed forces from present substantial level to that of mere police force would unquestionably represent added irritant.
My personal opinion is this subject could be explored in ordinary conversation without damage to our relations. Rhee in his conversations with me has often expressed fear of being sacrificed to some other great power as happened to Korea in 1905. Advantage could be taken of one of these moods to ask if he would prefer neutralization guaranteed by US and other great powers to a mutual defense pact by US as now being considered. If from our standpoint such neutralization would seem best solution I can see no reason for not sensing his attitude. However, if you decide to sound him out it should be done before he reaches decision on defense pact.
- In this telegram, July 1, drafted by Dulles, the Secretary of State asked Robertson if he had any impression as to the attitude of Rhee to a unified Korea neutralized and guaranteed by the United States and perhaps other great powers with armament limited to domestic security requirements. Although Dulles was not proposing such a plan at the time, he believed it should be explored in Washington if Robertson believed Rhee was receptive. (795.00/7–153)↩