795.00/7–453
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
Subject:
- Meeting with President Rhee on July 4.
Participants:
- President Syngman Rhee
- Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
- Mr. Paik Tu Chin, Korean Prime Minister
- Mr. Pyun Yongtae, Korean Foreign Minister
- Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
We met with President Rhee today at 2:30 to find out his decision on my aide-mémoire of July 22 which I left with him yesterday.
After stating that I hoped our conversations had cleared up many misunderstandings and doubts, I repeated all the assurances that President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles had already conveyed to President Rhee and which they had asked me to reaffirm. I again told President Rhee that he should have no doubt as to the good faith and determination of the United States Government to work closely with the Republic of Korea as a friend and ally. I stated to him frankly that our aide-mémoire represented our final position. In summing up, I said that Korea and the United States must establish a common front to meet the common enemy in order to advance our common objectives. I again expressed my opinion that Korea had so much more to gain by working with the United States than in veering off on an independent unilateral course of action. I again cited the advantages of support for the ROK military build-up, the program of economic aid, the Greater Sanctions Statement, a Mutual Defense Treaty, and the pledge of the United States to work shoulder to shoulder with his government in the political conference. While this support and assurance would only be possible, I pointed out, if the ROK accepted the armistice, the ultimate decision on whether Korea would work with us as we hoped was entirely one for him and his government to make. We had gone over this ground many times and seemed so close to agreement, that I now urged him to reach a final understanding with me that we could announce today.
Rhee expressed warm and friendly appreciation for the assurances from President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles and myself. He said that [Page 1327] my mission had done a great deal to clear up many of his doubts and fears. The conversation then revolved around two principal questions: the period after the political conference, and Senate treatment of a Mutual Defense Treaty. Rhee discussed at some length Korea’s desire for reunification. He kept saying that the main difficulty was in knowing what would happen after a failure of the political conference. He expressed again his great desire for a pledge from the United States for joint military action in the post-conference period. I again carefully explained why the President could, for constitutional reasons, give no such pledge beyond that included in my aide-mémoire of July 2. Rhee then stated that he could understand why American statesmen and the American people did not wish to resume the war, since they believed it would bring on the “holocaust” of a third world war. He said he did not want that to happen any more than President Eisenhower or anyone else in America. He said he understood the difference between the United States carrying on the war as a member of the United Nations and acting alone. He again expressed his hope that the United States at least could give him moral and material support in fighting alone for Korea’s reunification. However, he said that he also understood why American statesmen were reluctant to give such support if it also meant a risk of large-scale hostilities. He kept saying “then what” and told me frankly that this was a terribly difficult problem for him and his people.
It was because of the constitutional limitations upon the President’s action that made him doubt whether the Senate would approve a Mutual Defense Treaty. He told me that he would have nothing with which to reassure the Korean people of Korea’s protection in supporting an armistice if he could not be sure that such a treaty would pass the Senate. Since he knew the Senate sometimes failed to approve treaties, he wondered if the Senate leaders would support this treaty. He said it would be helpful if he could receive from the President and the Secretary assurances that the Senate leaders would act speedily on the treaty. I replied that the President and the Secretary had necessarily consulted several times before my departure with the Senate leaders on a Mutual Defense Treaty, since the President would make no such offer without referring the matter first to Senate leaders of both parties. They were aware of the offer of a treaty along the lines of the Philippine Treaty and had indicated their general approval. Since the publication of the President’s letter of June 6,3 there had been no register of protest in the Congress against such a treaty with the ROK.
Rhee said his people had been working on a draft treaty, and he would be very interested in seeing the text of any treaty we might have [Page 1328] brought along with us. He said he would like to have us send up one today, if we could. I told him that we would.
I then appealed to him again to agree with me today along the lines of my aide-mémoire of July 2, since we had cleared up so many doubts and misunderstandings. For several minutes Rhee reflected seriously and appeared to be laboring on the point of making a decision. When he began to speak, it seemed that he was about to agree. Suddenly Foreign Minister Pyun intervened to ask that the armistice be held up until the Senate acted on the treaty, since the ROK would have no assurance after an armistice that the Senate would approve a treaty. Therefore, he asserted, the ROK would have no guarantee of protection following an armistice, if the ROK now acceded to our request not to interfere with its implementation. He insisted that before the armistice the ROK Government needed full assurances on the treaty in order to have something with which to satisfy the Korean people. I replied that it was entirely out of the question for us to hold up the armistice pending ratification of the treaty. As we were willing to accept the good faith of the ROK regarding the armistice and other matters, so the ROK should accept our good faith that the United States Government would proceed as quickly as possible with the ratification of the treaty. Mr. Pyun further interjected the comment that the treaty would not get through the Senate this year since it would adjourn at the end of July, which would mean that the treaty would not even be considered by the Senate until sometime in 1954. He complained quite acidly that apparently the United States did not hesitate to leave the ROK for many months in indefinite and vague circumstances.
Mr. Young then pointed out to President Rhee and the Foreign Minister that such was not the case at all, in view of the fact that the Greater Sanctions Statement would be issued on or about the time the armistice would be concluded, and would be of tremendous importance not only to the United States but also to the ROK as a warning to the Communists in case of their breach of the armistice, of prompt reaction which might not be confined to Korea, He said he could well understand the Foreign Minister’s concern over lack of any concrete evidence of assurances against renewed Communist aggression, if none was at hand. However, he himself was convinced that the Greater Sanctions Statement would provide that assurance, while the United States Government would be processing a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea. It was Mr. Young’s opinion that the Greater Sanctions Statement was such an unprecedented undertaking and guarantee benefiting the ROK that the ROK Government could safely leave to the post-armistice period the negotiation and ratification of a Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States. Both President Rhee and Foreign Minister Pyun, who apparently had not thought of the Greater [Page 1329] Sanctions Statement in this respect, seemed to be somewhat relieved of their concern.
I again suggested to President Rhee that we conclude our understandings today. However, he indicated that he was not quite in a position to do so and repeated his request to see a draft of a Mutual Defense Treaty and to receive such assurances as could be obtained from the Senate leaders regarding Senate action on the treaty.
Comment: This was the most productive and businesslike talk that I had held with President Rhee since my arrival in Korea. I felt that this friendly and encouraging meeting had brought Rhee nearer agreement than he has ever been.
Note: A brief summary of this meeting is contained in Embassy telegram No. 13 from Seoul of July 4.4