Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

Washington, July 3, 1953—11 a.m.

Briefing by General Collins

General Collins: I was in Tokyo at the time of the meeting between Clark, Briggs, and Robertson, which resulted in the message Clark sent back here.² That message was fully concurred in by everybody concerned—Clark, Briggs, Robertson, and myself. The people out there said that up to now nobody had told Rhee that we would get out. Everybody out there was agreed that unless Rhee was told that we were willing to withdraw from Korea and convinced that we meant it, he would continue to oppose the armistice and to act in his present manner. I am personally convinced that this estimate is correct, but I understand the decision has been made that we are not prepared to withdraw³ and so that is that.

After my time in Tokyo I went to Taegu. I wanted to keep out of Seoul because I didn’t want to complicate Clark’s mission. He, after all, is our military representative and I thought that it would be harmful for me to be in Seoul while Rhee’s negotiations were going on. In Taegu I discussed with Herren the steps that we could take to make the zone of communications adequately secure in the event of trouble with the ROKs and also the steps that we could take to plant seeds of doubt in Rhee’s mind as to whether we were not planning to withdraw. I had already recommended to Clark that we move a regiment into the old Pusan bridgehead in order to bolster our position there. With Herren I discussed steps to increase the guards of the Chinese prisoners on Cheju-do against the possibility that Chiang Kai-shek’s urging of Rhee to release Chinese prisoners also might be acted on. Herren was also busy with measures to increase the American guards in the Korean camps. Before I left, Clark had decided to take steps to consolidate the POW Camps and this was going to be moved on about yesterday. Clark was somewhat nervous that Rhee might react in some way to measures to consolidate the camps, but since this was supposed to take place in the last couple of days and since Rhee has taken no action, I guess it will proceed without a hitch. From Taegu I went up to the front. I visited all the ROK Divisions except for the two which are in the corps on the northeast coast. I couldn’t get to them because of bad weather, in fact I was lucky to visit the divisions I did get to. On the front I saw absolutely no change in the relationship between ROK Divisions and our forces or between the ROK troops and our troops in the U.S. Divisions to which some ROKs are attached. They were going ahead in exactly the same friendly cooperation that has been the rule in the past. In Taegu, Herren had said that he noticed some slight change in the attitude of the civilian population. He didn’t think they were quite as friendly towards us as they had been before, but I personally didn’t notice any change and particularly at the front the ROKs are going ahead with us in the same way as they use to.

Herren says—and he, as you will remember, has been out in Korea before—that Rhee has consolidated his influence more than ever was the case before. Herren believes that Rhee has now complete control over the Korean people. I saw General Paek several times. Clark and Taylor both feel that although Paek is strongly pro U.S. that he is now completely circumscribed in his actions and that there is little that he could or would do to help us.

Mr. Matthews: Does that mean that he would obey Rhee’s orders no matter what happened?

General Collins: Yes, it probably does, except that I personally feel that he wouldn’t carry out orders to undertake hostile acts against U.S. forces. From the front I went down to Seoul. Rhee had asked me to come to dinner and everybody thought that I probably should go. After the dinner, Rhee came over and chatted with me and asked me how things were going at the front. I told him that I thought the ROK Divisions were doing very well but that some of the divisions had been under very heavy pressure and had given ground. Rhee said that the trouble was that the morale of the troops was poor as long as they just kept standing still, that if we really started moving forward they would have the spirit of victory. I didn’t see any point in arguing with him. I did mention to Pyun, … one thing that I had noticed was that one of the ROK Divisions is only 85 percent of strength and most of them are quite a ways under strength. Taylor told me there are 300,000 draft dodgers in Korea and that the ROKs have great deal of difficulty in keeping 16 divisions up to strength. I told Pyun that the ROK divisions were not up to strength and his answer was the same as Rhee’s, that it was difficult to keep them up to strength as long as the battle line stood still, that when we started moving forward there would be lots of volunteers. From Seoul I went back to Tokyo. In the meantime we got your message which authorized Clark to resume negotiations for an armistice but said that we could not get out of Korea. Both Clark and Murphy are convinced that there is a real probability that the Communists still want an armistice and they have some hopes that the Commies will go ahead with one. We were all agreed that it would be a good thing to go ahead with an armistice largely because if we did get an armistice it might serve in some way to protect our forces if the Commies had agreed to stop fighting. On the point of trying to convince the ROKs that we might withdraw, Clark thought it would be useful to call a meeting of the Senior Commanders. For psychological reasons we thought it would have a good effect if I was there too. It might give the Koreans occasion to worry about what we were talking about. At the meeting Clark agreed to send the rest of the 24th Division from Japan to the zone of communications in Korea. The suggestion was also made and agreed to that we should stop construction work on airfields and on the new military headquarters which we have been working on. The suggestion was made but decided against that we should stop shipping ammo to the ROK reserve depots. The reason for deciding against it was because of the effect such a move might have on ROK morale. It was also agreed that Taylor would call in the heads of the ROK Army, Navy, and Air Force and start talking with them about getting plans for a ROK takeover of the whole front in the event that there was no agreement with Rhee. It was also decided that after this Taylor would call in all his Corps Commanders, including two ROK Commanders, and talk with them along the same lines. This should give ROKs some pause, since it would really be impossible for them to take over and hold the whole front. Clark will be sending in a message⁴ which should get here probably today or tomorrow, outlining the other plans which they have gotten up.

The military situation in the front puts limits on what Clark can do. The Commies originally hit hard at our 3d Division, but although we took heavy casualties they didn’t get anywhere. After that they started hitting at the ROK Divisions which are on the boundary of the IX and X Corps. The X Corps consists of the 12th, 20th, and 5th ROK Divisions and 45th and 40th U.S. Divisions. The 12th and 20th ROK Divisions are new divisions. The 12th Division did pretty well for a new division, but the Commies hit it pretty hard and they hit the 20th Division even harder. The 20th Division had to give considerable ground and the Commies actually got into the main defensive positions. The supply difficulties for the X Corps are considerable and there is also difficulty in supplying the divisions on the eastern boundary of the IX Corps. Nevertheless the X Corps is on a line now which provides it a pretty good position. The Chinese are using two Armies against the ROK Divisions in the IX and X Corps already and there is pretty good intelligence they have another Army, the Sixteenth, which they could throw in. If they did put in a third Army, they might have a pretty good chance of exerting such pressure that they could force back the ROK Divisions and possibly break through to the Chun Chon Reservoir. This would have bad effects both militarily and psychologically. For this reason Taylor just isn’t in a position to pull out the 45th and 40th Divisions from the X Corps sector. He will need them there in case the Commies really attack in strength. What’s more Taylor now has only two divisions in reserve, the Marines and the 11th ROK. He is trying to bring in some replacements from the new ROK Corps which is on the northeast coast and he may have to put in some airborne elements as reserve. From the military point of view, therefore, there just is no possibility now of pulling out the U.S. 40th and 45th Divisions and probably there won’t be for some time. In summary, our military situation on the front is solid except for the general area of the boundary between the IX and X Corps. Here a situation could develop which would be not too good. The Communists’ artillery fire is heavier than it has ever been before and it is getting more accurate. I looked into the accuracy of their counter battery fire and it seems to be getting better and better. So we have to face heavy and accurate Communist fire which, as a matter of fact, very frequently is put down right on top of their own troops. Fortunately Commie tactics are just plain lousy. They put in one battalion right after another in a frontal assault with absolutely no deception or no imagination. They send one battalion, when it is wiped out they send another battalion against exactly the same position. Sometimes they send as many as 5 battalions in, one right after the other. They suffer extremely heavy casualties this way, although of course sometimes they eventually just overpower the ROKs by sheer force of numbers.

Mr. Matthews: Has the business with Rhee had any effect on the morale of our own troops?

General Collins: No, I don’t think so. I didn’t see any particular evidence of bad morale. Of course you see accounts in the press, but I think that is because our reporters over there are about as lousy as they come. The press has been overplaying our losses consistently. If we lose one outpost they talk about our losing the heights which dominate the road to Seoul and that kind of stuff. By and large the only things we have lost are outposts except in the Tenth Corps area. What’s going on here at home in the press is also dangerous. We obviously have to convince Rhee that nobody else is going over to talk to him if Robertson doesn’t get an agreement, otherwise Rhee will just figure he will get something out of whoever else is coming and won’t do business with Robertson. So, the report which our newspapers played up that there was going to be a further high-level mission certainly did no good.

Mr. Matthews: Has the Rhee business had any noticeable effect on the Korean labor forces which we use? Does there seem to be intimidation to keep them from working for us?

General Collins: So far there doesn’t seem to be anything much different. There have been no overt acts, but I asked our Port Commander at Inchon, who has 5,000 Korean laborers, whether he could count on them in case of a real showdown with Rhee. He said that he thought he couldn’t count on them and probably he would have to depend on using U.S. troops.

There is one point that has occurred to me that I don’t think you have made enough of. Rhee actually had no moral right and he had no legal right to release the POWs. The POWs were captured by the UNC, were in the custody of the UNC, and were prisoners of the UNC. When Won Yung Duk took action to release them he was really interfering in a military chain of command. I personally thought that if I had been there and in command, I would have pinched Won Yung Duk. I asked Clark whether he shouldn’t grab him even now. Clark said that he thought it would be a mistake because in the first place Won Yung Duk would be hard to get since he spends most of his time with Rhee at the Presidential Palace, but also arresting him would probably upset the applecart very badly in the rear areas. I do think, however, that when we are making statements about this thing that we should hammer very strongly on the point that Rhee and Won Yung Duk have no legal right to release POWs.

Mr. Johnson: If we assumed that within the next week or so the Commies should sign the armistice, how would the people out there foresee how the situation would develop?

General Collins: No one really thinks they can predict what will happen, but they are all in favor of signing an armistice. For one thing the fighting now is taking place on our side of the agreed line of demarcation. If the Commies signed an armistice, they would actually have to pull back from positions they now hold, so that unless they demand a completely new negotiation of the armistice line, they would have to give up all the territory they have taken.

Mr. Matthews: There are some areas, aren’t there, where the ROKs would have to withdraw?

General Collins: Yes, there are in the extreme northeast of the line but they are not important militarily and the Communists might not worry about it too much.

General Bradley: What happens if there actually is an armistice?

General Collins: The first thing I should think we would do would be to move the 40th and 45th Divisions over to the West so that we would have a solid U.S. front and possibly move the ROK Division from the present U.S. sector over to the East. Paek would then have to take over the right hand part of the front. If the ROKs attacked after an armistice they couldn’t get anywhere and the Commies know it.

Mr. Johnson: What if the Commies really counter attack and roll the ROKs back and keep on going?

General Collins: Clark has plans against almost every contingency. I don’t think I should go into them here because I imagine you gentlemen would just as soon know as little about them as possible, but he does have a whole variety of plans against almost anything that may happen. On some points he will need instructions from here, for example in the eventuality of complete withdrawal he would need instructions as to what percentage of equipment he was authorized to sacrifice. They figure that if he sacrificed 75 per cent of U.S. equipment it would take a minimum time of 45 days to withdraw. To get everything out would take between 6 and 9 months. There is, after all, only one port and that is Pusan. Inchon is not much use since everything has to be lightened.

Mr. Johnson: Are our reserve supplies concentrated about Pusan and Inchon?

General Collins: There are considerable dumps at Pusan and Inchon but we have other supply points quite a ways forward. The two most important of these are Chung Chon and Wonchu. There are only four important ammunition points which are under ROK control. Two of these are on the East coast right close to the shore and in case of emergency our Navy could cut them off very easily. One of the other two we probably also could grab if worse came to worse, so there really is only one ammunition point which is clearly under ROK control. All in all the ROKs probably don’t have more than a 10 day supply within their immediate control.

General Bradley: Some people have said that the ROKs are beginning to put stuff away in hiding. Do you think there is anything in that?

General Collins: I doubt it very much. I think we would know about it if they were doing it and I have heard no such indications. After all we still have American advisers with ROK units and I think we are in a pretty good position to know what is going on.

Mr. Matthews: Are the South Korean police interfering with our supply operations?

General Collins: Not so far, but they are after all under Won Yung Duk and we might run into trouble eventually.

Mr. Johnson: Going back to the assumption that we did sign an armistice. I take it that the thinking there is that we could probably handle the situation after an armistice. I am personally worried about the fact that an armistice would mean we would have to call off air and naval action and about what this would mean to our military position.

General Collins: I don’t think anybody is over optimistic but they do think they can handle what happens immediately after an armistice. If the Commies really hit hard after an armistice there would then be a new situation.

I should also say that Clark is not optimistic about the chances of the ROK Army taking action against Rhee. He and Taylor think there might be somewhat more possibility of the new Minister of Defense Sohn being more political minded and more apt to take a leading role if there were a showdown. But the very fact that Rhee has made him Minister of Defense may mean that Rhee is nervous about what he might do and wants to have him where he can watch him.

Admiral Fechteler: There might be something in that. Sohn was at the Coronation and was supposed to return to Korea by way of the U.S., but Rhee evidently ordered him to go back to Korea early and not to come by way of the U.S.

General Ruffner: Along the line of impressing the Koreans with the possibility of our withdrawal, has there been any thought of assembling amphibious and airlift capabilities?

General Collins: Yes there has and I think they are going to do something about moving some of the teams from Japan over to Korea.

The question was raised in one of the messages about the possibility of retaining a bridgehead. This would be very difficult. Actually the old Pusan bridgehead would have a longer front than the Kansas line. At present the battle line is about 150 miles long. The Kansas line is about 135 miles long. The old Pusan bridgehead was actually 150–155 miles long. The bridgehead would have to be held with our 7 divisions and the Commonwealth Division. This would mean that we would have 8 divisions for a 150 mile line. Against the level of forces that the enemy now has in Korea, it would be very difficult to hold a bridgehead, particularly since in the smallest perimeter that might be held at Pusan there would be no air base. The enemy would be free to move around and we would be exposed to air attack.

General Bradley: Does anybody have any further question?

Mr. Matthews: I don’t think we do. It’s been very helpful to us to get this fresh first-hand picture from Joe and we are grateful for it.

General Collins: I am afraid it isn’t very optimistic.

Mr. Matthews: What we need is not optimism but realism.

1. A note on the source text read: “Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”

   Of the JCS, Generals Bradley, Collins, and Admiral Fechteler attended as well as General Shepherd and Vice Chiefs Generals Hull and White. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. Sullivan represented the Department of Defense, Amory the CIA, and General Gerhard the NSC. In all, 21 persons were present at the meeting, where Korea was the sole topic of discussion.

2. Presumably the reference was to the meeting of June 27 and the message was joint State–Defense unnumbered telegram 281528Z, June 28, p. 1280.
3. See Eisenhower’s comments during the discussion on NSC 157 as reported in the memorandum of discussion at the 152d meeting of the NSC, July 2, p. 1300.
4. Reference was to CX 63500, July 5, p. 1332.