Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 152d Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 2, 1953¹

top secret
eyes only

July 2, 1953

The following were present at the 152nd meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, Presiding; The Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Director for Mutual Security; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the United States Representative to the United Nations (for Item 6); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Military Liaison Officer; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and Hugh D. Farley, NSC Special Staff Member.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion on item 1. “Port Security” and item 2. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

3. The Situation in Korea

The National Security Council:

Discussed the subject in the light of an oral briefing by the Chairman, JCS, in the military situation in Korea and the truce negotiations.

Note: A copy of the memorandum which General Bradley read to the Council, with regard to recent developments in the truce negotiations,² is filed with the minutes of the 152nd NSC meeting.

4. United States Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea (NSC 154; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 17, 1953³)

Mr. Cutler asked permission to read the interim courses of action proposed in NSC 154, in the course of which he indicated the amendments proposed by the Department of State and the Bureau of the Budget, either with or without the support of the Planning Board. With respect to paragraph 7, on the subject of continued controls on trade with Communist China, he asked Secretary Smith to explain this proposed State amendment, with which the Planning Board could not agree.

Secretary Smith replied that the proposed amendment was made simply in the interests of realism. Of course, he said, we would all like to see the embargo and controls on trade with Communist China extended, but the truth of the matter was that we would be very fortunate if we could induce our allies to hold the present line if a cease-fire materialized. Indeed, said Secretary Smith, he was now worried about the likelihood that some of the UN participants would try to wriggle out of joining in the so-called “greater sanctions” statement.

Mr. Stassen expressed agreement with Secretary Smith’s anxieties, and said he was sure that there would be a flood of trade by the Western powers with Communist China as soon as the truce occurred. The only way to stop this would be to institute a blockade.

The President expressed the view that as long as the Chinese remained in any part of Korea they were plain and simple aggressors. Despite the troubles he was causing us, the President said, he thought there was a lot to be said for Syngman Rhee. The real reason why we sought an armistice and why we do not wish to continue to fight, is that we know we cannot win a military decision in Korea without expanding the war beyond Korea. Nevertheless, as long as the Chinese are in Korea as aggressors, the President believed we were in a position to bring terrific pressure on our allies not to relax their controls on trade with China. He hoped we would be quite heavy-handed in exerting such pressure.

Mr. Stassen said that it still seemed to him a problem which could be solved only if our Navy intercepted ships carrying strategic materials.

The President disagreed, and said that this seemed to him an act of war, but Mr. Stassen replied that on the contrary it seemed to him merely a measure to carry out the UN resolution.

The President then inquired how our allies expect us to get the Chinese Communists out of Korea if we cease to bring any pressures on them.

Secretary Smith answered that the real truth was that our allies “didn’t give much of a damn.”

Mr. Cutler then suggested that in place of the language proposed by the State Department for a new paragraph 7,⁴ the Council adopt the language which it had agreed upon in dealing with this same problem at an earlier meeting.

General Bradley and Secretary Kyes pointed out that if this were adopted the Council would be choosing the weakest of the three possible statements.

Secretary Smith, however, summed up his own view that the Council was now engaged in semantics. We were all going to do the best we possibly could to keep the maximum control on all trade with Communist China. It therefore didn’t matter very much what form of language was chosen to express this objective.

Mr. Cutler then resumed discussion of the remaining courses of action.…

The National Security Council:

Adopted the interim courses of action contained in NSC 154, subject to the following amendments:

Page 2, paragraph 7: Delete the entire paragraph and substitute the following: “Continue intensified efforts to persuade our allies to refrain from relaxing their controls on trade with Communist China in the event of a Korean armistice.”

Page 4, subparagraph 14–b: Delete the entire paragraph and substitute the following: “Undertake with respect to the security of Korea, commitments (with or without reciprocal undertakings on the part of the ROK) similar to those undertaken by the U.S. under the treaties with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.”⁵

Page 4, subparagraph 14–c: Delete the entire paragraph and substitute the following: “Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea and continue to contribute to the economic recovery and rehabilitation of the Republic of Korea.”⁶

Page 5, paragraph 15: Delete the entire paragraph and substitute the following: “Assure ROK representation at the political conference, and full consultation with the ROK before and during the conference; and endeavor in the UN to obtain agreement to the establishment of a UN Delegation so composed as to give adequate recognition to the predominant U.S. and ROK interests.”⁷

Page 5, paragraph 17: Delete the entire paragraph.

Note: NSC 154, as amended, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 154/1.⁸

5. U.S. Objective With Respect to Korea Following an Armistice (NSC 157;⁹ Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 30, 1953¹⁰)

In explaining the background of the reference report, Mr. Cutler called attention to the emphatic views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff against the proposal for a unified and neutralized Korea which was recommended in NSC 157. He accordingly asked Secretary Smith if he wished to speak to the JCS objections.

Secretary Smith said that he had given these objections very careful thought, but believed that since his would be a rebuttal, General Bradley should be asked to speak first.

General Bradley admitted at the outset that it was conceivable that a neutralized and unified Korea might prove to be the only alternative open to us in the way of a political settlement. But in any case, he believed that it would be very bad tactics for the United States to go into the political conference with this proposal as its opening gun. General Bradley then proceeded to summarize and comment on the JCS written views.¹¹ He said that he, assumed, as did the Chiefs, that the proposed unified and neutralized Korea would be a disarmed Korea.

This assumption was immediately challenged by the President, who pointed to other instances, like Switzerland, of neutralized countries which were quite effectively armed. The President added that he felt there was a great advantage in countries like Sweden who were “neutral on our side”. The President said, however, that of course he would agree with General Bradley if NSC 157 actually contemplated that Korea would be a disarmed neutral state.

On the other hand, General Bradley replied that if Korea, though neutralized, was armed, many of the objections of the Joint Chiefs to this proposal would disappear.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that NSC 157 intended that the Korean state should indeed be armed, though the level of armament might have to be considerably lowered from its present status because of the economic difficulty of supporting an army of more than six or seven divisions.

Secretary Kyes expressed his concern lest the actual creation of a neutralized Korea serve as a precedent in other parts of the world. This might prove very dangerous to us in the long run.

The President stated that the essence of the problem was to see that any neutralized country had armed forces sufficient to provide it with a reasonable defense.

General Bradley again expressed the view that it would be very poor tactics for the United States to go into the political conference and bring up this proposal in the first instance, since the Communists would then take it as a point of departure to wring further concessions from the United States.

Secretary Smith then addressed himself to a discussion seriatim of the objections to this proposal which had been raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the first instance, he said, he was quite sure that Syngman Rhee was more than competent to handle the problem of Communist subversion if he were allowed any reasonable size police or paramilitary force. Rhee himself was quite adapt at using the methods which the Communists used. The situation might differ after his death, but Secretary Smith felt that this was a good gamble.

As to the second point raised by the JCS, with regard to the damage which such a proposal would do to the prestige of the U.S. and the UN, Secretary Smith expressed the view that this argument had no validity. On the contrary, a unified Korea was the ultimate objective of the U.S. and the UN, and even if Korea were neutralized the achievement would redound to the credit of our side.

On the third objection, as to the danger that this move would create precedents which the Soviets might cite for Germany, Austria or Indochina, Secretary Smith observed that Korean neutralization would only become a precedent if we permitted it.

On the fourth point, as to the loss to the United States of bases in Korea which were desirable for the defense of Japan, Secretary Smith again expressed doubts as to the validity of the argument, and pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not themselves always considered Korea to be a strategic area for the United States.

As for the fifth point made by the Joint Chiefs, viz., that the removal of our forces from Korea would increase rather than diminish our military commitments by adding to the forces we would have to maintain in Japan, Secretary Smith also expressed strong doubts, and noted that the removal of our forces would help to correct the current maldeployment of American forces in the Far East.

After Secretary Humphrey had noted how difficult it seemed to him it would be to keep Korea secure without a powerful army, the discussion shifted to the likelihood that the Communists would accept any such proposal as that recommended in NSC 157. On this point Secretary Smith noted the traditional Soviet sensitivity to the presence of alien military forces in areas adjacent to their borders. It was possible, accordingly, that they would buy such a proposal as this, though it would have to be made to them through devious channels rather than forthrightly and in the first instance by the United States. The proposal would, of course, involve free elections in both North and South Korea, and as a foregone result of such elections the appearance of a non-Communist government which would be anything but tasteful to the Chinese and Russian Communists. Still, for the reasons he suggested, Secretary Smith thought that there was a chance that this would be acceptable.

Mr. Dodge expressed anxiety as to the repercussions of the neutralization of Korea on a Japan which seems itself to desire the status of neutrality. Would the Japanese, he asked, use our action in Korea as an excuse to avoid rearming?

Secretary Smith replied that while this was certainly a possibility, he believed that Japanese pride alone would ultimately lead that country to rearm itself. He further pointed out the problem of arming the neutralized Korean state. Obviously the Communists would do everything in their power to prevent adequate armament for a neutralized Korea. The best we could hope for was a state with sufficient armament to be able to defend itself against internal subversion, although, added Secretary Smith, the limits of adequate forces against subversion could conceivably be stretched.

The President expressed the view that the Communists were quite likely to accept a certain level of armament in the neutralized state if we guaranteed to abandon and destroy our air bases there. He didn’t believe that the Communists had any concern whatsoever about the presence of infantry divisions and light armed forces in Korea. What they really feared was air attack and air attack only.

After further discussion of the question of arms for a unified and neutralized Korea, the President suggested that the policy state that the unified Korean state should possess armed forces “without offensive capabilities”.

To General Bradley, however, the important thing was a defensive capability for Korea sufficient to prevent a coup d’état. In other words, he added, a defensive capability sufficiently great so that if the Russians intended to seize control of the Republic of Korea they would be compelled to do so by open military aggression in violation of the commitments which they would have undertaken when the state was set up.

The President then suggested still another wording to deal with this problem: “A force capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power.” If, nevertheless, continued the President, the Chinese Communists did decide to attack the new state, they would be compelled to concentrate a considerable number of troops in order to carry out their intentions, and we would be forewarned as this concentration developed.

General Bradley then inquired again as to whether NSC 157 proposed that the United States go into the conference with this proposal as a starter, or whether it was, so to speak, a proposal to which we would retreat or seem to retreat in the course of the negotiations.

Secretary Smith replied that our position would be the latter, but the President added that you can say “retreat to it”, but this proposal actually offered the only real possibility of a political as opposed to a military settlement of the Korean problem.

Mr. Stassen inquired whether under this arrangement the United States could continue to supply a moderate level of military aid to the new Korean state.

The President pointed out the analogy of the Swiss, who purchase their own military equipment. It would come down, he thought, to what the Korean state could purchase in the way of military supplies, and that was certainly not going to be enough to scare the Russians or the Chinese.

The Vice President followed this with an inquiry as to the possibility of continued economic aid to Korea. Would all economic aid in a neutralized Korea have to be handled by the UN?

Secretary Smith replied to these inquiries by stating that it was the intent of NSC 157 to provide economic aid as well as some measure of military aid.

At this point in the discussion, Secretary Kyes said he wished to have the advice of the Council on a message which had just been received from Korea.¹² It involved the actions which it was proposed we should take in order to suggest to President Rhee that the United States would withdraw from Korea if he continued his present course of action. The immediate question, said Secretary Kyes, was whether Secretary Robertson should come home. While such a move might have its effect on Rhee, Secretary Kyes questioned whether Robertson should come home if in fact we were not proposing to get out of Korea.

Secretary Smith observed that there was some hope that the Communists would prove so intransigent that we would be placed in a position to blame them for a break in the armistice negotiations rather than to confess our failure to control Rhee and accept the blame for the break ourselves. Accordingly, he would advise against Robertson’s coming home at this time.

The President remarked that the toughest aspect of the situation is that if the armistice fails and we did have to resume fighting in Korea, we could no longer look upon Rhee as a reliable ally.

Apropos of Rhee, Secretary Smith inquired whether members of the Council would be interested in hearing Secretary Robertson’s personal summation of the assets and liabilities represented in Mr. Rhee.¹³ In response to the show of interest in the Council, Secretary Smith read Robertson’s very discerning study of the character of Rhee, indicating the curious mixture of obvious virtues and serious shortcomings.

The President then went on to suggest that we can do all sorts of things to suggest to Rhee that we might very well be prepared to leave Korea, but the truth of the matter was, of course, that we couldn’t actually leave. We must never say these things in words; we must only take actions which imply the possibility of our leaving, such actions as, for example, shifting military units or supplies, which might have some effect on the Korean people if not on Rhee himself. These were desperate moves to influence Rhee, but nothing else that we had done seemed to give any promise of influencing him.

The National Security Council:

a. Agreed to the following change in NSC 157, recommended by the NSC Planning Board:

Page 3, paragraph 8, line 13: After the words “security forces” insert the following: “and U.S. covert activity”.

b. Adopted the conclusion and recommendation contained in paragraph 9 of NSC 157, amended to read as follows:

“9. It is in the interest of the United States and should be the U.S. objective to secure a unified and neutralized Korea under a substantially unchanged ROK. Such an objective would entail Communist agreement to a unified Korea with U.S. political orientation, in exchange for U.S. agreement to remove U.S. forces and bases from Korea, and not to conclude a mutual security pact with Korea. This objective should also involve guarantees for the territorial and political integrity of a unified Korea under the ROK, the admission of the ROK to the UN, and ROK military forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power.”

c. Noted the desirability of continuing for the time being the mission of Assistant Secretary Robertson in Korea.

Note: NSC 157, as amended, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 157/1.¹⁴

6. Additional United Nations Forces for Korea (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 1 and 15, 1953;¹⁵ NSC 147 (paras. 168–180);¹⁶ NSC Action No. 759–b¹⁷)

In introducing this subject, Mr. Cutler referred to the action of the Council on April 8 [NSC Action No. 759–b],¹⁸ and called attention not only to Ambassador Lodge’s letter circulated on June 1, but also to the counterarguments set forth by the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget. He then invited Ambassador Lodge to comment on his position.

Ambassador Lodge opened his discussion by reading paragraph 12 of NCS 154, which the Council had just approved, which called for “a vigorous campaign to secure additional armed forces from other UN members for service in Korea.” It seemed obvious to him, said the Ambassador, that you couldn’t hope to conduct this vigorous campaign if you were going to insist on the dollar reimbursement policy now in effect. He furthermore doubted that there was any legal obstacle which prevented remitting actual payment by other nations as long as the principle of nominal reimbursement for logistic services was maintained. He then recapitulated the points that he had made in his letter in favor of a change in the reimbursement practice. He noted that he had received a quite unsolicited hint from Colombia that they were prepared to send additional forces if the United States would pay for their maintenance. He also noted that the Truman Administration had initiated the policy which required reimbursement, but had on September 27, 1952 indicated that it was not a matter of urgency to get additional UN forces. For the sake of political appearance, if for no other, the present Administration should change this. The two main reasons, however, for the course of action he was urging were (1) to lessen the burden on the manpower of the United States, and (2) to enhance the sense of collective responsibility. Many countries, the Ambassador insisted, could send men, but were wholly unable to support them in the field. It seemed to him shocking that only one of the Latin American countries had actually sent troops to Korea, and he queried whether this was not cause for a re-examination of our whole policy toward Latin America.

As for the argument that if we paid all the bills for the support of contingents of other countries we would be accused of employing mercenaries, Ambassador Lodge pointed out that this had no validity as long as we ourselves were involved in the military effort. After all, we were fighting for a cause and not for money.

Ambassador Lodge’s proposal seemed to him completely consistent with our foreign policy and our foreign situation generally. We have a very large preponderance of the world’s wealth, but only one sixth of the world’s manpower. Accordingly, it was nothing more than good sense to base our actions on this fact. Beyond this, the issue which he had raised seemed to Ambassador Lodge to be at the very heart of the whole problem of collective security. This was a political as well as a military war in which we were all engaged. For all these reasons, Ambassador Lodge insisted that his proposition needed a hard look by the Council.

The President then said he would like to hear from the Director of the Budget, since he had been somewhat surprised at the stand they had taken in opposition to Ambassador Lodge’s proposals.

Mr. Dodge replied that these proposals seemed to him to raise very difficult practical problems. Do we refund money to countries which have thus far paid the expenses of their forces in Korea? Do we cancel the commitments of nations which have obligated themselves to pay at some future time for the support of their forces? Certainly, he insisted, we have no legal authority to do this in the event of an armistice. Accordingly, Ambassador Lodge’s proposal would almost certainly require legislation.

After listening to these and other objections from Mr. Dodge, the President stated that he agreed with Ambassador Lodge that the significant cost in Korea is the cost in men and not the cost in money. The President then referred to the analogy of Lend-Lease during the second World War, when, he said, the United States provided the weapons and other nations for a long time provided the men. He added that he assumed that we would find a formula which would solve the legal and legislative problem.

Ambassador Lodge then addressed a question to the Council as to whether the reimbursement agreements between the United States and other nations had not all been drawn up on a separate and distinct basis in each case. The answer was in the affirmative, and Ambassador Lodge went on to point out that he was not advocating abolishing all reimbursement by nations which could pay, but merely not asking for reimbursement for other nations which could not pay.

The President expressed a complete willingness to contemplate going to Congress with a request for legislation if that were necessary to get over this hurdle. If we couldn’t trust Congress on a point so significant as this, we were in a very tough situation. He would argue before Congress in favor of Ambassador Lodge’s proposal on three very clear grounds: (1) It would help us financially because it would cost so much less to maintain foreign soldiers than American; (2) it would help us manpower-wise by enabling us to bring some of our forces home; and (3) it would help the solidarity of the United Nations by involving more nations in the common cause.

After Mr. Cutler had given the statistics as to those countries which had paid up in part or in full and those which had not, Secretary Smith read from a statement which presented the view of the Department of State. State in general wished the present policy to be modified in such a way as to give greater flexibility and authority to the Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury, who jointly negotiated the reimbursement agreements. Essentially he desired more latitude in order to secure more manpower. The present agreements and practices were too rigid. Secretary Smith admitted that the desired change might require legislation, but was sure that it would not be difficult to obtain such legislation from Congress, and concluded by expressing hearty agreement that the human commodity was by and large the most expensive commodity which we provided in Korea.

Secretary Humphrey then inquired whether there was any objection to making separate deals with separate countries.

Mr. Dodge replied that he could see no objection except the political one. Wouldn’t Canada be very angry if we let off certain countries from payment when Canada herself had paid up virtually in full for the support of her forces?

The President manifested impatience with this argument and said that if Canada objected to this proposal she could very well pay some of these people herself. Canada was in a position to help and ought to be willing to do so.

Ambassador Lodge called the Council’s attention to the President’s right to waive payment in certain cases, as he had done, for example, with India.

Secretary Kyes said of course the President had authority to make an exception, but the whole Defense Department position was not to make exception the policy rule.

With this argument the President likewise showed impatience. He said he felt the Department of Defense had every right to put in their oar on the question as to whether the troops which other nations might offer were good troops and in feasible units. Beyond this the matter was not primarily one for consideration by the Defense Department.

General Bradley replied to the President by citing two points: He admitted that the issue raised by Ambassador Lodge was primarily a political and fiscal issue, but he insisted that it nevertheless had military implications. If we pay the whole bill, he inquired, will we not be accused of converting the action in Korea from a UN to a U.S. action? That was a point which greatly worried the military.

The President replied that it need not worry the military as long as contingents from all these different nations were bleeding and dying under their own flags in Korea.

Ambassador Lodge added that after all, he was not proposing that the United States pick up the whole check, but that exceptions to reimbursement be made and that in general our policy in this matter be more lenient. As for the UN, it is only good as long as it is vigorously supported on a wide scale. He therefore was not greatly concerned with the fears expressed by General Bradley.

Secretary Humphrey then asked whether in point of fact we were not now dealing with a theory rather than a practice. He pointed out that we are not likely ever to collect from the U.K., from Turkey, Thailand, the Philippines, and many other nations. The truth of the matter, therefore, was that we were already making all kinds of exceptions.

As for General Bradley’s fear that the change proposed by Ambassador Lodge would lead to the conversion of the UN action into a U.S. action, the President inquired what would we do if these contingents from other nations walked out and went home. This would surely convert the Korean war into a U.S. war. In any case, said the President, we have talked enough about this problem, and he believed that Mr. Cutler should be asked to get together a group of representatives to work out a new formula which would meet the problem successfully.

The National Security Council:¹⁹

a. Discussed the subject in the light of Ambassador Lodge’s letter with reference to obtaining additional UN forces for Korea, transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 1, and his oral remarks at the meeting.

b. Agreed in principle that the present practice regarding reimbursement of the United States for logistic support of other UN forces in Korea (NSC Action No. 759–b) should be modified in the direction of Ambassador Lodge’s proposals.

c. Directed that a committee composed of representatives of the Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury, and of the Director, Bureau of the Budget, with Ambassador Lodge’s assistance, should prepare a new formula in accordance with b above with respect to the practice regarding reimbursement of the United States for logistic support of other UN forces in Korea, for early consideration by the National Security Council.

[Here follows discussion on items 7. “Report to the President by the President’s Committee on International Information Activities Dated June 30, 1953”; 8. “Security of Strategically Important Industrial Operation in Foreign Countries”; 9. “United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East”; and 10. “NSC Status of Projects”.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. This memorandum was drafted by Gleason on July 3.
2. A copy of this memorandum has not been found.
3. Ante, p. 1189. For text of NSC 154, see p. 1170.

4. The Department of State language was as follows:

   “Make every feasible effort to induce other free world countries, pending a settlement regarding Korea: (a) to maintain their current levels of controls and restriction of trade and shipping with Communist China and North Korea, including, where possible, extension of their embargo lists to include such items as are essential to maintain effectively current multilaterally agreed levels of controls; and (b) to tighten enforcement of such restrictions.” (Amendments Proposed by the Department of State to NSC 154, July 1, 1953; S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 154 Series)

5. This amendment was proposed by the Department of State.
6. Proposed by the Bureau of the Budget.
7. Proposed by the Department of State.
8. For text of NSC 154/1, July 7, see p. 1341.
9. Dated June 25, p. 1272.
10. Not printed, but see footnote 1, ibid.
11. The reference was to the memorandum by the JCS, June 30, p. 1288.
12. Telegram CX 63449, July 2, supra.
13. The reference was to telegram 1 from Seoul, July 1, p. 1291.
14. For text of NSC 157/1, July 7, see p. 1344.
15. Ante, pp. 1129 and 1177, respectively.
16. Dated Apr. 2; for text of paragraphs 168–171 and 173–180, see pp. 850–857.
17. For NSC Action No. 759–b, see the memorandum of discussion at the 139th meeting of the NSC, Apr. 8, p. 892.
18. Brackets in the source text.
19. The following three paragraphs constituted NSC Action No. 835; a record copy of which is in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.