795.00/7–253: Telegram
The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State
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021750Z. (Army Message) Repeated information CINCUNC for General Clark AmEmbassy Pusan. For the Secretary and Alex Johnson from Robertson.
After receiving letter from Rhee of July 1,2 I met with him this morning and emphasized points in Deptel 4.3 I greatly appreciate your prompt reply. As a result of conversation I propose to give him following letter and aide-mémoire on morning of July 3. Their purpose is to summarize our final position upon which we are endeavoring to obtain agreement. Would appreciate your comments niact.
Text aide-mémoire follows as concurred in by Briggs and Murphy:
“This aide-mémoire is intended to confirm the understandings which it is hoped can be reached by President Rhee and Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson, special representative of President Eisenhower, as a result of their conversations.
For its part the United States Government is prepared to take the following steps to assist the Republic of Korea:
- 1.
- In order to help defend the security and independence of the Republic of Korea from attack, the United States Government will undertake the conclusion of a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of Korea along the general lines of the present mutual defense treaty between the Governments of the United States and the Philippines. The United States Government is prepared immediately to begin negotiations to draft a mutual defense treaty. The ratification of such a treaty would be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States.
- 2.
- The United States Government will aid the Republic of Korea in strengthening and maintaining Republic of Korea armed forces to defend the security and independence of the Republic of Korea against attack. It is understood that Republic of Korea armed forces will include ground forces of approximately the level of 20 divisions, as well as supporting air and naval forces.
- 3.
- The United States Government will undertake an integrated program of economic assistance and logistical and other support to help the Republic of Korea in its efforts to improve the standards of living [Page 1313] of the people of Korea, to sustain Republic of Korea armed forces and to progress towards the goal of economic self-sufficiency. It is recognized that such a program would be subject to Congressional authority and appropriations.
- 4.
- After the signing of the armistice agreement the United States Government would be willing to have a high level conference with the President of the Republic of Korea or his representative at some intermediate point to confer on all aspects of our common objectives at the political conference to follow within 90 days after the effective date of the armistice agreement.
- 5.
- The United States Government agrees that the political conference to follow within 90 days after the effective date of the armistice agreement should seek promptly and vigorously to obtain the common objectives of a unified Korea and the withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces from Korea. If, at the end of 90 days after the opening of the political conference, it becomes clear that all attempts to achieve these objectives have been fruitless and that the conference is being exploited by the Communists mainly to infiltrate, propagandize or otherwise embarrass the Republic of Korea, the United States Government would be prepared together with the Republic of Korea to withdraw from the political conference; and thereafter the United States Government would consult immediately with the Government of the Republic of Korea to determine what courses of action should be taken in the light of the circumstances then existing to seek the unification of Korea.
In consideration and acceptance of the foregoing, the Government of the Republic of Korea would agree to take such measures as may be necessary on its part for the implementation of the above proposals of the United States, including the following measures:
- a.
- The Government of the Republic of Korea will cooperate with the United Nations Command in moving non-Communist Korean prisoners of war now in the custody of the United Nations Command from their present locations to the demilitarized zone, where they will be turned over to the neutral nations repatriation commission in accordance with agreed terms of reference and where they will be questioned in the presence, among others, of representatives of the United Nations Command and the Republic of Korea. Any Korean prisoners of war who desire to go back to Communist control shall be free to do so in accordance with the agreed terms of reference. Non-Communist prisoners of war who desire to reside in the territory of the Republic of Korea shall be released according to the agreed terms of reference and thereafter shall be free to proceed to any destination of their own choosing. In the case of the Chinese non-Communist prisoners of war now in the custody of the United Nations Command, the Government of the Republic of Korea will cooperate with the United Nations Command in turning them over to the neutral nations repatriation commission for disposition in accordance with the agreed terms of reference.
- b.
- The Government of the Republic of Korea will agree to continue its forces under the United Nations Command, which has the authority to conduct and conclude the hostilities, and is prepared to support the armistice agreement entered into between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and the commanders of the Communist forces. In the interests of the continued security of the Republic of [Page 1314] Korea, the Government of the Republic of Korea agrees that Republic of Korea armed forces will remain under the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, following the armistice, during the period of a political conference and as long thereafter as it is mutually agreed that such an arrangement is necessary.”
Text of my letter to Rhee follows:
“July 2, 1953.
My Dear Mr. President:
I wish to thank you for your letter of July 1. I greatly appreciate the opportunities you have afforded me for frank and friendly discussions with you and the Ministers of your Government. I earnestly hope that our conversations have eliminated many doubts and misunderstandings.
Your letter indicates that there is one major problem blocking agreement, and that if this problem is satisfactorily resolved, there should be little difficulty in reaching agreement on the other points at issue. I refer to the political conference to be convened within 90 days after the effective date of the armistice, to your request that its discussions be limited to a period of 90 days, and to your proposal for action in the event the conference fails to reach agreement upon a unified, independent Korea within the time limit specified.
I have already advised you upon the authority of President Eisenhower that, while we cannot impose a limit upon the discussions of other nations, we are prepared to agree with you that, if at the end of 90 days, our attempts to achieve agreement on an independent, unified Korea have been frustrated, and it has become clear that the conference is being used by the Communists to infiltrate, propagandize and otherwise embarrass the Republic of Korea, the United States Government would be prepared together with the Republic of Korea to withdraw from the conference and thereupon to consult immediately with the Republic of Korea to determine what course of action should be taken in the light of the circumstances then existing to achieve the unification desired.
In the last paragraph of your letter of July 1, you ask that under such conditions the United States give definite ‘pledges to resume fighting until the unification of Korea is accomplished.’
As I explained in our discussion this morning, President Eisenhower cannot legally make such a commitment. We are now in Korea as a member of the United Nations forces fighting aggression under authority of United Nations resolutions. The independent action by the United States Government which you propose would require a declaration of war. As you know, under our constitution only Congress has authority to declare war.
I urge you to consider the undertakings which President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles have authorized me to make to you. They are sent forth in the enclosed aide-mémoire. I am well aware that the situation now confronting us is not ideal either from your standpoint or from ours. However, I earnestly hope that it will be obvious to you that you would be in a much stronger position to achieve your objective for a unified, independent Korea working with us as your ally than you could possibly be in carrying on the struggle alone.
Sincerely yours, Walter S. Robertson.”