Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

FE files, lot 55 D 338, “South Korean Attitude Toward Armistice, July 1–15, 1953”: Telegram

The Commander in Chief United Nations Command (Clark) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, July 2, 1953—7:53 p.m.

CX 63449. Exclusive for Kyes. CGArmy Eight exclusive for Taylor. US Ambassador Seoul exclusive for Asst Secy of State Robertson. Ref DEF 942613.²

Appreciate the ideas expressed therein. My comments, based on prior study and on full consideration of views given in conference referred to in paragraph 2a below, follow. I also requested Robertson to give me his views on paragraph 6a, b and c. They are included in appropriate paragraphs of this message.

1. Comments on 6a.

a. It is my firm conviction, and has been for some time, that Rhee will continue to bluff, to delay, to embarrass and impede the conclusion of an armistice by all means at his disposal until it is made firmly and irrevocably clear to him that my government has made its maximum concessions. Though there is a considerable element of bluff it is not possible to predict how far Rhee may recede from his position, or to what extent he will go to obstruct the implementation of an armistice, but you can be certain that he will continue to embarrass us to the best of his ability both prior to and following an armistice if his major demands are not satisfied. How far he will go beyond that, Rhee himself is the only one who knows. I feel the President of the United States has made maximum concessions. The sooner Rhee knows this the better. I am convinced that as long as Rhee feels he can demand and obtain acquiescence from Washington that more authoritative emissaries be sent out, the more he is able to sabotage our efforts.

b. Robertson has been of inestimable value on his present mission. He has ably and courageously presented the position of our government. In this connection the ROKs are leaking to news channels, for purposes best known to them, that he has not been given sufficient authority. A UP dispatch today carries the following items: “It seems obvious that the Robertson mission is not sufficiently empowered to decide such important matters as the Korean Government’s demands, one pro-Rhee Korean official said. Another said that too many things are being referred back to Washington and complained that this makes the consultations drag on and consume time. These complaints were accompanied by indications the Koreans may be hoping Mr. Eisenhower will send a higher level delegation to confer with Rhee. Thus far there has been no hint as to whom the Koreans might like to see head such a delegation.” Additionally, a summary of information here indicates that Rhee has gained “much face” with the Korean masses for the way he has handled negotiations and the manner in which he has forced America to listen to his wishes.

c. Robertson’s comments on 6a are as follows: “It is my opinion Rhee is not bluffing, but is serious in his demands. I will advise more fully upon receipt of his message on morning July 1 regarding his latest ‘final position’ as described in my message No. 36 to Secretary of State, No. 27 to CINCUNC June 30.”³

2. Comments on 6b and c.

a. I concur in the action proposed therein. I feel such course of actions should follow our indications to Rhee that we have made the maximum concessions possible to his demands. I believe if he becomes aware through various actions of the UNC that it is contemplating withdrawing from Korea, Rhee will be tremendously impressed and such action may produce in the minds of the senior ROK Army officials the necessity of their doing something about it. In this connection, I called a conference of commanders at my headquarters 1 July. Among those attending were Weyland, Taylor, Briscoe and Kendall. Collins was also present. This conference served three important purposes: (1) The psychological effect of such a conference in Tokyo, at this time, upon the ROKs, (2) Obtained the benefit of General Collins’ presence during the conference, and (3) Thorough consideration and analysis of plans for initiating the action authorized me in the second sentence of paragraph 4, JCS 942368.⁴

b. Further details of the plan referred to above will be furnished you as they are formulated and prior to any implementation. I already have discussed this matter with Overesch of CIA, who will assist. The detailed development of this plan will be greatly influenced by the events of the next few days, If we obtain an armistice we are only over the first hump with Rhee. He will continue to be a troublemaker and we should continue our efforts to counteract his obstructionist tactics.

c. Here are Robertson’s comments on 6b: “I consider it inadvisable to make a threat of withdrawal unless willing to carry out threat. Rhee is a zealous, irrational and illogical fanatic and might well call our bluff.” I concur in Robertson’s conviction that it is dangerous to threaten without being able to follow through, but in spite of my government’s repeated decision that there is no intention of withdrawing from Korea, I still feel that the threat to do so, properly disseminated and coordinated with overt actions may be an advantageous course to pursue.

d. Robertson has indicated agreement with me that no action should be taken to implement suggestions in your paragraphs 6b and 6c until thorough preparation and coordination of plans.

3. Comments on 6d.

We had already given considerable thought to these suggestions, several of which are considered both appropriate and feasible. I have already moved the 187th Combat Team from Japan to Korea, the 34th Combat Team of the 24th Division is about to close in Korea, and the remainder of the 24th Division will follow. The 24th Division’s troops are available to Herren in the Communications Zone to tighten up security on critical installations. I have already indicated my intent to consolidate non-repatriate Korean POWs. US guards at these camps have been strengthened. As you know, in anticipation of an armistice, the movement of supplies and personnel to Korea has been stepped up in order that our strength on the effective date of the armistice would be 100% and that all available supplies would be on hand to assist in the equipping of the additional ROK divisions. It would be quite a reversal of trend to start the supplies back to Japan. However, we are giving this thought and I will keep you advised. Consideration has been given to concentrating UN forces on the battlefront. At present all but 2 US divisions are concentrated on the western portion of the front and I do not consider it advisable at this time to replace these 2 divisions with new ROKA divisions and weaken the eastern portion of the front along the critical avenue of approach in the X US Corps sector. This is a possibility, however, I have in mind for implementation when conditions permit. The plans for the activation of the additional 4 ROK divisions have been developed and some ROK Army officers have been involved in the plans. I am withholding announcement of the paper activation of these divisions and may be able to exploit psychologically the fact that consideration is being given to cancelling these plans.

4. With reference to paragraph 8 of reference message, I have partially covered my estimate above. I had already discussed this at length with Taylor and did so again today. Taylor’s opinion is that such action is possible but improbable. He feels, and I concur, that the ROK commanders we could trust are not willing to risk their necks unless there is a much stronger underwriting on the part of the US than we can provide at our level. In order to plant the thought that we may, by reason of ROK attitude, be forced to withdraw from Korea, I plan a series of 3 coordinated actions in Korea. The first action which is being taken is a tri-service meeting of US commanders in Korea to discuss course of action and plans to inject this thought. The second course of action is a high-level meeting of key US and ROK military commanders in Korea at which time Taylor will indicate frankly and confidentially to the ROK service representatives, that based on President Rhee’s oft expressed thought that the UNC may have to withdraw, they should have in mind the necessity of formulative plans for ROK to take over the entire front in the event of UN withdrawal from Korea. The third action will be conferences between the individual US and ROK service commanders, with other key personnel if appropriate. The manner in which we will proceed during these separate service conferences will be dictated by the developments at the preceding conferences.

5. With respect to your paragraph 7, I will keep you informed as to the steps I am taking along these lines.

a. I think it highly important that our efforts here be fully supported by high level statements from Washington and by keeping our government and appropriate foreign representatives informed.

b. With reference to State message 3072 and my message CX 63391,⁵ I strongly recommend that if Robertson’s mission is terminated without result Secretary Dulles’ letter be published, together with statements from other top governmental representatives. The publicity covering the recent negotiations has been one-sided, most of the information slanted and coming from Rhee. I think it high time that our side of the picture be told from Washington. In addition to the Secretary’s letter the statements should include the concessions we have made to Rhee’s demands, his unreasonable reply contained in his aide-mémoire of 28 June and Rhee’s obvious dilatory tactics designed to prolong negotiations and prevent an armistice. I think it might also be well to include in these statements an indication of the heavy casualties UNC has suffered while these negotiations have been stymied.

c. Consideration should also be given to withholding information on the recommendations of the Tasca mission or leaking information that his report will not be considered until developments in Korea justify further consideration. It may well be that the greatest pressure on ROK can be applied in the economic field.

6. Courses of action I plan to take under paragraph 3 and 4 above will follow as soon as they are thoroughly coordinated.

1. An information copy of this telegram was repeated to the JCS and passed to the Department of State.
2. Dated June 29, p. 1287.
3. In this telegram, Robertson strongly advised against publication of Dulles’ June 22 letter to Rhee for the time being because it was referred to in the press as a “secret” letter. To publish it would do more harm than good. The United States had nothing to lose and perhaps something to gain, Robertson argued, by waiting for Rhee’s statement of his final position promised for July 1. Briggs, Murphy, and McCardle concurred. (795.00/6–3053)
4. Dated June 25, p. 1271.
5. In telegram 3072 to Tokyo, June 29, the Department of State proposed to release Dulles’ letter of June 22 at the Secretary of State’s press conference on June 30, unless Robertson and Clark objected. (795.00/6–2953) In telegram CX 63391, June 30, Clark stated that although his personal inclination would be to publish, he was deferring to Robertson’s judgment and not advocating release of the letter at the time. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)